Examining the effect of health behaviors on wages and healthcare utilization in models with endogeneity by NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro & Trombley, Matthew J.
TROMBLEY, MATTHEW J., Ph.D. Examining the Effect of Health Behaviors on 
Wages and Healthcare Utilization in Models with Endogeneity. (2014) 
Directed by Dr. Christopher A. Swann. 186 pp. 
 
 
This dissertation contains three essays on applied health economics.  Although 
each essay is independent of the others, all three address the issue of estimating models 
where the relationship of interest is confounded by factors that are unobservable to the 
researcher.  The first essay is an econometric simulation study while essays 2 and 3 
address behavioral health topics. 
Essay 1 compares the accuracy and efficiency of parametric count data 
specifications paired with the Extended Olsen Model (EOM; Terza, 1998, 2009).  The 
EOM is a nonlinear instrumental variables approach that allows for consistent estimation 
of model parameters when the data suffer from binary endogenous switching (e.g., 
endogenous sample selection or endogenous treatment).  Count data models are 
ubiquitous in the health literature for estimating non-negative, discrete outcomes such as 
physician visits, hospital admissions, cigarettes smoked, etc.  Essay 1 provides insight 
into the model selection process by informing practitioners which specification is likely 
to provide the most accurate parameter estimates under a variety of data configurations.  
Essay 1 also demonstrates the applicability of the Conway-Maxwell Poisson (CMP), a 
flexible count model developed in the field of industrial engineering that has yet to be 
utilized in the economic literature. 
In Essay 2, I apply a count version of the Extended Olsen Model to estimate the 
relationship between marijuana use disorder (MUD) and ER visits among US Medicaid 
recipients.  This essay is the first in the literature to estimate the relationship between 
marijuana consumption and the demand for ER visits in isolation from other illicit drugs, 
thus providing an important addition to the ongoing policy regarding the potential 
relaxation of marijuana regulation.  This study is also the first in the illicit substance 
literature to use an instrumental variables count data model to estimate the full 
distribution of ER visits, thus accounting for unobserved factors that may be jointly 
correlated between individual propensity for MUD and demand for ER visits.  I fail to 
find a positive relationship between MUD and ER visits, instead uncovering suggestive, 
but inconclusive, evidence that MUD and ER visits may rather be negatively correlated. 
Essay 3 considers the relationship between wages and obesity.  Although prior 
literature has firmly established a negative relationship between wages and obesity, it is 
equivocal with regard to the underlying pathway(s) through which obesity results in 
lower wages.  Using firm-level data that gives me unique access to proxies for 
productivity and discrimination against obese individuals, I find that inputs to 
productivity, particularly health, are important confounders of the wage-obesity 
relationship.  I fail to find any evidence of discrimination against obese employees, but I 
do find that among females the negative relationship between wages and obesity exists 
only among mothers. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
ESSAY 1: EFFICIENT ESTIMATION OF PARAMETRIC COUNT MODELS 
WITH ENDOGENEITY: A MONTE CARLO ANALYSIS 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Count data regression models are a popular method of estimation when the 
outcome of interest assumes only nonnegative integer values.  The standard specification 
for count data is the Poisson distribution.  Efficiency of a Poisson estimator requires the 
restrictive assumption that the conditional mean equals the conditional variance: the 
assumption of equidispersion.  This assumption is tenuous in most situations, and much 
of the count modeling literature consists of refinements to the basic Poisson in an effort 
to provide a more flexible, and therefore efficient, fit for count data that are not 
equidispersed. 
One issue that has received less attention is the modeling of count processes in the 
presence of endogenous switching.  Endogenous switching models are appropriate when 
(a) the outcome of interest occurs as one of two regimes, determined by a binary 
“switching” variable, and (b) the switching and outcome variables are correlated through 
unobserved confounders.  The following study utilizes Terza’s (2009) Extended Olsen 
Model (EOM) in order to account for endogenous switching in either of its two main 
incarnations: sample selection or endogenous treatment.  We compare the performance of 
the standard Poisson model to several generalizations, including the negative binomial 
(NB), restricted generalized Poisson (RGP) and the Conway-Maxwell Poisson (CMP).  
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Unlike the popular NB model that can fit overdispersed data (variance exceeds the mean) 
but not underdispersed data (mean exceeds the variance), the RGP and CMP are able to 
fit data under either dispersion condition. 
The RGP has featured sporadically in the economics literature (Price; 2009; Wang 
& Famoye, 1997) but failed to catch on as an alternative to the NB or Poisson 
specifications, likely due to the restricted range of underdispersion it is able to fit, and its 
similarity to the NB model in the case of overdispersion.  To date, the CMP has not 
penetrated the econometric literature, although it is increasingly applied in other 
disciplines.  Consequently, several papers have discussed the performance of the CMP 
relative to other models (Francis et al., 2012; Sellers & Shmueli, 2010; Zou, Lord, & 
Geedipally, 2011).  However, no study has yet investigated the efficacy of the CMP or 
RGP in the context of endogenous switching.  The purpose of this paper is to present the 
EOM framework, and compare the performance of the relatively unknown RGP and 
CMP to the widely used NB and Poisson models under conditions of endogeneity. 
Results suggest that in the case of endogenous treatment, the new CMP model is 
most robust to misspecification, and, in general, provides both the best overall fit of the 
data and the minimum bias of the treatment effect estimates.  However, the model 
typically performs poorly in accurately estimating coefficient values.  The NB and RGP 
models both perform well in the case of endogenous sample selection, and either is 
preferable to the CMP in cases of sample selection with positive dependence.  However, 
the CMP is the superior model in situations of negative dependence in both the 
endogenous treatment and endogenous sample selection cases.  The standard Poisson is 
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the least robust of the four models, performing relatively poorly when the data are not 
generated by a pure Poisson process. 
2. Parametric Count Models 
2.1. Poisson Specification and Dependence 
The standard econometric model for count data is the Poisson distribution.  The 
Poisson probability mass function (PMF) can be expressed as: 
 
P(Y = y|X) =  e
−λλy
y!
 y = 0, 1, 2 . . . (Eq. 1) 
 
where E[Y | X] V[Y | X] λ exp(Xβ)= = = , X is a (n x k) vector of covariates, and β is a (k 
x 1) vector of parameters to be estimated.  The primary shortcoming of the Poisson 
specification is the assumption of equidispersion, i.e., that the conditional variance is 
equal to the conditional mean.  Provided the conditional mean is correctly specified, 
Poisson estimates retain their consistency if this assumption does not hold.  However, the 
precision of the estimates is diminished, and making economic inferences may become 
problematic (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). 
The assumption of equidispersion is identical to the assumption of independence 
of the events.  The independence assumption requires that the probability of successive 
events (e.g., physician visits) is conditionally independent of the number of events that 
have previously occurred (e.g., previous physician visits.) (This refers to the 
independence of events comprising a single count, rather than independence of 
successive counts over time.)  If prior events make successive events more likely, then 
the counts are said to have positive occurrence dependence, which results in 
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overdispersion: a variance greater than the mean.  If prior events make successive events 
less likely, then the counts are said to have negative occurrence dependence, which 
results in underdispersion: variance less than the mean (Winkelmann, 2008).1  The 
Poisson is thus troubling from a theoretical standpoint since any individual heterogeneity 
that is not controlled for by X will introduce dependence between outcomes, even if the 
heterogeneity is exogenous.  The potential problem with the Poisson then is not just that 
it is too restrictive of a statistical model to perfectly fit the data, but also too restrictive of 
a theoretical model to fit most economic events. 
2.2. Individual Heterogeneity and Dispersion 
One way to model overdispersion is to introduce a stochastic error term.  As 
mentioned previously, count regression typically assumes that the expectation of Y 
conditional on X is an exponential function of a linear index: E[Y|X] = exp(Xβ).  
However, it is standard econometric practice to model the linear expectation of Y as 
having an additive error, such that: E[Y|X] = exp(Xβ+ε).  The “unobserved 
heterogeneity” ε introduces positive dependence between outcomes since it increases the 
probability of all positive realizations of Y but is not conditioned out of the expectation 
by X.  Moreover, exponential transformation of the error will manifest as a positive 
                                                          
1 Another closely related statistical framework considers duration dependence rather than occurrence 
dependence.  In this case duration refers to the amount of “time” elapsed between successful outcomes (i.e., 
a count of failures), where “time” is measured as the number of binary draws from a distribution that could 
result in success or failure.  As discussed in Winkelmann (2008), the statistical consequences of this 
framework are essentially the same as occurrence dependence.  We choose to use the occurrence 
framework for the remainder of the study with the opinion that dependence of occurrence rather than 
duration is a more intuitive way to understand the relationship between count outcomes.  
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value, resulting in a variance larger than the mean.2  This helps demonstrate the 
relationship between positive dependence and overdispersion. 
  Models of continuous, unobserved heterogeneity are known as continuous 
mixture models, because they are generated as a mixture of a Poisson process and a 
second, continuous, positive distribution (typically Gamma or log-normal.)  The marginal 
density of Y can be recovered by integrating out ε over its assumed distribution, in which 
case the independence assumption is restored. 
 Practitioners typically avoid this necessity by assuming that the unobserved 
heterogeneity follows a gamma distribution.  Doing so allows for a closed-form solution 
to the marginal density of Y that may be expressed as 
 
 P(Y = y|X, ν) =  λ
y
y!
Γ(ν+y)
Γ(ν)Γ(y+1)
� λ
ν+λ
�
y
 (Eq. 2) 
  
The result is the popular Negative Binomial (NB) specification, which includes an 
additional parameter ν that models overdispersion, even if the assumed data generating 
process does not involve continuous heterogeneity.  ν is constrained to be ≥ 0, with the 
standard Poisson nested at ν = 0.  The conditional mean remains identical to the Poisson 
specification, but the variance is now permitted to deviate from the mean and may be 
expressed as Var[Y|X,ν] = λ(1+ν-1λ).  Although frequently appearing in the literature, the 
                                                          
2 The error is sometimes modeled as a multiplicative error, with mean 1, expressed as E[Y|X]=exp(Xβ)u.  It 
may be more sensible to use this notation in the case of a positively distributed error such as the Gamma.  
However, since exp(Xβ)u = exp(Xβ+ ε) with ε = ln(u) and E[ln(u)] = 0, the two notations are  essentially 
equivalent.  Rather than juggle two conventions I choose to use the additive linear error for parsimony with 
standard linear models. 
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NB is limited to modeling overdispersion, where the variance exceeds the mean.  If data 
are underdispersed, the NB will collapse to a nested standard Poisson. 
2.3. Count Models with Statistical Dependence 
Another group of count models includes an additional parameter that allows 
models to account for the variance of Y without making an assumption about the 
distribution of the error.  One example that is flexible enough to handle both over- and 
underdispersion is the restricted generalized Poisson (RGP) model (Famoye, 1993).  The 
PMF of the generalized Poisson model can be expressed: 
 
 P(Y = y|X, ν) =  � λ
1+νλ
�
y (1+νλ)y−1
y!
exp �−λ(1+νy)
1+νy
� (Eq. 3) 
 
with the dispersion parameter ν restricted to the range [min(-1/max(λ),-1/max(Y)),1), 
where λ is the conditional expectation of Y.  ν > 0 indicates the data are over-dispersed, 
while ν < 0 indicates under-dispersion: the standard Poisson distribution is nested at ν = 
0.  As in the case of the NB model, the conditional mean of Y remains the same as the 
Poisson specification and the variance is now a function of both λ and ν: V[Y|X,ν] = 
λ(1+νλ)2.  Although the RGP can model underdispersed data, the range of 
underdispersion it can fit is limited to the value min(-1/max(λ),-1/max(Y)).  This 
restriction is set because for values of ν < 0, the CDF does not sum to one.  So long as ν 
is constrained to fall within the restricted range, the truncation error will only be 
approximately 0.5%, and estimates will be consistent.  However, if the true value of ν 
falls below the restriction, then the size of the error will increase to the point that the 
model fails to converge.  This limitation means that the magnitude of underdispersion the 
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model can handle is inversely related to the maximum value of Y.  This is often not 
problematic as higher underdispersion typically results in shorter right tails of the 
distribution.  However, in cases where there is both overdispersion from unobserved 
heterogeneity, and negative statistical dependence, the RGP may have trouble fitting the 
data, an outcome that will be explored in Section 5.4. 
Another model of statistical dependence is the Conway Maxwell Poisson (CMP).  
The CMP was formulated by Conway and Maxwell (1962) in the context of queuing 
systems for engineering applications.  A reformulation of the CMP in the regression 
context was provided by Shmueli, Minka, Kadane, Borle, and Boatwright (2005), 
opening the door for additional applications of the model.  Recent analyses include the 
modeling of automobile accidents (Lord, Geedipally, & Guikema, 2010; Lord, Guimeka, 
& Geedipally, 2008), risk analysis (Guikema & Goffelt, 2008), and customer behavior 
(Borle, Dholakia, Singh, & Westbrook, 2007), among others (Sellers, Borle, & Shmueli, 
2011).  Despite the increasing popularity of the model, it has yet to be utilized in the 
economics literature. 
The CMP is a straightforward extension of the standard Poisson, with pmf 
 
 P(Y = y|X, ν) =  λ
y
(y!)νZ(λ,ν)
        for y = 0, 1, 2 . . .  (Eq. 4) 
 
where ν > 0, and Z(λ,ν) = ∑ λ
j
(j!)ν
∞
j=0 .  Like the NB and RGP, the CMP nests the standard 
Poisson (ν = 1).  In addition, the CMP nests two other common specifications: the 
geometric (ν = 0, λ < 1), and Bernoulli (ν → ∞ with probability λ/1+λ; Shmueli et al., 
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2005).  The nested Poisson allows for a simple statistical test of whether or not the 
specification varies significantly from the standard Poisson.  Unlike the RGP, the CMP is 
theoretically unlimited in the range of underdispersion it is able to fit and is even capable 
of modeling binary outcomes, giving it an unmatched flexibility among fully parametric 
models.  The CMP also differs from the NB and RGP models in that the dispersion 
parameter ν enters the expression for conditional variance, in addition to conditional 
mean. 
 According to Schemueli et al. (2005) the first two moments of the CMP are 
 
 E[Y|X, ν] =  ∂lnZ
∂lnλ
=  λ ∂lnZ
∂λ
 (Eq. 5) 
 
and 
 
 V[Y|X, ν] =  ∂
2lnZ
∂2lnλ
≈  λ ∂E[Y|X,ν]
∂lnλ
. (Eq. 6) 
 
An obvious concern with the CMP specification as presented is that Z(λ,ν) is an 
infinite summation with no closed form.  There are two possible approaches to this issue.  
The first is to use an approximation for Z(λ,ν) provided by Minka, Shmeuli, Kadane, 
Borle, and Boatwright (2003) who demonstrate that  
 
 Z(λ, ν) ≈  
exp �νλ
1
ν�
λ(ν−1)/2ν(2π)(ν−1)/2√ν
 (Eq. 7) 
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Given 7, the first two moments may then also be approximated: 
 
 E[Y|X, ν] =  λ1/ν − v−1
2ν
 (Eq. 8) 
 
and 
 
 V[Y|X, ν] =  λ
1/ν
ν
. (Eq. 9)  
 
The approximations come at the cost of accuracy.  Minka et al. (2003) warn that the 
approximated moments will not hold if ν > 1 (negative dependence) or λ < 10ν (small 
mean with marginal positive dependence).  The approximation for Z(λ,ν) is also biased.  
The approximated value is generally within 5% of the true value.  However, if λ falls 
below 1, or if the data are highly overdispersed (ν < 0.5) the absolute percentage error 
increases rapidly, ranging from 6% to 100% (Shmueli et al., 2005).  If this approximation 
is used in the calculation of the likelihood function, coefficient estimates will become 
biased, further undermining the estimated relationship between X and Y.   
 An alternative approach is to estimate Z(λ,ν) directly.  Due to the factorial term in 
the denominator, the summation is convergent.  This allows Z(λ,ν) to be calculated to 
within some acceptable truncation error.  Furthermore, since the Z-function is 
convergent, the derivative of the summation can be expressed as the summation of the 
derivative, which allows E[Y|X,ν] to be computed to within an acceptable truncation 
error, as well, so that 
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 E[Y|X, ν] =  λ�
∑ jλ
j−1
(j!)ν
∞
j=1
∑ λ
j
(j!)ν
∞
j=0
� (Eq. 10) 
 
2.4. Other Count Models 
 The literature contains several other parametric approaches that can model both 
over- and under-dispersed count data.  Efron’s (1986) double-Poisson model includes an 
additional parameter that can fit both types of dispersion.  However, the double-Poisson 
is problematic in that the PMF is not defined when Y = 0.  Additionally, the CDF of the 
model is not guaranteed to sum to one.  Although the double-Poisson has seen a great 
deal of application in the statistical literature, the model has failed to catch on in the 
applied econometrics literature, and we omit this model as a comparison against the 
CMP. 
Another branch of the parametric literature involves modeling dispersed Poisson 
data using a polynomial expansion around the standard Poisson distribution.3  The 
primary benefit of this class of models is the relaxing of the assumption that the expected 
value of Y is an exponential function of a linear index, i.e., that E[Y] = exp(Xβ+ε).  The 
converse is that the moments of the distribution become more complex, as does the 
computation of corresponding policy effects and standard errors.  The two main 
drawbacks are the additional parameter that must be estimated for each increased order of 
polynomial, as well as the fact that the correct polynomial order is unknown to the 
researcher a priori, and must be determined using various fit statistics.  Additionally, 
                                                          
3 A similar, semi-parametric approach uses series expansion to approximate the density of the unobserved 
heterogeneity, maintaining the assumption of a linear exponential index.  See Gurmu, Rilstone, and Stern 
(1999) for an example. 
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polynomial expansion models are not amenable to integration due to the higher order 
values of the expectation that must be computed.  This makes adapting the model to 
account for unobserved heterogeneity problematic.  Although a notable segment of the 
literature, polynomial expansion methods have not gained the traction enjoyed by the 
standard Poisson or continuous mixture models, particularly in the health 
economics/health services literature, and we also do not consider these models for 
comparison.  
 There are several special cases of count outcomes that appear frequently in the 
literature, that we do not consider in this study.  The finite mixture model assumes that 
the data belong to one of K discrete classes with unknown probability πk, each of which 
has a given count specification fk(Y|X) (Winkelmann, 2008).  The Zero-Inflated model 
fits count data when zeros may occur due to one of two processes: a binary 
“participation” process, as well as zeros occurring naturally as part of the assumed count 
specification (Lambert, 1992; Mullahy, 1986).  Endogenous sample selection is a special 
case of the Zero-Inflated model, where the errors of the participation equation and the 
count outcome remain correlated after controlling for observables.  The Zero-Inflated 
model is closely related to the Hurdle model (Mullahy, 1986).  The Hurdle model also 
assumes a binary determinant of participation: however, the Hurdle model assumes that 
all zeros are due to non-participation, while the count outcome is a truncated distribution 
that generates only non-zero values.  
These special cases provide an extension of a given count distribution (e.g., 
Poisson, CMP) rather than a replacement for them.  For this reason we do not compare 
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behavior of the various specifications under each of these frameworks (with the exception 
of the special Zero-Inflated case of endogenous selection).  Although there may be some 
merit in such an analysis, comparison of each count model under every scenario in the 
literature lies outside the scope of this study.   
3. Count Models in the Full-Information Extended Olsen Framework 
A common difficulty faced in applied research is the presence of endogeneity in 
the model.  No matter how robust, a count probability mass by itself is unable to correctly 
model the outcome of interest if the true data generating process suffers from 
endogeneity.  A frequently encountered incarnation of the endogeneity problem is the 
presence of a binary endogenous switching variable (Terza, 2009).  Switching refers to a 
situation where the outcome of interest, Y, occurs as one of two possible values 
depending on the value of a binary “switching” variable, Xs.  For instance, researchers 
interested in estimating the effect of insurance on the number of physician visits would 
have to account for the fact that they are unable to observe the number of physician visits 
that would have occurred if individuals were in the opposite insurance state from the one 
in which they are observed.  If the probability of obtaining insurance is related with the 
number of physician visits in ways unobservable to the researcher (e.g., underlying 
health) then the switching is said to be endogenous.  
Switching models are a variant of the Roy Model, where the observed outcome Y 
depends on the value of a latent variable Xs*.  Two common manifestations of switching 
are sample selection and treatment.  Sample selection occurs when Xs places Y into one 
of two regimes so that Yi = y if Xsi = 1 and Yi = 0 if Xsi = 0.  In the treatment case, Y 
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occurs as being influenced by Xs(treated) or uninfluenced by Xs (untreated).  Then Yi = 
y1i if Xsi = 1, Yi = y0i if Xsi = 0.  In both instances of switching, the value of Y that could 
have occurred but did not, remains unobservable.  
Consistent estimation of Y requires accounting for the relationship between Y and 
Xs.  In the endogenous switching case, Y and Xs are correlated through both observed and 
unobserved attributes, so that controls for observable characteristics are insufficient to 
consistently estimate Y.  The following provides a framework for estimating count 
models in the presence of either endogenous sample selection or endogenous treatment. 
 Let Xu be an unobserved confounder through which Xs and Y are related.  We 
formalize the relationship between Xs and Xu as: 
 
 Xs = I(Wα + Xu > 0) (Eq. 11) 
 
Where W = [Xo W+], Xo is an observed vector of covariates, W+ is a vector of identifying 
instrumental variables, and (Xu|W) is a known binary distribution.  The count PMFs 
remain as before, except now 
 
 λ = exp(Xoβo + Xuβu). (Eq. 12) 
 
 Let f(Y,Xs) refer to the joint distribution of the outcome of interest (Y), and the 
(possibly endogenous) switching variable (Xs).  We can express the joint distribution of 
the two variables as 
 
 f(Y, Xs|W) =  ∫ f(Y, Xs, Xu|W)d(Xu|W) = ∫ f(Y|Xs, W, Xu)f(Xs, Xu|W)d(Xu|W).
∞
−∞  
∞
−∞   (Eq. 13) 
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Since (Xu|W) is a known distribution, the form of f(Xs,Xu|W) is also known: 
 
 f(Xs, Xu|W) = Xsg[Xu>−Wα](Xu|W) + (1 − Xs)g[Xu<−Wα](Xu|W),  (Eq. 14) 
 
where g[q](Xu|W) is the conditional distribution of Xu over the interval q.  Using (Eq. 13) 
and (Eq. 14) we obtain 
 
f(Y, Xs|W) =  Xs � f(Y|Xs, W, Xu)g(Xu|W)d(Xu|W)  
∞
−Wα
 
 +(1 − Xs)∫ f(Y|Xs, W, Xu)g(Xu|W)d(Xu|W) 
−Wα
−∞  (Eq. 15)  
 
in the case of ET, and 
 
f(Y, Xs|W) =  Xs ∫ f(Y|Xs, W, Xu)g(Xu|W)d(Xu|W)  
∞
−Wα + (1 − Xs)G(−Wα)    (Eq. 16) 
 
in the SS case, where f(Y|Xs,W,Xu) is the PMF of the specified count distribution, with λ 
expressed as in (12).  The likelihood function follows simply from (15) or (16): 
 
 L(θ|Y, Xs, W) = ∏ f(Yi, Xsi|Wi)ni=1  (Eq. 17) 
  
 The integration of the error term out of the PMF of Y is analogous to the 
integration of the heterogeneity term in the continuous mixture model.  However, Terza 
(2009) demonstrates that under the EOM framework, the exact form of the error of Y 
need not be specified so long as it is a linear function of Xu conditional on W.  Our model 
thus fits dispersion along two dimensions: by modeling unobserved heterogeneity (Xu) 
that is jointly correlated with Xs and Y, as well as modeling exogenous dependence with 
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the parameter ν.  Lastly, assuming the vector of instruments is valid, the estimated value 
of βu allows for straightforward testing of the null hypothesis that Xs is exogenous. 
 Since Xu only appears in the λ term, the expectation of λ can be recovered by 
integrating out Xu, so that 
 
 λ� =  ∫ exp (Xoβ�o +  Xuβ�u
∞
−∞ )g(Xu|W)d(Xu|W) (Eq. 18) 
 
If we assume that g(Xu|W) ~ N(0,1) then we can rewrite (1.18) as 
 
 λ� = exp�Xoβ�o� exp �
β�u2
2
� (Eq. 19) 
 
(We maintain the assumption of standard normally distributed errors for the remainder of 
the paper.  Proof of (Eq. 19) is contained in Appendix A).  Now E[Y|Xo,Xu,ν] can be 
expressed as in (Eq. 5) or (Eq. 8) where λ� replaces λ in the formulation. 
4. Estimating Policy Effects in the Extended Potential Outcomes Framework 
 Coefficient estimates of count data models are of limited usefulness, providing 
only the direction of the relationship between explanatory variables and the outcome of 
interest Y.  Often, of primary consideration to researchers is estimating the effect that the 
change in a specific variable exerts on Y.  Particularly, we assume that studies are 
focused on a certain variable (the policy variable - Xp) that is at present, or in the future 
will be, under the control of a policy-making entity.  In standard econometric models, 
estimating the effect that a change in Xp would have on Y (the policy effect - PE) is a 
straightforward exercise.  In the case of endogenous switching, outcomes occur in one of 
two regimes (e.g., treated or untreated) and directly observing outcomes in the opposite 
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regime from that which occurred is not possible.  Furthermore, assignment to regimes is 
considered to depend on both observed (Xo) and unobserved (Xu) confounders.  
Correcting for endogenous assignment is necessary to produce unbiased estimates of 
policy effects.   
 In Terza’s (2012) Extended Potential Outcomes Framework, the expected value 
of Y is said to be “mean causal” if we can assume that the vector V = [Xo, Xu] is 
comprehensive: i.e., that V comprises all possible confounders for Xp and Y.  In this case, 
conditional on V, differences in the mean observed value of Y can be exclusively 
attributed to differences in the value of Xp.  In the extended POF, the policy effect of 
interest can be broadly stated as the difference between the distributions of YXp1  and, 
YXp2where Xp1 and Xp2 represent well-defined and distinct counterfactually imposed pre- 
and post-intervention versions of the policy variable, respectively.4  Without loss of 
generality, we represent the policy increment and pre- and post-policy scenarios as Δ, 
Xp1 =  Xp∗  and Xp2 =  Xp∗ +  ∆, respectively, where Xp∗  is a counterfactual version of Xp 
representing a (possibly degenerate) random variable.  For the remainder of the 
discussion we will focus on the following average incremental effect (AIE) as the policy 
effect of interest 
 
 AIE(∆) = E �YXp∗ +∆� − E �YXp∗ � (Eq. 20) 
                                                          
4 Simply put, the framework involves a thought experiment where we begin by assuming everyone in the 
population has Xp = Xp1 (a specific value or distribution of the treatment variable), with corresponding 
outcome YXp1.  We then assume that everyone is shifted to Xp = Xp2 by some exogenous force, and note the 
corresponding outcome YXp2.  With the assumption that V is comprehensive, the difference between YXp2 
and YXp1 can be casually interpreted as the effect of the “treatment” (i.e., the shifting of Xp1 to Xp2).  This 
reflects the total effect of both “prevention” (all individuals in the sample reporting Xp2 remain at Xp2) and 
“treatment” (all individuals in the sample reporting Xp1 are shifted to Xp2.) 
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 Expression (20) can be generalized to include binary or continuous changes in 
Xp1.  For example, when the policy variable is binary, if we set Xp∗  = 0 and Δ = 1 then 
(20) measures the average treatment effect (ATE).  When the policy variable is 
continuous and Δ approaches 0 then 
Δ 0
lim (AIE(Δ) / Δ)
→
 represents the average marginal 
effect (AME) of an infinitesimal change in the policy variable 
In the case of endogenous treatment, the endogenous variable Xs is also the policy 
variable of interest, Xp.  As a binary variable, the appropriate policy effect is the average 
treatment effect (ATE) that would occur if Xp was exogenously shifted from 0 to 1.  Let  
λ1 = exp�βp + Xoβo� exp �
βu2
2
� and λ0 = exp(Xoβo) exp �
βu2
2
�.  Then, given (Eq. 11) and 
(Eq. 19) we can write 
 
 ATE = EXo[λ1 − λ0] (Eq. 21) 
 
and 
 
 ATE� = 1
n
∑ λ�1i − λ�0ini=1  (Eq. 22) 
 
Where λ� is the estimate of λ constructed using �β�p β�o β�u�, consistent estimators of 
�βp βo βu�. 
 In the SS case, we assume that Xp is exogenous.  Since the policy variable is not 
constrained to be binary as in the case of ET, all three policy effects discussed previously 
are feasible.  The estimator for the ATE remains as in (1.22).  Considering a non-binary 
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Xp, we can write λp2 = exp�Xp2βp2 + Xoβo� exp �
βu2
2
� and λp1 = exp�Xp1βp1 +
Xoβo� exp �
βu2
2
�.  The AIE can now be expressed as: 
 
 AIE = EXo,Xp1�λp2 − λp1� (Eq. 23) 
 
which can be estimated by 
 
 AIE� = 1
n
∑ λ�p2i − λ�p1ini=1 . (Eq. 24) 
 
If Xp is continuous, and the researcher has no policy-relevant increment in mind, 
then the policy effect of interest is the AME. 
 
 AME =  EXo,Xp�βpλ� (Eq. 25) 
 
which can be consistently estimated by: 
 
 AME� = 1
n
∑ β�pni=1 λ�i . (Eq. 26)  
 
The previous formulations for the policy effects do not hold with the CMP 
distribution since the expected value of Y does not have a closed-form solution. 
With our assumption that Xu is standard normally distributed we can express (Eq. 18) as 
 
 λ =  ∫ exp (Xpβp + Xoβo +  Xuβu
∞
−∞ )φ(Xu)dXu. (Eq. 27) 
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Appendix A demonstrates that the endogenous version of λ has a closed-form solution.  
Unfortunately, (Eq. 10) does not hold if the closed-form solution is used when calculating 
the summation terms.  Instead, (Eq. 10) must be re-expressed as 
 
 E[Y|X, ν] =
∑
j�∫ exp�Xpβp+Xoβo+ Xuβu�φ(Xu)dXu
∞
−∞ �
j
(j!)ν
∞
j=1
∑
�∫ exp�Xpβp+Xoβo+ Xuβu�φ(Xu)dXu
∞
−∞ �
j
(j!)ν
∞
j=0
 (Eq. 28) 
(i subscripts here, and the in the remainder of the section, have been dropped for 
convenience.) 
 
 
If the distribution is assumed to be standard normal (28) can be computed using standard 
Gauss-Hermite quadrature.  Equation (28) forms the basis for the “true” CMP estimated 
policy effects. 
As discussed above, the ATE is equal to the difference between YXp2∗   and YXp1∗ .   
Let  
 
E[YXp2∗ |X, ν] equal (27) with λ2 =  ∫ exp (βp + Xoβo +  Xuβu
∞
−∞ )φ(Xu)dXu and 
E[YXp1∗ |X, ν] equal to (27) with λ1 =  ∫ exp (Xoβo +  Xuβu
∞
−∞ )φ(Xu)dXu.  Then  
 
 ATE = E[YXp2∗ |X, ν] - E[YXp1∗ |X, ν]. (Eq. 29) 
 
The AIE can be expressed identically to the ATE, except in this case  
λ2 =  ∫ exp (βp(Xp + Δ) + Xoβo +  Xuβu
∞
−∞ )φ(Xu)dXu and 
 λ1 =  ∫ exp (βpXp + Xoβo +  Xuβu
∞
−∞ )φ(Xu)dXu.  Calculation of the AIE using λ2 and 
λ1 remains the same in (Eq. 29). 
20 
 
 
The average marginal effect is the derivative of 10 with respect to βp, which is 
equal to 
 
 AME = ∂E[Y|X,ν]
∂βp
= Xp
∑ λj∞j=0
∑ (j!)ν∞j=0
∑ j2λj−1∞j=0
∑ (j!)ν∞j=0
−
∑ jλj−1∞j=0
∑ (j!)ν∞j=0
∑ jλj−1∞j=0
∑ (j!)ν∞j=0
∑ λj∞j=0
∑ (j!)ν∞j=0
 (30) 
 
where λ is the same as (Eq. 27). 
5. Evaluation and Comparison of the Estimators 
5.1. Count Models with Endogenous Heterogeneity 
In practice, dispersion is treated as a single statistical phenomenon to be fit by the 
selected specification.  Dependence models, rather than continuous mixture models, are 
the preferred method of fitting overdispersion since they do not require integration, nor 
do they require specifying a distribution for the dispersion.5,6  It is possible, however, that 
variance in the model could arise from both unobserved heterogeneity and other forms of 
dependence.  Individual-level heterogeneity (i.e., stochastic error) should be taken as 
given in any econometric model.  If theory also suggests another form of dependence, 
then dependence models alone may not provide the best fit for the data.  Moreover, if 
dependence does not follow the same distribution as the heterogeneity, then heterogeneity 
                                                          
5 Although technically the NB is a continuous mixture model, the closed form makes it functionally similar 
to a dependence model.  Chapter 2 of Winkelmann (2008) describes how the pure negative binomial model 
(as opposed to the Gamma-Poisson mixture expressed as a negative binomial) arises from a positive linear 
dependence process.  Although NB regression implicitly assumes that the heterogeneity is Gamma 
distributed, the simulations show that ν is functionally without an assumed distribution. 
 
6 Of the papers used to guide the simulation study (see Appendix C), virtually every parametric 
specification involves a negative binomial specification, while only two utilize a different continuous 
mixture model (log normal).  No studies utilize the RGP or CMP models. 
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models will misspecify the density of the dispersion.  In fact, it is possible for 
heterogeneity to increase the variance of the model, while negative dependence 
simultaneously decreases the variance of the model, an outcome that will be explored in 
Section 5.4.  As discussed in Section 3, one advantage of dependence distributions 
specified under Terza’s EOM is that the models account separately for both dependence 
and individual heterogeneity without the need to exactly specify the distribution of the 
heterogeneity.  This added flexibility should give the models more robustness than either 
mixture or dependence models in isolation, even allowing them to account for processes 
that pull the variance in opposite directions.  We explore this flexibility under various 
combinations of dependence in Section 5.4, and explore the ability of a heterogeneity 
model to properly account for multiple sources of dispersion. 
5.2. Simulation Background 
The estimation of treatment effects for count data under the EOM and EPOF can 
be executed with many parametric count specifications.  The following section 
characterizes the performance of the CMP, RGP, NB, and Poisson specifications under 
several distributions of data.  To the degree possible, our simulations are guided by the 
health economics literature.  Adapting the literature into a representative simulation 
scheme was conducted in an organized but unscientific manner.  Studies from the health 
economics literature ranging as far back as 20 years were collected.  Those that did not 
report a mean of the count variable, or that utilized a method other than parametric 
maximum likelihood (e.g., nonlinear least squares with an exponential mean) were not 
considered, leaving a total of 44 papers.  In general, count models are utilized within the 
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field to estimate healthcare demand (e.g., physician visits) or substance abuse (e.g., 
alcoholic drinks per week).  A majority of the count data literature is focused on the 
former, with physician/general practitioner (GP) visits being the primary variable of 
interest, and specialist visits, ER visits, prescription drug use, and inpatient hospital 
nights/weeks generally accounting for the rest of the healthcare demand literature. 
Mean averages of GP visits typically fell in a range between 1 and 6, while non-
GP visits generally had a mean less than 1.  Means from the substance abuse literature 
ranged anywhere between <1 and 99 (excepting a single outlier on each end, all other 
values were between 4 and 17).  (See Appendix C for details.)  Since GP visits comprise 
the bulk of the literature, the values drawn from these studies were selected to guide our 
simulation design.7  The data considered were drawn from myriad datasets, and were 
often separated by gender; some studies pooled multiple years and others only reported 
an annual mean across multiple years.  Rather than attempting to approximate an 
unweighted “mean of the means,” we simply chose a mean that we felt was 
representative of the data in general.  The mean selected is 3. 
In order to keep the study focused, we limit the policy effect estimated to the 
average treatment effect (ATE) rather than the average marginal (AME) or incremental 
effects (AIE) discussed earlier.  Current parametric methods of estimating nonlinear 
endogenous policy effects are intended to fit binary, rather than continuous (or multi-
                                                          
7 Although the substance abuse literature has higher means, we believe it is reasonable to assume that the 
behavior of the count models considered will not differ much between two means that are both relatively 
small.  Of more interest are the extremely small values of the healthcare demand studies.  Such small 
values are almost certainly created by dual data generating processes: a binary variable of requiring 
treatment, and a count of demand conditional on seeking treatment.  In general, studies did not report 
conditional means, but we feel safe assuming the mean conditional on requiring specialized treatment is 
roughly in line with that of the unconditional mean of GP visits. 
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level discrete) variables.  Although the AIE and AME can be computed in the 
endogenous sample selection case (under the assumption of exogeneity for the policy 
variables), estimating the ATE in the sample selection case is congruent with the binary 
policy effect estimated in the endogenous treatment case. 
The literature provides much less guidance regarding estimated policy effects.  
With few exceptions, results were reported as coefficient values rather than marginal or 
treatment effects.  We thus selected three “true” treatment levels for our simulations.  
Section 5.3 considers performance of the models estimating a “small” treatment effect 
(10% of the mean), and a “large” treatment effect (100% of the mean), generated using a 
standard Poisson distribution with log-normally distributed heterogeneity, and no 
dependence.  Ten percent is likely nearing the lower bound of what is economically 
significant in the case of a binary variable.  Although effect sizes greater than 100% of 
the mean are possible, it is likely that the magnitude of the 100% effect is sufficient to 
serve as a “large” treatment effect, and the ability of the various estimators to estimate the 
ATE would likely be similar for all values greater than 100%.  Section 5.4 considers data 
generated with both heterogeneity and dependence.  These data sets have a “moderate” 
treatment effect of approximately 25% of the mean. 
The four models are compared according to four criteria.  The relative accuracy of 
the models is determined by computing an absolute percent bias for the coefficients, as 
well as the expected value of Y and the ATE, where 
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 ABP(β) =  1
k
∑ �β
�i−β
β
�ki=1  (Eq. 31) 
 
and k is the number of repetitions. 
 Relative efficiency of estimated treatment effects is compared using the Mean 
Squared Error (MSE) 
 
 MSE = Var�ATE� � + �ATE� − ATE�
2
. (Eq. 32) 
 
Goodness of fit is determined using the Akaike Information Criterion, a measure 
that penalizes for additional parameters, and then commonly appears in the literature 
when comparing count models.8 
 
 AIC = 2j – 2lnL, (Eq. 33) 
 
where j is the number of parameters in the model and lnL is the opmitized value of the 
log-likelihood function.  Although there is no test statistics to determine what a “good” fit 
is, the AIC provides a measure of relative fit, where smaller values indicate a superior fit 
of the data.9
  
 
All of the simulations have several components in common.  Recall that Xs is the 
binary selection/treatment variable, Xp represents the policy variable of interest (which 
may be endogenous), Xo is the remaining observed data, Xu is an unobserved (scalar) 
confounder that enters the equations for both Y and Xs, and W+ is an instrumental 
                                                          
8 For some examples of AIC in count model selection in health economics, see Deb and Trivedi (1997, 
2002), Gerdtham and Trivedi (2001), Liu and Gupta (2011), and Schmitz (2012). 
 
9 We calculated BIC for each model as well: however, the relative AIC and BIC values between models 
were virtually identical, and we do not report the BIC values. 
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variable for the binary selection/treatment equation.  The data are generated according to 
the following: 
Xo ~ U(0.5,1), W+ ~ U[0,1], Xu ~ N(0,1) 
Xp = 1(u > 0.45) if exogenous (where u is standard uniformly distributed) 
Xp = 1(αoXo + αwW+ + αc + Xu > 0) if endogenous and  
Xs = 1(αpXp + αoXo + αwW+ + αc + Xu > 0) for sample selection. 
In the case of endogenous selection, �αp αo αc αW� = [-0.5 1 1 0.5], resulting in a roughly 
64% probability of selection.  Endogenous treatment has participation coefficients α = [-
0.47 1 0.5] resulting in a 55% probability of treatment. 
 As demonstrated in 1.19, the expected influence of βu on the expected value of Y 
has a closed-form solution when Xu is standard normally distributed.  βu was selected so 
that unobserved heterogeneity served as “multiplier” of roughly 10%: i.e., exp �βu
2
2
� =1.1.  
For all simulations, βu = 0.437 in the Poisson, RGP, and NB cases, and βu = 0.437ν in the 
CMP scenario.  Where possible, the constant βc was selected to account for roughly 1/3 
of the effect of observables on the expected value of Y.  βc = 0.334 in the Poisson, RGP, 
and NB cases (except for the case of 100% treatment effect, where βc is adjusted to hold 
Y constant despite the larger βp value.)10 
 All CMP data is generated based on 4, with the true Z calculated to within a 
truncation error of 1e-5.  Estimation using the CMP model also computes the true Z to 
within 1e-5 of the “true” value, and post-estimation computation of the expectation of Y 
                                                          
10 Data generated according to a CMP process do not strictly follow this outline, since the model does not 
have a reliable closed-form solution to calculate the coefficient values.  The values assigned correspond as 
closely as possible to the plan of assignment discussed above. 
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and the ATE are calculated using 10 and 28 respectively.  (For comparison, estimations 
of Y and the ATE computed from 8 are reported in Appendix B.) 
 Each simulation is run 500 times with n = 5000.  All simulations are executed 
using Gauss-Legendre quadrature with ten points of support.  Since the focus of the 
analysis is on the performance of the count specification with regard to the β coefficients 
and ATE, we do not report the FIML estimations of the α parameters or the predicted 
probability of selection/treatment. 
5.3. Simulation 1—Estimating “Small” and “Large” Treatment Effects 
The first set of simulations compares the effectiveness of the models under 
endogenous sample selection or endogenous treatment with both small (10%) and large 
(100%) binary treatment effects (TE).  The data are generated according to a Poisson 
distribution with endogenous heterogeneity in the second stage equation as described in 
12.  Although the standard Poisson is the true data generating process, the CMP, RGP, 
and NB all nest the Poisson, and therefore should not be at a disadvantage.11  Estimated 
values are presented in Tables 1-4, with absolute percent bias in parentheses. 
The CMP produces the best estimate in the small TE case.  Both the CMP and 
Poisson have virtually identical bias and MSE values, but the CMP produces the most 
accurate point estimate of the four models.  Despite this, the log likelihood values 
generated by the CMP estimation do not reject the null hypothesis of a standard Poisson 
                                                          
11 The Poisson being described here is not technically a pure Poisson process, but a linear function of a log-
normal mixture of a Poisson specification (whereas the other three models are linear functions of a log-
normal mixture combined with a dependence specification).  This Poisson mixture is technically a model of 
overdispersion and is not subject to the same assumptions as a pure Poisson.  Therefore the standard errors 
used to calculate the MSE are not subject to the corrections necessary for a pure Poisson in the absence of 
equidispersion. 
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specification according to the likelihood ratio test.  The NB and RGP models both reject 
the standard Poisson model in favor of a dispersion model.  The RGP edges out the NB 
according to the information criterion, but the NB model has a slightly lower MSE.  Both 
distributions pay a small penalty in bias and MSE relative to the CMP and Poisson 
specifications. 
 
Table 1 
10% Treatment Effect with Endogenous Treatment 
 βp = .111 
βo = 
.720 
βc = 
.334 
βu = 
.437 
Y = 
3.00 
ATE = 
.330 
 
MSE 
 
AIC 
 
lnL 
Poisson .105 (19.07) 
.718 
(1.30) 
.340 
(5.27) 
.442 
(2.70) 
2.99 
(1.02) 
.314 
(19.01) .062 23066.84 11529.42 
NB .119 (22.17) 
.719 
(1.37) 
.335 
(5.31) 
.429 
(3.74) 
2.97 
(1.36) 
.353 
(21.86) .079 23027.99 11509.00 
RGP .121 (21.79) 
.720 
(1.27) 
.334 
(5.14) 
.429 
(3.37) 
2.99 
(1.00) 
.362 
(21.82) .082 23002.19 11496.10 
CMP .112 (17.80) 
.701 
(3.55) 
.312 
(11.36) 
.421 
(5.75) 
2.89 
(4.00) 
.334 
(18.82) .065 23071.87 11530.94 
 
In the large treatment effect case all four models perform substantially better, 
although the Poisson provides the best fit according to every metric.  None of the three 
dispersion models reject the null hypothesis that the standard Poisson is the best 
specification, and the Poisson also has the least bias and most accurate point estimate.   
The CMP performs slightly better than the NB and RGP in terms of bias and MSE, and 
has similar IC values to the NB.  The RGP, which had the best fit according to the AIC in 
the small TE case now has the worst. 
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In both sample selection models, the Poisson has the worst fit statistics, and is 
rejected in favor of all three dispersion models by a likelihood ratio test.  However, the 
Poisson also has the lowest MSE in both cases.  Although it has the lowest bias of the 
ATE estimate in the small TE case, it has the highest bias of the ATE estimate in the 
large TE case.  The CMP performs well in terms of bias, but has a higher MSE than the 
other three specifications.   
 
Table 2 
100% Treatment Effect with Endogenous Treatment 
 βp = 1.331 
βo 
=.755 
βc =-
.621 
βu = 
.437 
Y = 
3.00 
ATE = 
3.15 
 
MSE 
 
AIC 
 
lnL 
Poisson 1.33 (1.82) 
.754 
(1.24) 
-.615 
(3.58) 
.440 
(3.03) 
2.68 
(10.83) 
3.15 
(1.80) 5.103 21526.67 10759.34 
NB 1.351 (2.41) 
.757 
(1.32) 
-.625 
(3.62) 
.419 
(4.91) 
2.66 
(11.47) 
3.19 
(2.33) 5.254 21701.92 10845.96 
RGP 1.351 (2.29) 
.757 
(1.25) 
-.625 
(3.56) 
.418 
(4.89) 
2.69 
(10.71) 
3.21 
(2.55) 5.331 21724.52 10857.26 
CMP 1.290 (3.77) 
7.25 
(4.53) 
-.624 
(3.55) 
.411 
(7.10) 
2.63 
(12.70) 
3.16 
(1.90) 5.223 21705.50 10847.75 
 
Table 3 
10% Treatment Effect with Sample Selection 
 βp = .111 
βo = 
.720 
βc = 
.334 
βu = 
.437 
Y = 
3.00 
ATE = 
.330 
 
MSE 
 
AIC 
 
lnL 
Poisson .109 (18.34) 
.719 
(1.84) 
.365 
(10.59) 
.390 
(10.74) 
3.04 
(1.45) 
.329 
(18.35) .065 17963.88 8977.88 
NB .117 (18.02) 
.703 
(2.53) 
.427 
(27.63) 
.358 
(19.18) 
3.09 
(3.07) 
.358 
(19.18) .073 17901.78 8945.89 
RGP .117 (18.08) 
.703 
(2.54) 
.428 
(28.03) 
.300 
(31.21) 
3.09 
(3.15) 
.359 
(19.33) .074 17901.46 8945.73 
CMP .121 (20.40) 
.756 
(5.15) 
.280 
(16.55) 
.349 
(20.07) 
2.89 
(3.66) 
.348 
(18.52) .076 17923.16 8956.58 
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 In all four models the CMP tends to do the worst job of estimating coefficient 
values.  This is to be expected since the CMP coefficient estimates must be rescaled as 
β�
ν��   in order to make a comparison to models with an exponential conditional mean.  The 
rescale is an approximation involving two estimated values, and is therefore subject to 
greater bias than the other models.  The CMP also performs the worst in estimating the 
true value of Y in three out of the four cases.  The NB, RGP, and Poisson produce very 
similar coefficient estimates in the endogenous treatment models, and similar Y estimates 
in all four cases.  The NB and RGP models do both fair slightly worse estimating the 
constant βc and the heterogeneity term βu in the sample selection case.  However, this 
does not affect the estimates of the coefficient of interest βp or the estimated ATE, which 
are fairly similar to the CMP and Poisson in the sample selection case. 
 
Table 4 
100% Treatment Effect with Sample Selection 
 βp = 1.218 
βo = 
-.527 
βc = 
.334 
βu = 
.437 
Y = 
3.12 
ATE = 
3.22 
 
MSE 
 
AIC 
 
lnL 
Poisson 1.220 (2.04) 
-.523 
(2.50) 
.330 
(7.40) 
.440 
(3.36) 
3.07 
(2.73) 
3.17 
(3.36) 2.383 15902.92 7947.46 
NB 1.225 (2.06) 
-.531 
(2.48) 
.355 
(10.05) 
.406 
(7.78) 
3.17 
(2.15) 
3.28 
(2.97) 2.930 15693.86 7851.93 
RGP 1.224 (2.04) 
-.529 
(2.20) 
.349 
(8.39) 
.415 
(5.71) 
3.16 
(1.76) 
3.26 
(2.57) 2.877 15695.90 7842.95 
CMP 1.257 (3.63) 
-.541 
(3.46) 
.300 
(11.86) 
.423 
(4.39) 
3.10 
(1.51) 
3.27 
(2.53) 3.013 15695.91 7842.96 
 
None of the first set of simulations provides a clear recommendation for any of 
the four specifications.  However, all four specifications nest the true data generating 
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process, and none of the simulations introduces dependence.  Section 5.4 explores the 
performance of the specifications when they do not correspond exactly to the true data 
generating process, and when both heterogeneity and dependence cause dispersion.  The 
robustness of the various specifications to incorrect assumptions will provide a better 
demonstration of which model is preferable when the true distribution of the data is 
unknown. 
5.4. Simulations 2 & 3—Positive and Negative Dependence 
The second and third set of simulations compare the performance of the four 
models under conditions of positive and negative dependence in both the endogenous 
sample selection and endogenous treatment cases.  Data with positive dependence are 
generated using all three dependence models, while data with negative dependence are 
generated using the CMP specification.  All four count models are used to produce 
estimates from each of the three data configurations with positive dependence, in order to 
determine which model performs best when it is not the true data generating distribution.  
The NB is not considered in analyzing data with negative dependence since it collapses to 
the Poisson in this instance. 
The ATE is selected to be a “moderate” effect size of approximately 25% of the 
mean, and the mean remains at 3.  The dispersion is selected so that the conditional 
variance is approximately 7.3.  We target this variance with all three data generating 
processes in order to keep the comparison data sets as similar as possible.  Results are 
presented in Tables 5-10. 
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Table 5 
CMP Generated Data with Endogenous Treatment and Positive Dependence (ν = 0.281)12 
 βp = .141 
βo = 
-.005 
βc = 
.042 
βu =  
.123 
Y =  
3.13 
ATE = 
.917 
 
MSE 
 
AIC 
 
lnL 
Poisson -.097 (168.95) 
-.025 
(457.71) 
.326 
(677.34) 
.202 
(65.44) 
3.80 
(21.44) 
-1.460 
(259.21) 5.741 27906.29 13948.15 
NB .094 (33.14) 
-.002 
(76.67) 
.246 
(486.87) 
.065 
(47.06) 
3.36 
(8.15) 
1.187 
(29.95) .116 27207.99 13599.00 
RGP .097 (31.03) 
-.002 
(81.70) 
.248 
(491.27) 
.065 
(47.27) 
3.17 
(3.91) 
1.09 
(20.63) .128 26742.13 13366.07 
CMP .141 (11.05) 
-.005 
(103.79) 
.039 
(53.43) 
.122 
(9.89) 
3.05 
(2.33) 
.921 
(10.95) .024 26435.09 13212.55 
  
Table 6 
 
NB Generated Data with Endogenous Treatment and Positive Dependence (ν = 25.00) 
 
 βp = .281 
βo = 
.629 
βc = 
.334 
βu = 
.437 
Y = 
3.00 
ATE = 
.825 
 
MSE 
 
AIC 
 
lnL 
Poisson .214 (23.71) 
.620 
(1.92) 
.365 
(9.55) 
.487 
(11.63) 
2.99 
(1.14) 
.637 
(22.88) .198 23676.38 11833.19 
NB .285 (9.47) 
.629 
(1.57) 
.336 
(5.70) 
.432 
(3.68) 
2.97 
(1.31) 
.842 
(9.36) .285 23656.49 11823.25 
RGP .285 (9.49) 
.629 
(1.57) 
.337 
(5.70) 
.433 
(3.68) 
2.97 
(1.31) 
.841 
(9.38) .285 23656.40 11823.20 
CMP .281 (7.48) 
.632 
(3.36) 
.299 
(12.17) 
.466 
(6.82) 
2.53 
(15.65) 
.661 
(19.95) .092 23008.46 11499.23 
 
 
 One takeaway from all of the simulations with positive dependence is that in the 
case of endogenous treatment the standard Poisson with heterogeneity performs poorly 
when there is additional dependence.  The Poisson has the worst bias in estimating 
                                                          
12 Estimates of CMP coefficients produced by the NB, RGP, and Poisson models are multiplied by 0.281 
post-estimation in order to rescale them for comparison with the CMP.  This cannot be done in reverse 
since the “true” dispersion parameter from the CMP is unknown if the data are not generated by a CMP 
process. 
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treatment effects, even predicting a large effect in the wrong direction in the case of the 
CMP.  In all three cases the Poisson has the worst fit statistics, and the LR test correctly 
rejects it in favor of any of the three dependence models.  The one advantage the Poisson 
possesses is that it has the lowest variance of the estimates.  However, this cannot 
overcome its primary weakness of large and potentially catastrophic bias. 
 
Table 7 
RGP Generated Data with Endogenous Treatment and Positive Dependence (ν = .025) 
 βp = .281 
βo = 
.629 
βc = 
.334 
βu = 
.437 
Y = 
3.00 
ATE = 
.826 
 
MSE 
 
AIC 
 
lnL 
Poisson .193 (31.36) 
.617 
(2.17) 
.374 
(11.93) 
.503 
(15.15) 
2.99 
(1.11) 
.574 
(30.46) .198 23764.23 11877.12 
NB .282 (9.75) 
.628 
(1.55) 
.338 
(5.91) 
.434 
(3.74) 
2.97 
(1.32) 
.832 
(9.58) .280 23734.25 11862.13 
RGP .282 (9.84) 
.628 
(1.55) 
.338 
(5.93) 
.437 
(3.77) 
2.97 
(1.31) 
.832 
(9.67) .280 23734.06 11862.03 
CMP .267 (10.64) 
.654 
(4.15) 
.262 
(21.93) 
.473 
(8.37) 
2.97 
(1.30) 
.758 
(11.31) .249 23746.73 11868.37 
 
 
Table 8 
 
CMP Generated Data with Endogenous Sample Selection and Positive Dependence  
(ν = 0.281) 
 
 βp = .141 
βo = 
-.005 
βc = 
.042 
βu = 
.123 
Y = 
3.13 
ATE = 
.917 
 
MSE 
 
AIC 
 
lnL 
Poisson .075 (46.67) 
.029 
(745.99) 
.153 
(264.42) 
.193 
(57.07) 
2.70 
(13.59) 
.709 
(22.93) .066 18931.99 9461.00 
NB .090 (35.97) 
-.005 
(91.27) 
.261 
(523.59) 
.057 
(53.45) 
3.10 
(1.83) 
.971 
(9.59) .023 18545.38 9267.69 
RGP .091 (35.63) 
-.006 
(94.15) 
.262 
(526.40) 
.054 
(55.73) 
3.11 
(1.86) 
.979 
(10.21) .025 18544.00 9267.00 
CMP .140 (8.39) 
-.004 
(138.29) 
.037 
(46.80) 
.113 
(14.21) 
3.05 
(2.70) 
.925 
(8.05) .015 18529.36 9259.68 
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Table 9 
 
NB Generated Data with Endogenous Sample Selection and Positive Dependence  
(ν = 25.00) 
 
 βp = .281 
βo = 
.629 
βc = 
.334 
βu = 
.437 
Y = 
3.00 
ATE = 
.826 
 
MSE 
 
AIC 
 
lnL 
Poisson .277 (7.86) 
.635 
(2.41) 
.335 
(7.54) 
.429 
(3.97) 
3.01 
(1.14) 
.817 
(7.78) .265 18214.33 9102.65 
NB .286 (7.67) 
.616 
(2.63) 
.414 
(23.94) 
.322 
(26.22) 
3.09 
(2.93) 
.865 
(8.67) .282 18121.29 9055.65 
RGP .287 (7.73) 
.616 
(2.66) 
.417 
(24.74) 
.317 
(27.30) 
3.09 
(3.06) 
.868 
(8.86) .284 18120.47 9055.24 
CMP .308 (11.55) 
.805 
(8.60) 
.199 
(40.55) 
.376 
(13.95) 
3.49 
(14.06) 
.964 
(17.22) .557 18651.22 9320.61 
 
 
Table 10 
 
RGP Generated Data with Endogenous Sample Selection and Positive Dependence  
(ν = 0.025) 
 
 βp = .281 
βo = 
.629 
βc = 
.334 
βu = 
.437 
Y = 
3.00 
ATE = 
.826 
 
MSE 
 
AIC 
 
lnL 
Poisson .275 (8.95) 
.641 
(2.93) 
.321 
(8.09) 
.442 
(4.03) 
3.02 
(1.10) 
.814 
(8.85) .271 18368.79 9179.40 
NB .286 (7.77) 
.617 
(2.59) 
.411 
(23.02) 
.327 
(25.11) 
3.09 
(2.85) 
.862 
(8.66) .281 18175.59 9082.80 
RGP .287 (7.85) 
.617 
(2.60) 
.414 
(23.90) 
.322 
(.263) 
3.09 
(2.98) 
.866 
(8.88) .284 18174.89 9082.45 
CMP .310 (12.09) 
.814 
(9.80) 
.172 
(48.46) 
.387 
(11.40) 
3.50 
(13.95) 
.959 
(16.82) .560 18717.12 9353.56 
 
The CMP performs well in all three cases.  The CMP has the best fit statistics 
when it is the correctly specified distribution, and also when the data follow an NB 
distribution.  In the case of RGP data, the CMP has fit statistics comparable to the true 
RGP model.  The CMP also has a lower variance of the estimator than the RGP and NB 
models, resulting in a smaller MSE even when the data follow a NB or RGP 
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specification.  Although the CMP has somewhat high bias with NB distributed data, the 
bias of the NB model is even worse with CMP data.  The CMP also performs better on 
RGP data than the RGP performs with CMP data, although when both models are pitted 
against NB data, the RGP has the lowest bias of the two, landing in a virtual tie with the 
true NB model.  As in the case of simulations 1-4, the CMP does a relatively poor job 
fitting the coefficients compared to the NB and RGP models, although the Poisson fares 
the worst in this regard. 
 Although the CMP is arguably the superior model in the case of endogenous 
treatment, this advantage does not hold in the case of sample selection.  The CMP 
performs best across the board when it is the true data generating process, but the bias of 
the treatment effect estimates, and the mean squared error are the worst of all four models 
when the data are NB or RGP distributed.  Moreover, the CMP does substantially worse 
fitting the data than any of the other three models.  Contrary to the endogenous treatment 
case, the NB and RGP models perform fairly well (and nearly identically) when they do 
not reflect the true data generating process.     
The Poisson performs reasonably well in the CMP case, but is still the worst by 
every metric, indicating that it may have trouble handling dependence when it re-enters 
the conditional mean as it does in CMP distributed data.  The Poisson fares better with 
RGP and NB data, actually having the least bias and smallest MSE in the NB case, and 
fitting the data better than even the CMP in both cases.  Overall, the NB model edges the 
RGP slightly in fit and bias over the three models, although the two models are virtually 
interchangeable. 
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In case of negative dependence the mean remains at 3 and the ATE remains at 
25% of the mean.  However, the presence of the heterogeneity presents a problem, since 
it overdisperses the data relative to a basic specification.  In the case of the CMP, since 
the dependence parameter enters the conditional mean (including the heterogeneity term), 
it takes an extreme level of negative dependence (approaching a binary outcome) to make 
the conditional variance less than the conditional mean.  Rather, the model presented for 
simulation represents a case where individual heterogeneity increases the variance of the 
model, but negative dependence decreases the variance, leaving the model with net 
overdispersion.   
One interesting finding of the present study is the failure of the RGP model in the 
case of negative dependence with overdispersion induced by individual heterogeneity.  
The restrictions on the RGP force the dispersion parameter ν to be such that ν >  
min(-1/max(λ),-1/max(Y)) when the dependence is negative.  This is typically not a 
problem, but the mix of net overdispersion with negative dependence results in such large 
values of Y and/or λ that ν is constrained to be virtually 0.  Although in theory this should 
collapse the model to the Poisson, it rather prevents the model from achieving concavity 
and it is unable to converge consistently in this case.  As such, we do not consider the 
RGP for comparison with the CMP or Poisson models in the case of negative 
dependence. 
In the ET case, the Poisson performed fairly poorly in terms of bias of the ATE 
estimate and the MSE.  As expected the CMP performed much better, but still had a 
fairly large bias and MSE in comparison to data with positive dependence.  Both models 
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performed better in the sample selection case, and the Poisson was actually more accurate 
in estimating the coefficient values.  However, the CMP still fit the data better, rejecting 
the null hypothesis of a Poisson specification, in addition to having both lower bias and 
MSE of the ATE.  (See Tables 11 and 12.) 
 
Table 11 
 
CMP Generated Data with Endogenous Treatment and Negative Dependence (ν = 4.50) 
 
 βp = 1.023 
βo = 
2.506 
βc = 
2.540 
βu = 
1.965 
Y = 
3.03 
ATE = 
.766 
 
MSE 
 
AIC 
 
lnL 
Poisson 2.323 (127.10) 
3.000 
(22.47) 
0.822 
(67.63) 
1.301 
(33.79) 
2.89 
(2.98) 
1.463 
(93.54) 1.384 21250.64 10620.32 
CMP 0.942 (8.18) 
1.84 
(25.02) 
1.700 
(33.07) 
1.343 
(31.63) 
2.90 
(2.57) 
.939 
(24.21) .292 20398.54 10194.27 
 
 
Table 12 
 
CMP Generated Data with Endogenous Sample Selection and Negative Dependence  
(ν = 4.50) 
 
 βp = 1.023 
βo = 
2.506 
βc = 
2.540 
βu = 
1.965 
Y = 
3.03 
ATE = 
.766 
 
MSE 
 
AIC 
 
lnL 
Poisson 1.213 (18.82) 
2.599 
(6.06) 
2.224 
(12.43) 
1.184 
(39.75) 
3.12 
(4.78) 
.825 
(10.18) .228 16689.19 8339.60 
CMP .466 (54.40) 
1.050 
(57.17) 
1.103 
(56.57) 
.634 
(67.75) 
3.03 
(1.98) 
.793 
(7.60) .184 16484.67 8237.34 
 
6. Discussion 
The results of the simulations did not overwhelmingly favor one model over the 
others.  All four models performed comparably well at estimating both “large” and 
“small” treatment effects when the data follow a Poisson distribution.  This result is not 
surprising given that all three of the dispersion models nest the standard Poisson. 
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The strongest conclusion to be drawn from the simulations is that the Poisson 
specification does not fare well when there is both unobserved heterogeneity and 
occurrence dependence (i.e., the Poisson is not robust to misspecification).  The three 
dependence models perform substantially better in terms of fit and bias of the treatment 
effect in virtually every case.  Although the Poisson does have a low variance of the 
estimate, and generally does a comparable job estimating coefficient values, it is also the 
only specification to fail catastrophically and predict a treatment effect that was both 
large and in the wrong direction. 
The simulations show that in the case of endogenous treatment, the CMP is the 
most robust to being the incorrect specification in terms of fit of the data and accuracy of 
the estimated ATE.  However, the CMP performs worse than the other two dispersion 
models in the sample selection case by virtually every metric.  Additionally, the CMP 
produces the worst coefficient estimates in nearly every model, in both the ET and SS 
case, and the approximation that re-scales the CMP to be comparable to the other models 
becomes less reliable the more dispersed the data become.   
 These results suggest that the CMP is the preferred specification if the data suffer 
from endogenous treatment, and the researcher is primarily interested in estimating 
treatment effects.  Under positive occurrence dependence, either the NB or RGP models 
are appropriate when the data involve endogenous sample selection, or when the 
researcher is primarily interested in coefficient estimates.  However, if there is suspected 
negative dependence, both the NB and RGP models will be inappropriate, and the CMP 
is preferred no matter what the objective.   
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 The primary shortcoming of the CMP model is the failure of the approximation 
for Z during integration.  Data that deviate significantly from a standard Poisson 
distribution result in unreliable estimates when the approximation is used.  This requires 
that Z be computed directly to within an acceptable truncation error, resulting in a 
massive penalty in computing time.  Running on Stata 12 MP with two processors, the 
Poisson, NB, and RGP endogenous treatment models each took less than ten seconds per 
repetition.  The CMP took roughly three minutes.  In the sample selection case, the 
Poisson, NB, and RGP models still took under ten seconds, whereas the time necessary 
for the CMP to execute rose to nearly 35 minutes.  These discrepancies arose with 
simulated data, and it’s likely that real data would exacerbate the differences in speed 
between the two models.  Despite this issue, the simulation results suggest that the CMP 
is a preferable model when the research goal is estimation of an endogenous treatment 
effect, or estimation of an effect with both unobserved heterogeneity and negative 
dependence.  
There are several potential approaches for increasing the scope of this study that 
we elected not to pursue.  In the case of endogeneity it may be helpful to test the response 
of the model to various levels of selection or treatment.  While characterizing the 
performance of the EOM under several proportions of selection/treatment may be 
beneficial, the relative performance of the various count specifications should remain 
constant under different conditions of endogeneity.  A more relevant extension would be 
to characterize the performance of the count models under a different parametric 
framework of endogeneity.  For instance, a growing literature has begun to approach 
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endogenous count models using a Copula specification, whereby the errors of Xs and Y 
are modeled as marginal distributions linked by a dependence parameter, rather than 
belonging to a joint distribution (Van Ophem, 2000; Zimmer & Trivedi, 2006).  This 
approach is advantageous in that it requires limited assumptions regarding the 
relationship between the errors of Y and Xs.  Moreover, Copulas do not force variance-
increasing heterogeneity on the model in order to account for endogeneity: omitting 
heterogeneity from the model may allow better comparisons of the specifications, 
particularly the CMP and RGP. 
However, Copula estimation of variables with discrete margins may encounter 
problems in convergence.  Methods to transform discrete marginals into a continuous 
distribution are available, but will introduce a small amount of additional bias to the 
model (Trivedi & Zimmer, 2005.)  Additionally, if there is reason to believe that there is 
both unobserved heterogeneity and latent dispersion in the model, the Copula approach 
will not provide a computational benefit as an integration of the PMF will still be 
required.  Regardless, the merits of the Copula framework relative to the EOM remain a 
topic for future review. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
ESSAY 2: ESTIMATING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MARIJUANA USE 
DISORDER AND EMERGENCY ROOM UTILIZATION AMONG MEDICAID 
RECIPIENTS 
 
 
1. Abstract 
 
 The study uses data from the National Survey of Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) 
across seven years (spanning 2005–2011) to investigate the relationship between 
marijuana use disorder and total emergency room (ER) visits in the past year among adult 
(age 18+) Medicaid recipients.  No economic study of demand for medical care has ever 
looked at marijuana use separate from other drugs to disentangle the effect of marijuana 
versus so-called “hard” drugs: this distinction is of growing policy-relevance as the 
national debate grows over the future of marijuana regulation, and states begin to 
consider the ramifications of relaxing current restrictions.  Consistent with previous 
literature I find a positive relationship between hard drug use disorder and ER visits.  
However, I fail to find  a positive relationship between marijuana use disorder and ER 
visits, conditional on hard drug use disorder  Using a two-stage nonlinear least squares 
approach, I estimate an average treatment effect ranging from roughly -0.62 to -1.23 
visits among females, and from -0.61 to -1.03 visits among males.  Although these 
estimates are generally not significantly different from zero, the preferred specification 
rejects an ATE greater than 0.24 for females and 0.23 for males at the 95% significance 
level, suggesting that if a positive relationship exists,  it is fairly small. 
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2. Introduction 
Marijuana is a topic of growing national interest: 20 states and the District of 
Columbia have legalized medical marijuana, while seventeen have decriminalized 
marijuana, and both Colorado and Washington recently legalized the limited sale and 
distribution of marijuana (Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2013).  As debate 
continues regarding the future of marijuana policy, it is important for policymakers to 
understand the potential ramifications of relaxing marijuana regulations.  In this study I 
use data from the National Survey of Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) to estimate the 
relationship between marijuana use disorder and total annual ER visits among Medicaid 
recipients.  Marijuana use disorder (MUD) refers to either dependence on or abuse of 
marijuana, as defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(Appendix D).  Given the heterogeneity of consumption among marijuana users, MUD 
provides a clinically significant definition of use that reflects severe levels of 
consumption.  While previous studies have investigated the effect of marijuana 
consumption on education or employment (e.g., Bray, Zarkin, Ringwalt, & Qi, 2000; 
McCaffrey, Pacula, Han, & Ellikson, 2010; Yamada, Kendix, & Yamada, 1996; Popovici 
& French, 2014) no study has investigated the effect of marijuana consumption on acute 
healthcare utilization.  Estimates of the relationship between MUD and ER visits will be 
of use to state and federal policymakers considering the potential costs of relaxed 
marijuana regulation. 
Although marijuana is typically considered less dangerous than so-called hard 
drugs (e.g., cocaine, heroin, methamphetamines, prescription narcotics), its consumption 
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is correlated with numerous health issues such as respiratory problems, liver disease, 
cardiovascular disease, sexually transmitted disease, and increased mortality among 
AIDS patients (Brook, Stimmel, & Brook, 2008; Gordon, Conley, & Gordon, 2013; 
Mittleman, Lewis, Maclure, Sherwood, & Mueller, 2001; Schuster, Crane, & Gonzalez, 
2012; Sidney, Beck, Tekawa, Quesenberry, & Friedman, 1997; Smith & Crespo, 2001).  
Marijuana consumption may also trigger or exacerbate schizophrenic episodes (Rey & 
Tennent, 2002), and daily smokers of marijuana are more likely than non-users to visit 
the physician for respiratory problems or injury (Polen, Sidney, Tekawa, Sadler, & 
Friedman, 1993).   
While several previous studies have investigated the potential causal impact of 
drug use on demand for acute medical care no study has specifically tried to isolate the 
effect of marijuana use.  This has left a need for marijuana-specific estimates that may 
inform the current policy debate regarding the relaxation of marijuana regulations at the 
state and federal level.  Moreover, no previous study has considered the effect of drug use 
(marijuana or otherwise) among Medicaid recipients.  Care covered by Medicaid derives 
from Federal and state discretionary budgets.  With the Affordable Care Act expanding 
Medicaid coverage to include all individuals under 65 earning less than 133% of the 
federal poverty limit beginning in 2014 (among participating states), information 
regarding demand for health services among Medicaid recipients may be especially 
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valuable to policymakers, particularly those from states considering Medicaid 
expansion.13 
            This study is also the first in the literature to utilize an instrumental variables 
count data model to estimate the relationship between marijuana dependence and ER 
visits, making estimates robust to both time-invariant and time-variant endogeneity.  This 
study is therefore the most econometrically rigorous study of the relationship between 
drug use and ER visits to date, and demonstrates an approach that may be used to 
estimate other healthcare outcomes among drug users.  
3. Prior Research 
Several individual-level economic studies have investigated the direct effect of 
marijuana use on physical or mental health.  Williams and Skeels (2006) estimate the 
joint impact of tobacco and marijuana use on self-reported health in Australia and find 
that weekly use of marijuana is associated with a 6-18 percentage point reduction in the 
probability of reporting excellent or very good health, conditional on smoking status.  
Marijuana users were also 22 percentage points more likely to have seen a doctor in the 
past twelve months.  A similar study by van Ours and Williams (2012) finds that 
marijuana use among citizens of Amsterdam is correlated with diminished physical 
functioning among males and diminished mental functioning among both males and 
females.   
                                                          
13 Estimates from current Medicaid recipients are not perfectly generalizable to individuals who are not 
currently covered by Medicaid.  However, since the influx of new beneficiaries will disproportionately 
consist of males and individuals without children, it is likely that estimates in this study will serve as a 
lower bound on the relationship between drugs and healthcare use. 
44 
 
 
Several previous studies have attempted to link the health effects of drug use to 
demand for medical care.  French, McGeary, Chitwood, and McCoy (2000) study the use 
of outpatient services, ER visits, and total hospital admissions among residents of Dade 
County Florida who use illicit drugs weekly or more.  They find that use of illicit drugs is 
significantly associated with fewer outpatient visits, but increased ER and hospital 
admissions.  However, the authors assume exogeneity of drug use, which may result in 
biased estimates if drug use is endogenous to health care utilization.  McGeary and 
French (2000) use the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse (NHSDA—
predecessor to the NSDUH) to investigate the relationship between weekly drug use and 
the probability of any ER services used in the last year, using a bivariate probit with 
instrumental variables to account for the potential endogeneity of drug use.  The authors 
find that the probability of ER utilization is significantly higher among both male and 
female drug users.  They also find that the error terms in the drug use and acute medical 
care equations are significantly negatively correlated, and results of a Hausman test reject 
the null hypothesis that drug use is exogenous to acute medical care.  French, Fang, and 
Balsa (2011) utilize a fixed effects regression in lieu of an instrumental variables 
approach to investigate the effect of “casual” (less than sample median) or “heavy” 
(greater than sample median) drug use frequency on the probability of any ER visit or 
hospital admission, and counts of ER visits and  hospital admissions.  Heavy drug use 
was correlated with a significantly higher probability of any ER use among both males 
and females, but only hospital stays for women.  Both heavy drug using males and 
females were admitted to the hospital more frequently, but drug use intensity had no 
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effect on the number of ER visits.  Drug use of any intensity was also significantly 
correlated with increased probability of and number of injuries among both males and 
females.  However, these studies fail to disentangle the effect of marijuana from other 
hard drugs, and the implications for states considering new marijuana policy is unclear. 
4. Conceptual Model 
Acute medical care is one service of many on which people are able to spend 
their time or money, and they will select a utility maximizing number of ER visits, 
subject to a budget constraint.  I assume that ER visits do not provide any utility in and of 
themselves, but rather, going to the ER restores utility by alleviating or eliminating 
disutility that is caused by an injury or illness.  To consume an ER visit, individuals incur 
a cost (e.g., time and money), and so only visit the ER when the utility restored by doing 
so exceeds the utility that could be purchased by using the same resources (e.g., time and 
money) on other goods or services.14  Therefore, demand for ER visits depends on the 
amount of utility that would be gained by going to the ER and the amount of utility that 
would be foregone by going.   
Consistent with French et al. (2011), I assume that individuals have a latent 
probability of negative health shocks determined by H(Xo, ,M(Xo,Xu),D(Xo,Xu), Xu , μ), 
where Xo is a vector of observable individual demographic and socioeconomic 
characteristics, M is a binary variable representing MUD, D is set of binary variables 
representing alcohol, nicotine, and/or hard drugs use disorders, Xu represents unobserved 
heterogeneity that may be jointly correlated with MUD and the probability of a negative 
                                                          
14 The monetary cost of visiting the ER is capped at $3.90 for Medicaid recipients, so time costs and 
“psychic” costs of going to the ER will be the primary costs associated with ER visits. 
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health shock (e.g., future discount rate, health knowledge), and μ is a stochastic error 
term capturing factors that may affect health but are assumed to be exogenous to 
substance use disorders. 
The probability of negative health shocks may be increased by MUD through 
illness (e.g., respiratory issues among marijuana smokers, or reduced time and money for 
investment in health stock), or through an increased probability of injury (e.g., driving 
while under the influence).  On the other hand, the probability of health events may be 
decreased if, for example, individuals with MUD are less likely to participate in activities 
that can result in injury (e.g., less time driving, less time pursuing outdoor activities).  If 
those with MUD are more likely to suffer adverse health events, then the expected benefit 
of going to the ER should be higher than among non-dependents, and ceteris paribus 
marijuana dependents should visit the ER more often.  Conversely, if those with MUD 
are less likely to suffer adverse health events then their expected benefit of going to the 
ER should be lower, and we should see fewer visits to the ER.      
While the demand for ER visits (ER) will partly (or even primarily) be 
determined by H, other inputs such as M, D, factors contained in Xo (e.g., relative 
income) or Xu (e.g., future discount rate) will also influence demand by determining the 
tradeoff in utility between the consumption of ER visits and the consumption of other 
goods (including marijuana), conditional on H.15  The full demand equation for acute 
medical care may thus be expressed as 
 
                                                          
15 Since data are not available on the price of acute medical care or marijuana, these factors are also 
contained in Xu. 
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 ER = f(H(Xo, Xu, M, D, μ), Xo, Xu, M, D). (Eq. 1) 
 
Since H is unobserved, the goal of the empirical model is to estimate the reduced-form 
equation 
 
 ER = f(Xo, Xu, M , D). (Eq. 2) 
 
The effect of MUD is considered independently of other illicit drugs for several reasons.  
First, marijuana is the most commonly used illicit drug in the United States: in 2012 
roughly 7% of Americans twelve and older had used marijuana at least once in the past 
month (National Institute on Drug Abuse, 2014).  Although the risk of dependence is 
estimated to be less than for other substances such as nicotine, alcohol, or other drugs, 
roughly one in ten individuals who ever try marijuana will at some point develop 
dependence: a risk that rises to one in two among daily users (Copeland & Swift, 2009).  
Second, marijuana is policy-relevant in isolation given the current political climate where 
the need to assess the potential costs of expanded marijuana use, and the subsequent 
potential for increased levels of marijuana use disorder, is a pressing issue at the state and 
federal level.  Finally, there is reason to believe that the effect of marijuana on demand 
for acute medical care may differ to that of other illicit drugs.  In general, marijuana is 
substantially cheaper in monetary terms than many other illicit drugs (Fries, Anthony, 
Cseko, Gaither, & Sculman, 2008) and due to the relative prevalence of marijuana is also 
likely cheaper in time costs to obtain.  Moreover, consumption methods for marijuana are 
generally less prone to directly cause disease (e.g., infection), or to result in direct health 
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shocks from accidental overdose or substance adulteration (Ashton, 2001; British 
Medical Association, 2013).   
One remaining identification issue is that Xu is not observed.  Since M is a 
function of Xu, failure to condition on these unobservable factors will produce estimates 
that are confounded by the joint relationship of Y and M to Xu.  To account for this, I 
utilize a nonlinear instrumental variables method introduced by Terza (1998, 2009).  By 
assuming that Xu is continuous and standard normally distributed conditional on 
observable covariates (and with at least one valid instrument that is correlated with M and 
independent of Y conditional on Xo), I am able to condition on Xu, which renders M 
exogenous to Y.  This approach will be addressed further in the empirical section. 
5. Data and Variables 
 
5.1. NSDUH 
 
The National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) is a nationally 
representative sample of non-institutionalized Americans age twelve and older, funded by 
the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration.  The survey is a 
repeated cross-section conducted annually and includes approximately 70,000 
observations per year, of which roughly 55,000 are available in the public use data set.  
The observations not in the public use file are dropped at random to help ensure that 
responses are not identifiable, and the sampling weights are adjusted to account for their 
deletion.  Therefore, the available observations should retain their representativeness, and 
the randomness of the process should alleviate concern about the possibility of 
endogeneity being introduced into the sampling procedure.  
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The NSDUH is uniquely suited to the present study since it is administered with 
the primary intent of obtaining information regarding substance use, including marijuana 
and other illicit drugs, as well as licit substances like alcohol and nicotine.  In addition to 
information regarding annual ER visits, the data contain a rich collection of demographic 
and socioeconomic characteristics.  The data also provide information regarding 
respondent health, as well as personality traits that may be correlated with substance use 
or healthcare demand such as preferences for risk-taking or dangerous behavior.   
My analysis sample is limited to Medicaid recipients between 18 and 64 years of 
age.  From an initial sample of 30,893, roughly 6% of observations (1,575) report an 
annual family income of over $75,000.  There are several plausible explanations for 
receipt of Medicaid with such high income.  Financial eligibility for Medicaid is adjusted 
according to the number of children an individual has.  If a respondent has many 
children, then $75,000 may not exceed the threshold to surrender eligibility.  Another 
possibility is that an individual who qualifies for supplemental security income (SSI) may 
qualify automatically for Medicaid.  The family income may exceed $75,000 if one or 
more non-disabled family member(s) works.  However, in the data individuals reporting 
an income over $75,000 do not have more children, on average, nor are they more likely 
to report disability.  I therefore assume that individuals reporting such a high income are 
either incorrect about their income, or incorrect about qualifying for Medicaid, and 
anyone reporting over $75,000 in annual family income is dropped from the sample.  
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From the remaining sample of 29,318 respondents, I drop 1,392 observations due 
to missing responses.16  This leaves a final sample of 27,841 (19,766 females and 8,075 
males).  Sampling weights are provided with the data to ensure national 
representativeness and also to account for survey non-response that is potentially 
endogenous.  Unweighted data may also be heteroskedastic, in which case the sampling 
weights will improve the precision of the estimates (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005).  
Therefore, all regressions are weighted to account for both the sampling design, and the 
possibility of endogenous sampling.  It is also common in the economic literature to split 
the analysis between males and females when drug use is an independent variable of 
interest (French, Roebuck, & Alexandre, 2001; MacDonald & Pudney, 2000; Popovici & 
French, 2014) particularly when the dependent variable relates to health or healthcare 
(French et al., 2011; McGeary & French, 2000; Van Ours & Williams, 2012).  This 
approach has also recently been used when considering Medicaid recipients or potential 
Medicaid recipients (Brown & Finkelstein, 2008; Hamersma & Kim, 2013) and so I 
adopt this approach moving forward.   
5.2. Variables and Summary Statistics 
 The variables used in this analysis may be divided into five broad groups: the 
dependent variable, independent variable of interest, instruments, and controls.  Table 13 
describes the distribution of ER visits, while Table 14 provides weighted summary 
statistics for all five groups of variables. 
                                                          
16 This includes 849 missing responses for annual ER visits, 107 missing responses for the instrumental 
variable, and 436 missing responses for other independent variables.  Observations dropped due to missing 
data are assumed to be missing at random. 
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Table 13 
Weighted Sample Means by Gender 
 Female Male 
Dependent Variable   
ER Visits 1.455 (2.754) 1.202 (2.550) 
Independent Variable of Interest  
Marijuana Use Disorder 0.022 (0.146) 0.047 (0.212) 
     Dependence Only 0.016 (0.127) 0.032 (0.176) 
     Marijuana Abuse 0.005 (0.073) 0.015 (0.122) 
Instrumental Variables   
Neither Approve  0.506 (0.500) 0.579 (0.494) 
Nor Disapprove   
Somewhat Disapprove 0.102 (0.303) 0.111 (0.315) 
Strongly Disapprove 0.392 (0.488) 0.310 (0.462) 
Demographic and Household Characteristics  
White  0.441 (0.497) 0.480 (0.500) 
Black  0.268 (0.443) 0.237 (0.426) 
Asian  0.025 (0.155) 0.029 (0.169) 
Other  0.039 (0.194) 0.032 (0.176) 
Hispanic  0.228 (0.419) 0.222 (0.415) 
Age 18-24 0.219 (0.414) 0.208 (0.406) 
Age 25-29 0.189 (0.392) 0.123 (0.328) 
Age 30-34 0.125 (0.331) 0.095 (0.293) 
age 35-49 0.276 (0.447) 0.314 (0.464) 
age 50-64 0.191 (0.393) 0.261 (0.439) 
Married  0.248 (0.432) 0.305 (0.461) 
Not Married 0.280 (0.449) 0.200 (0.400) 
Never Married 0.472 (0.499) 0.495 (0.500) 
Kids  1.338 (1.127) 0.899 (1.111) 
Pregnant 0.070 (0.256) - 
No HH Member Over 65 0.917 (0.276) 0.885 (0.319) 
1 HH Member Over 65 0.072 (0.258) 0.095 (0.293) 
2+ HH Members Over 65 0.011 (0.105) 0.021 (0.142) 
CBSA Pop. > 1 Million 0.501 (0.500) 0.489 (0.500) 
CBSA Pop. < 1 Million 0.420 (0.494) 0.418 (0.493) 
Does Not Live in CBSA 0.072 (0.258) 0.094 (0.291) 
Human Capital and Financial Resources 
Less than High School 0.329 (0.470) 0.391 (0.488) 
High School 0.388 (0.487) 0.385 (0.487) 
Some College 0.229 (0.420) 0.166 (0.372) 
College Graduate 0.054 (0.226) 0.059 (0.235) 
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Table 13 
(Cont.) 
 Female Male 
Human Capital and Financial Resources (cont.) 
Full Time 0.192 (0.394) 0.241 (0.428) 
Part Time 0.142 (0.349) 0.115 (0.319) 
Disabled – No SSI 0.088 (0.283) 0.140 (0.346) 
Disabled and Collects SSI 0.155 (0.362) 0.214 (0.410) 
Did Not Work Last Week 0.422 (0.494) 0.291 (0.454) 
Family Income < $20,000 0.597 (0.491) 0.567 (0.495) 
Family Income $20-50,000 0.346 (0.476) 0.366 (0.482) 
Family Income > $50,000 0.058 (0.233) 0.067 (0.250) 
Private Insurance 0.070 (0.255) 0.090 (0.286) 
Family Collects Food Stamps 0.585 (0.493) 0.487 (0.500) 
Family Collects Public Asst 0.190 (0.392) 0.124 (0.329) 
Family Collects SSI 0.133 (0.339) 0.136 (0.343) 
0 Phone Lines 0.324 (0.468) 0.320 (0.466) 
1 Phone Line 0.644 (0.479) 0.646 (0.478) 
2 Phone Lines 0.032 (0.175) 0.035 (0.183) 
Other Substance Use Disorders 
Other Drug Use Disorder 0.031 (0.172) 0.048 (0.214) 
Alcohol Use Disorder 0.064 (0.245) 0.123 (0.329) 
Nicotine Use Disorder 0.276(0.447) 0.337 (0.473) 
Supplementary Control Variables - Health 
Asthma 0.131 (0.338) 0.080 (0.272) 
Bronchitis 0.068 (0.251) 0.044 (0.206) 
Pneumonia 0.022 (0.147) 0.016 (0.127) 
Sinusitis 0.050 (0.218) 0.017 (0.128) 
Stroke 0.008 (0.088) 0.011 (0.105) 
High Blood Pressure 0.141 (0.348) 0.153 (0.360) 
Heart Disease 0.034 (0.181) 0.045 (0.208) 
Diabetes 0.078 (0.268) 0.082 (0.274) 
Hepatitis 0.010 (0.098) 0.025 (0.156) 
STD 0.028 (0.164) 0.008 (0.089) 
HIV 0.003 (0.053) 0.014 (0.118) 
Ulcer 0.024 (0.054) 0.023 (0.149) 
Other Disease 0.009 (0.095) 0.016 (0.127) 
Depression 0.172 (0.378) 0.111 (0.314) 
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Table 13 
(Cont.) 
 Female Male 
Supplementary Control Variables – Attitudes and Beliefs 
Risk 0.106 (0.307) 0.195 (0.040) 
Danger  0.123 (0.329) 0.238 (0.043) 
Seatbelt  0.084 (0.277) 0.129 (0.396) 
Religion Important 0.783 (0.412) 0.700 (0.426) 
Service Attender 0.345 (0.475) 0.271 (0.444) 
Religious Friends 0.373 (0.484) 0.375 (0.375) 
Relig. Affects Decisions 0.727 (0.446) 0.657 (0.657) 
Supplementary Control Variables – Illegal Activities 
Ever Arrested 0.206 (0.404) 0.421 (0.494) 
Offered Drugs 0.120 (0.325) 0.194 (0.396) 
Time Control Variables   
2005 0.139 (0.346) 0.122 (0.327) 
2006 0.125 (0.331) 0.126 (0.332) 
2007 0.140 (0.347) 0.138 (0.345) 
2008 0.134 (0.340) 0.123 (0.329) 
2009 0.189 (0.346) 0.147 (0.354) 
2010 0.155 (0.362) 0.159 (0.366) 
2011 0.168 (0.374) 0.184 (0.388) 
Quarter 1 0.226 (0.418) 0.237 (0.426) 
Quarter 2 0.260 (0.438) 0.268 (0.443) 
Quarter 3 0.266 (0.442) 0.249 (0.432) 
Quarter 4  0.248 (0.432) 0.245 (0.430) 
N 19766 
[9,719,097] 
8,075 
[4,966,773] 
Notes.  Standard deviation in parentheses.  Brackets contain the population size represented by the 
weighted data.  Risk refers to often or always preferring to participate in risky behavior.  Danger refers to 
often or always preferring to participate in dangerous behavior.  No seatbelt indicates an individual rarely 
or never wears a seatbelt when riding as a passenger in a car.   
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Table 14 
Weighted Distribution of Annual ER Visits 
 Female Male 
0 0.473 0.550 
1 0.202 0.191 
2 0.159 0.131 
3 0.065 0.048 
4 0.030 0.027 
5-10 0.057 0.039 
11-15 0.015 0.010 
16-20 0.004 0.001 
21-25 0.004 0.002 
>25 0.002 0.002 
N 19,766 
[9,719,097] 
8,075 
[4,966,773] 
Notes.  Brackets contain the population represented by the weighted data.  Values in the table are collapsed 
due to the rarity of high-valued outcomes, but the analysis considers the full, unaltered distribution of ER 
visits. 
  
 The dependent variable is the count of total ER visits in the past twelve months.  
Females visited the ER approximately 1.5 times in the past year while males attended 1.2 
times.  Roughly half of respondents did not visit the ER in the past year, while 20% went 
one time, 15% went twice, and roughly 5% went more than 4 times.  Fewer than 2% of 
males or females went more than 10 times.  
The primary independent variable of interest is a binary indicator for marijuana 
use disorder (MUD), which refers to either abuse or dependence upon marijuana in the 
past twelve months.  Definitions of abuse and dependence are based on the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders Fourth Edition (DSM-IV).  The DSM-IV was 
published by the American Psychiatric Association in 1994 and serves as the medical 
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standard for diagnosing mental health disorders.17  According to the DSM-IV individuals 
are substance abusers if they meet 1 of 4 substance abuse measures but are not dependent 
on the substance.  Substance dependence indicates that they meet 3 of 6 DSM 
dependence criteria, and therefore the two diagnoses are mutually exclusive, with 
dependence being a more severe level of use than abuse.   Diagnostic criteria for abuse 
and dependence are listed in Appendix D.18   
Roughly 2% of females and 5% of males are classified as having MUD.  Rates of 
MUD among individuals who have used marijuana at least once in the past year are 15% 
and 21%, respectively.  A brief descriptive analysis comparing respondents with MUD to 
those without is presented in section 4.3.   
 When allowing for MUD to be endogenous, identification of the coefficient for 
marijuana dependence requires one or more variables that are excluded from the equation 
for ER visits—that is, instrumental variables.  Valid instruments must be both correlated 
with MUD conditional on Xo and also independent of acute medical care use conditional 
on Xo.  In the current data, one measure that is plausibly independent of the process 
generating ER visits is the respondent’s opinion of another adult trying marijuana once or 
twice.  Respondents were asked “How do you feel about adults trying hashish once or 
twice?”  Responses include “neither approve nor disapprove,” “somewhat disapprove,” 
and “strongly disapprove,” as well as “don’t know” and “refused.”  I create dummy 
                                                          
17 The DSM-V was published in 2013, but the updated version has not yet been adopted by the NSDUH 
survey.  Version V has eliminated the distinction between abuse and dependence, classifying both as “use 
disorder.” 
 
18 Alcohol and certain “hard drugs” (e.g., heroin, cocaine, painkillers, etc.) also have a 7th dependence 
criterion that refers to withdrawal symptoms.  This is not a determining factor for marijuana or nicotine 
dependence. 
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variables for both slight and strong disapproval, in reference to all other possible 
responses (roughly 1.3% of respondents did not know or refused).  Roughly 1/2 of 
respondents neither approved nor disapproved of adults trying marijuana, while 
approximately 1/3 strongly disapprove, and the remainder disapprove somewhat. 
The controls variables (Xo) are observable factors that may directly affect demand 
for medical care through their impact on health, or indirectly through their effect on the 
relative cost of ER visits.  Xo is split into four subsets of variables.  The organization of 
the variables is intended to group together measures that are in the same theoretical 
category (e.g., demographic controls vs. human capital controls).  The groups are also 
generally intended to correspond with the risk each set presents of introducing 
endogenous regressors to the model. 
The most basic subset of variables refers to controls for demographic and other 
household characteristics that are plausibly exogenous to ER visits, such as race/ethnicity 
(white, black, Hispanic, Asian, other).  This also includes categorical measures of age 
(18–24; 25–29; 30–34; 35–49; 50–64), which may enter the model both indirectly, as 
health stock is expected to decline with age, and directly, since risky behavior is expected 
to be negatively correlated with age.  Marital status, pregnancy status (for females), 
number of children under 18 living at home, and number of household members over age 
65 will directly affect demand for acute medical care by reducing the amount of 
household resources available for individual i.  These variables may also capture other 
types of heterogeneity, as married individuals and/or parents may behave differently to 
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single or childless individuals.19  The size of the Core Based Statistical Area (> 1 million, 
< 1 million, or no CBSA) in which the respondent lives controls for the access to both 
acute medical care as well as illicit drugs.   
Roughly 45% of the sample (both male and female) is white, with the other half 
being split between black and Hispanic.20  The demographic distribution of the sample is 
roughly consistent with national averages reported by CMS.  Nationwide in 2009, 
Medicaid beneficiaries were 59% female (41% male), and 41% white (23% black, and 
22% Hispanic).21  The sample is split roughly evenly among all age categories, with the 
exception of 30–34 year olds who comprise about 10%, and 35–49 year olds who 
comprise about 30% of the sample.  Only 25–30% of respondents are currently married, 
and the vast majority (roughly 90%) does not have any household members over 65 
living with them.  Seven percent of females are pregnant at the time of the survey, and on 
average, females have 1.4 children, while males have less than 1.22 
Another subset of control variables contains measures of human capital, 
employment, and financial resources.  Education (less than a high school diploma, high 
school, some college, and college graduate) provides a measure of human capital, which 
is expected to increase the efficiency with which individuals “produce” health 
                                                          
19 Whether these variables “cause” individual attributes to change or merely signal their presence (e.g., 
marriageability signals greater responsibility) is irrelevant to the current analysis. 
 
20 The NSDUH data are coded such that anyone who self-classifies as “white-Hispanic” or “black-
Hispanic” etc. is categorized as Hispanic, not white or black. 
 
21 CMS: Medicaid Statistical Information System, 2014.  Retrieved May 25, 2014, from 
http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Computer-Data-and-
Systems/MedicaidDataSourcesGenInfo/MSIS-Tables.html 
 
22 The number of children in the public use data are top-coded at 2, which explains why the mean number 
of children in the sample may appear small. 
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(Grossman, 1972).  Employment status (full time, part time, or did not work last week) 
accounts for the opportunity cost of time spent investing in health as well as time spent 
receiving acute medical care.  Additional employment categories include individuals who 
reported that they did not work the previous week due to disability but did not collect 
supplemental security income (SSI), and those who reported that they did not work due to 
disability and do collect SSI.  Categorical family income (<$20,000; $20,000–$50,000; 
$50,001–$75,000) proxies for financial resources available to invest in health or to 
directly purchase acute medical care or drugs (recall that observations reporting more 
than $75,000 in annual family income were dropped from the sample).  Three additional 
proxies for financial resources include whether any member of the family collects food 
stamps, whether any member of the family collects welfare, job placement assistance, or 
childcare assistance, and whether anyone in the respondent’s family besides the 
respondent collects supplemental security income.23  I also include an indicator for 
possession of private insurance, which directly affects the price of visiting the ER.24  The 
number of phone lines (0, 1, or 2) in the house is included as a final proxy for financial 
resources.   
Over 60% of respondents reported that they did not work for pay in the previous 
week, and consequently about 60% of the sample reports an annual family income of less 
                                                          
23 Information is not provided on whether the respondent collects SSI him or herself.  Therefore, if an 
individual reports not working due to disability and also indicates that somebody in their family collects 
SSI, I code that individual as disabled and collecting SSI.  If an individual reports not working due to 
disability but also indicates that nobody in the family collects SSI, they are coded as disabled without SSI.  
Therefore the indicator for “family collects SSI” indicates that the family receives SSI and the respondent 
does not self-report a disability. 
 
24 Possession of private insurance does not automatically disqualify one from qualifying for Medicaid.  It is 
conceivable to envision low-income individuals (particularly those with children) receiving some form of 
employer-provided insurance but still falling below the income threshold for Medicaid. 
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than $20,000.  Only about 5% of respondents are college graduates, while roughly one-
third of the respondents have only a high school diploma, and another one-third of the 
respondents did not finish high school.  Approximately half the sample has at least one 
family member on food stamps, and 20% of families have at least one member collecting 
welfare, job placement assistance, or childcare assistance.  Over 60% of families have at 
least one phone line but nearly one-third of families have none.  Less than 10% of 
respondents report access to private insurance.  These results are consistent with the low-
income status expected among Medicaid recipients, and support the possibility that ER 
visits may be generated differently among this subsample compared to the US population 
at large. 
The set of controls most strongly suspected to be endogenous are indicators for 
alcohol use disorder, nicotine use disorder, and a use disorder for any illicit drug besides 
marijuana (so-called “hard” drugs).  Three percent of females and 5% of males have a 
hard drug use disorder, while 6% of females and 12% of males have an alcohol use 
disorder, and roughly 30% of males and females have a nicotine use disorder.  These 
other substance use disorders are expected to either reduce individual health stock, or to 
directly cause an adverse health event (e.g., alcohol poisoning or drug overdose), 
although they could have indirect effects on demand for ER visits.  Overall, substance 
dependence is expected to be positively correlated with ER visits. 
The fourth and final set of controls refers to additional variables used for 
robustness checks in Section 7.4.  These include variables controlling for the 
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respondent’s health, the respondent’s attitudes and beliefs, and the respondent’s 
participation in illegal activities. 
Measures of health include binary indicators for whether the respondent has been 
diagnosed by a physician with any of the following in the past year: asthma, bronchitis, 
pneumonia, sinusitis, stroke, high blood pressure, heart disease, diabetes, hepatitis, STD, 
HIV, ulcer, lung cancer, liver cirrhosis, pancreatitis, and tuberculosis.25  An indicator for 
depression is also included to account for potential mental health confounders.26  Health 
is considered to be the primary factor that affects demand for ER visits.  By controlling 
for as many diseases as possible, I am able to account for one of the key vectors through 
which MUD may influence demand for ER visits.  If marijuana consumption is positively 
correlated with disease as predicted by the medical literature (Brook et al., 2008; Gordon 
et al., 2013; Mittleman et al., 2001; Polen et al., 1993; Rey & Tennent, 2002; Schuster et 
al., 2012; Sidney et al., 1997; Smith & Crespo, 2001), then inclusion of these controls 
should decrease the value of the coefficient on MUD.  However, these variables may be 
endogenous to ER utilization since affirmative response requires diagnosis by a medical 
professional, which may occur as the result of an ER visits.   
Measures of attitudes and beliefs refer to the respondent’s preference for risky or 
dangerous behavior, as well as the importance they ascribe to their religious beliefs.  
Preference for risk-taking, preference for danger, and actual risky-taking (i.e., seat belt 
use) are measured as the response to the following questions: “How often do you like to 
                                                          
25 Due to the relatively rarity of lung cancer, cirrhosis, pancreatitis, and tuberculosis, these four diseases are 
lumped together into a single “other disease” category. 
 
26 Although a more specific mental health measure is also available, the questions and scoring vary 
significantly between survey years, prohibiting use of a single measure across the multiple survey years. 
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test yourself by doing something a little risky?”; “How often do you get a kick out of 
doing things that are a little dangerous?”; and “How often do you wear a seatbelt when 
you ride in the front passenger seat of the car?”27  Possible responses are “Never,” 
“Seldom,” “Often,” and “Always.”   Binary indicators were created for individuals who 
“Often” and “Always” seek risk or danger, and who “Seldom” or “Never” wear a 
seatbelt.   
Individual religiosity is determined by the response to four questions.  Three 
questions ask for agreement/disagreement with the following statements: “My religious 
beliefs are very important,” “My religious beliefs influence my decision making,” and “It 
is important that my friends share my religious beliefs.”  Responses range from strongly 
disagree to strongly agree.  The responses are transformed into binary variables reflecting 
agreement (1) or disagreement (0).  The final measure of religiosity is the number of 
religious services attended in the past 12 months.  Responses include six categories 
ranging from never to more than once per week.  Individuals who attended at least 6-24 
times in the past year are coded as attenders (1), while those attending fewer than 6 times 
are coded as non-attenders (0).28   
Risk-taking or dangerous behavior is expected to increase the demand for ER 
visits by increasing the probability of an adverse health event.  To the extent that 
                                                          
27 A separate question asked how often a seatbelt was worn when driving a car.  A possible response to this 
was “I do not drive.”  This was not a possible response to the passenger seat belt question.  Non-response to 
the passenger seatbelt question was less than for other questions regarding risk/danger suggesting that few 
if any non-drivers refused to answer the passenger question. 
 
28 The range 6–24 is a full response category.  Therefore the two alternatives were to say that attendance 
once every two months is the minimum for an attender or that twice in one month is the minimum.  I opted 
for the former. 
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individuals who develop MUD have different preferences for risky behavior, controlling 
for these preferences should help to eliminate omitted variables bias.  Religious beliefs 
may also affect behavior in ways that affect the demand for ER visits, and are expected to 
be negatively correlated with MUD since the moral code of many of the religions 
common in the United States prohibits the use of drugs. 
The controls for illegal activities consist of binary indicators for affirmative 
response to the questions “Not counting minor traffic violations, have you ever been 
arrested and booked for breaking the law?” and “In the past 30 days has anyone 
approached you to sell you an illegal drug?”  Both these variables may be endogenous to 
MUD.  Presumably individuals with high levels of marijuana use are frequently offered 
drugs, while in many states the use of marijuana can lead to arrest.  However, individuals 
with MUD may be involved in other risky or illegal activities besides drug use that could 
be correlated with demand for ER visits (whether or not they state a preference for risky 
activities).  Therefore, omission of these controls may bias estimates of the relationship 
between MUD and ER visits. 
Two control variables that are not available in the public use NSDUH data are 
state of residence or region of the country.  Although drug regulations and Medicaid 
participation criteria vary from state to state, the unobserved effect of state-specific and 
regional attributes should be absorbed by Xu, which should in turn be accounted for by 
the instrumental variables approach as detailed in Section 6.  Since the NSDUH data are 
intended to be nationally representative, the estimated relationship between marijuana 
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dependence and healthcare utilization should be consistent with the average relationship 
that would be observed if state indicators were available.  
5.3. Descriptive Analysis 
Table 15 presents the weighted mean of annual ER visits, rates of other substance 
use disorders (hard drugs, nicotine, alcohol), and opinion of other adults trying marijuana, 
by MUD.  The comparison shows that females with MUD visit the ER significantly more 
times than those without.  However, males and females with MUD are significantly more 
likely to be dependent on any of the three other substances, which may be correlated with 
negative health outcomes.  Table 15 also suggests that the instrumental variables are 
correlated with MUD, as expected.  Females with a marijuana use disorder are 30 
percentage points less likely to strongly disapprove of adults trying marijuana, while 
males with MUD are 25 percentage points less likely.  The difference is significant in 
both cases.  Females with MUD are also significantly less likely to somewhat disapprove, 
a difference of roughly 4 percentage points. 
Table 16 compares the full distribution of ER visits between those with and 
without MUD.  Among both males and females those with MUD are significantly more 
likely to visit the ER.  Females with MUD are significantly more likely to visit between 
11 and 20 times, while males with MUD are significantly more likely to visit the ER one 
time. 
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Table 15 
Comparison of Weighted Means by Marijuana Use Disorder 
 Females Males 
 No Marijuana 
Use Disorder 
Marijuana 
Use Disorder 
No Marijuana 
Use Disorder 
Marijuana 
Use Disorder 
Dependent Variable     
ER Visits 1.439 2.184** 1.189 1.478* 
 (2.715) (4.389) (2.541) (2.892) 
Other Substance Dependence    
Other Drug Dependence 0.025 0.260*** 0.037 0.270*** 
 (0.156) (0.441) (0.190) (0.444) 
Alcohol Dependence 0.058 0.334*** 0.107 0.461*** 
 (0.234) (0.472) (0.309) (0.499) 
Nicotine Dependence 0.271 0.509*** 0.327 0.548*** 
 (0.448) (0.500) (0.469) (0.498) 
Instrumental Variables     
Somewhat Disapprove 0.103  (0.302) 
0.066*** 
(0.248) 
0.110 
(0.313) 
0.136 
(0.343) 
Strongly Disapprove 0.399 (0.488) 
0.092*** 
(0.358) 
0.322 
(0.467) 
0.051*** 
(0.219) 
N 19,101 
[9,506,713] 
665 
[212,384] 
7,458 
[4,733,374] 
617 
[233,399] 
Notes.  Standard deviation in parentheses.  Brackets contain the population represented by the weighted 
data.  Asterisks denote significant difference in weighted means between those with and without MUD 
within a gender. *** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10 
 
Overall, descriptive analysis suggests that those of either gender with MUD are 
generally more likely to use the ER.   However, both males and females with MUD are 
more likely to have other substance use disorders, which may be confounding the results.  
Marijuana use disorder and ER utilization are both complex processes and a more 
thorough analytic approach is necessary to disentangle the causal impact of MUD on ER 
utilization.  The empirical model used to estimate this causal effect is detailed in the next 
section.  
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Table 16 
Weighted Distribution of Annual ER Visits by Marijuana Use Disorder 
 Females 
With No 
Marijuana Use 
Disorder 
Females 
With 
Marijuana 
Use Disorder 
Males 
With No 
Marijuana Use 
Disorder 
Males 
With 
Marijuana Use 
Disorder 
0 0.477 0.327*** 0.559 0.426*** 
1 0.201 0.223 0.188 0.270** 
2 0.158 0.194 0.129 0.162 
3 0.064 0.111 0.047 0.061 
4 0.030 0.045 0.027 0.019 
5–10 0.058 0.052 0.039 0.049 
11–15 0.014 0.043** 0.010 0.004 
16–20 0.004 0.011*** 0.001 0.002 
21–25 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.005 
>25 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.003 
N 19,101 
[9,506,713] 
665 
[212,384] 
7,458 
[4,733,374] 
617 
[233,399] 
 
Notes.  Brackets contain the population represented by the weighted data.  Asterisks denote significant 
difference between marijuana dependents and non-dependents within a given gender.  Significance is 
determined by a survey-adjusted χ2 statistic. ***p < 0.01 **p < 0.05 *p < 0.10.  Values in the table are 
collapsed due to the rarity of high-valued outcomes, but the analysis considers the full, unaltered 
distribution of ER visits. 
 
6. Empirical Approach 
 The estimation objective is the average effect of M on ER where ER is the 
reduced form demand for emergency room visits as a function of Xo, Xu, M, and D.  This 
average “treatment” effect (ATE) of marijuana use disorder measures the partial change 
in demand for ER visits that occurs (or would occur) if an average individual in the 
population switched from a non-dependent to a dependent state.   The ATE can be 
defined as: 
 
 ATE = E[𝐸[𝐸𝐸1]–  𝐸[𝐸𝐸0]] = 𝐸[𝐸[𝐸𝐸|𝑋,𝑀 =  1] –  𝐸[𝐸𝐸|𝑋,𝑀 = 0]] (Eq. 3) 
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where ER1 is the count of ER visits that did (or would) occur if an individual suffers from 
MUD, and ER0 is the count that did (or would) occur if the same individual does not have 
a marijuana use disorder. 
 Estimation is complicated by the fact that for a given individual only one state is 
observed: individual i either suffers from MUD or not.  The observed value of M is not 
randomly assigned, but rather depends on characteristics of an individual or her 
environment (X) that may also affect demand for acute healthcare, some of which are 
observed (Xo) and some of which are not (Xu).  Failure to account for this “selection” into 
MUD will lead to biased and inconsistent estimates of the effect of MUD on healthcare 
utilization.   
 Consistent estimation of the ATE is possible given a vector of control variables X 
that contains all variables correlated with ER and M.  Following Terza (2009), I express 
these variables as X = [Xo D Xu] where Xo is a vector of observable characteristics, D is a 
vector of other possible substance use disorders (alcohol, nicotine, or hard drugs) and Xu 
is a continuous scalar representing the combined effect of unobservable characteristics 
(including measurement error).  As discussed in Section 4, Xo, D, and Xu may affect ER 
directly but may also operate indirectly through their effect on H.  
I allow for M to be endogenous to health (and therefore to utilization of medical 
care) since the consumption of marijuana and medical care may depend, in part, on 
common unobservable factors (Xu).  For example, potential marijuana users may discount 
the future higher than non-potential users, and consequently invest less in their health 
stock.  Use of illicit drugs may also reflect a low stock of knowledge, both about the 
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danger of illicit drug use and of other health behaviors that may change one’s stock of 
health (e.g., proper exercise or nutrition).29,30 
 Following the approach discussed in Terza (2009), the conditional expectation of 
ER can be expressed as 
 
 𝐸[𝐸𝐸|𝑀,𝑋]  =  1
𝑛
∑ 𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑀𝑖𝛽𝑚 + 𝑋𝑜𝑜𝛽𝑜 + 𝐷𝑖𝛽𝐷 + 𝑋𝑢𝑜𝛽𝑢)𝑊𝑖𝑖
∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑖
 (Eq. 4) 
 
where Wi refers to the individual-level sampling weights. 
 Marijuana use disorder can be represented by a probit specification such that M = 
1(M* > 0) where: 
 
 M * = Wδ + Xu, (Eq. 5) 
 
W = [Xo D W+], W+ is a vector of identifying instruments and Xu is standard normally 
distributed conditional on W and independent of W.  Unobserved correlation between M 
and ER occurs due to a joint dependence upon Xu, and therefore M and ER are 
independent conditional on Xo, D, and Xu.   
 Xu can be conditioned out of the ATE by integrating over the assumed density.  
Since Xu is assumed to be standard normally distributed conditional on W the estimated 
ATE can be expressed as 
 
                                                          
29 For example, Smith and Crespo (2001) find that marijuana users consume more sodium, pork, and 
cheese, but less fruit than non-users. 
 
30 Individuals with a high propensity to consume marijuana may also have a less reliable 12-month recall, 
and therefore measurement error in Y may also be a function of Xu.  
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 𝐴𝐴𝐸� =  1
𝑛
∑ ∫ 𝐸�𝐸𝐸1𝚤� − 𝐸[𝐸𝐸0𝚤�]]𝜑(𝑋𝑢)𝑑𝑋𝑢
∞
−∞
𝑛
𝑜=1  (Eq. 6) 
 
where φ(∙)is a standard normal density, E�Y1ı�� is equivalent to (4) with Mi = 1, and E[Y0ı� ] 
is equivalent to (4) with Mi = 0.  The ATE can be computed from (6) by obtaining 
consistent estimates for the parameters βm, βo, and βu. 
 To obtain parameter estimates, an estimator must be selected that appropriately 
accounts for the data generating process that produces ER visits.  Consistent with a 
traditional count measure, the number of ER visits is the sum of a number of binary 
outcomes.  Under the assumptions of the conceptual model, a severe enough health event 
will result in a visit to the ER.  While a single underlying condition may trigger repeated 
ER visits, a single ER visit cannot directly cause another one.  (That is, the condition may 
be severe enough that the patient will remain in the hospital but the severity of the shock 
cannot result in a repeat admission to the ER during the same trip to the hospital.)  ER 
visits may thus be modeled by a single count distribution.   
 I model ER visits using the two-stage nonlinear least squares (2SNLS) approach 
introduced by Terza (1998).  Although less efficient than the full information maximum 
likelihood (FIML) approach proposed by Terza (1998, 2009), 2SNLS is more robust to 
misspecification since only the conditional mean of ER visits needs to be specified rather 
than the entire conditional distribution (although both approaches requires that the 
distribution of Xu is correctly specified).  As discussed previously, I assume Xu is 
standard normally distributed conditional on W.  Then, as presented in Terza (1998) the 
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exponential conditional expectation of ER when Xu is standard normally distributed can 
be expressed as: 
 
E[ER|W,M]=𝑀 𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑀𝛽𝑀  +  𝑋𝑜𝛽𝑜+ + 𝐷𝛽𝐷)
𝛷�𝑊𝛿�+𝛽𝑢�
𝛷�𝑊𝛿��
+ (1 −𝑀)𝑒𝑒𝑒( 𝑋𝑜𝛽𝑜+ +
𝐷𝛽𝐷)
𝛷�−𝑊𝛿�−𝛽𝑢�
𝛷�−𝑊𝛿��
   (7) 
 
where β𝑜+ contains a constant term that is shifted upward by �
𝛽𝑢2
2
� and δ� refers to estimates 
obtained from probit regression of M.  Applying NLS to (7) allows for consistent 
estimates of βM, βo, and βu, which may be substituted into (6) to produce estimates of the 
ATE with respect to ER visits.  The ATE thus captures the expected change in the 
number of ER visits that would occur if all individuals in the population switched from a 
state of no MUD to MUD.  Unfortunately, cluster identifiers are unavailable in the 
public-use data so standard errors are computed using the Huber-White sandwich 
estimator.31  Additionally, the covariance matrix must be adjusted for the first stage 
estimation of δ, an adjustment discussed further in Appendix E. 
 Specification of the model is complicated by the fact that elements of Xo may be 
endogenous to ER visits and/or marijuana use disorder (i.e., elements of Xo may also be 
functions of Xu).  For instance, educational and employment decisions may be correlated 
with unobservable factors (e.g., future discount rate) that are expected to influence the 
decision to consume drugs, or the decision to invest in one’s health stock.  Other 
                                                          
31 Estimates of the standard error should be clustered within sampling units.  However, sampling unit 
identifiers are not provided in the public use data file and estimation of clustered standard errors is thus 
impossible.   
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measures of substance use disorder (hard drugs, alcohol, and nicotine) are particularly 
problematic, since all forms of substance use are likely generated by similar processes.  
(This is especially true for hard drugs since in most states consumption of nicotine and 
alcohol is legal, while consumption of hard drugs or marijuana is prohibited.) 
 Estimates of parameters for endogenous variables will not be consistent.  
Moreover, any endogenous variable in the model for ER visits that is correlated with M 
will also render estimates of the coefficient for M inconsistent (and by extension, 
estimates of the ATE as well.)  Additionally, variables endogenously correlated with the 
probability of marijuana use disorder may lead to inconsistent estimates of δ that in turn 
affect second stage estimation of the model for ER visits.   
The solution is not as simple as omitting any variables that are considered to be 
endogenous.  Although the use of instrumental variables in the second stage should 
render the coefficient estimate for M consistent despite the omission of variables that 
belong in the second stage equation, the omission of variables that belong in the first-
stage probit equation for M will render estimates of δ inconsistent, and by extension 
affect second stage estimates.  However, in order for the instrumental variables strategy 
to be feasible, all variables included in the first stage that do not meet the criteria to be 
exclusion restrictions must also be included in the second stage, and so variables 
endogenous to ER visits that belong in the equation for M cannot simply be omitted from 
both stages without risking additional problems.  Moreover, it is neither known with 
certainty which variables in particular are endogenous, nor the severity of the 
endogeneity problem. 
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 The approach moving forward is intended to assess the tradeoffs between 
potential omitted variables bias on the one hand and inconsistencies potentially 
introduced by endogenous variables on the other.  Ideally, a specification that minimizes 
the likelihood of endogenous regressors while maximizing the possibility for omitted 
variables bias will produce estimates very similar to one that minimizes the risk of 
omitted variables bias but maximizes the number of potentially endogenous variables.  If 
this is the case, then it bolsters the credibility of the results and suggests that the estimates 
are reasonably close to the “true” parameter values.  However, if the estimates are highly 
unstable as tradeoffs are made between endogenous regressors and omitted variables bias, 
it may suggest that the empirical model is not a good match for the data.  The analytic 
strategy is described in more detail in the following section. 
7. Results 
In this section I present results for four sets of regression analyses.  These include 
NLS estimates of the demand for ER visits; 2SNLS estimates of the demand for ER 
visits, which account for the potential endogeneity of MUD; first-stage probit estimates 
for MUD; and follow-up 2SNLS estimates, which further investigate the results from the 
first set of 2SNLS estimates.  
For the first three sets of regressions I run three separate specifications for both 
males and females to determine the stability of the estimates under various combinations 
of potential omitted variables bias and potentially endogenous regressors.  This will 
inform not only on the robustness of the results, but also provide insight into which 
variables may be more damaging to include than exclude.  The analytic strategy consists 
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of moving along the spectrum from a large risk of omitted variables bias and small risk of 
endogenous regressors, to a larger risk of endogenous regressors and reduced risk of 
omitted variables bias.  The three specifications correspond to the initial three sets of 
control variables introduced in Section 5.  In each specification a new set of variables is 
added so that the third specification contains all three sets of variables.   
The three sets of variables include controls for demographic and household 
characteristics; education, employment, and financial resources; and whether the 
respondent has a substance use disorder for hard drugs, alcohol, or nicotine.  The 
variables are grouped in such a way as to balance theoretical considerations (i.e., what 
types of variables control for roughly the same type of characteristics) with the goal of 
moving from the most plausibly exogenous set of variables to the one most suspected to 
be endogenous.  Although a handful of variables could reasonably be assigned to other 
groups, the assigned categories and order of analysis are expected to fulfill the analytic 
objective. 
In the fourth set of regressions, I conduct robustness checks of the initial 2SNLS 
results by running 2SNLS models with additional controls for health, attitudes/beliefs, 
and participation in illegal activities, corresponding to the fourth set of controls described 
in Section 5.  I also conduct 2SNLS regression without the sampling weights.  The results 
are discussed below. 
7.1. Exogenous Model Development 
Exogenous results for females and males are presented in Tables 17 and 18, 
respectively.  Among females, MUD is positively and significantly correlated with ER 
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visits in the basic demographic model.  On average, respondents with MUD visit the ER 
0.7 more times than those without, a change of roughly 1/4 of a standard deviation.  
These results are robust to the inclusion of controls for human capital.  However, 
inclusion of controls for other substance use disorders attenuates the estimated ATE by 
nearly 50%, suggesting that the previous estimates were upward biased due to the high 
prevalence of other substance use disorders among those with a marijuana use disorder.  
This is consistent with the findings of William and Skeels (2006) who show that the 
positive correlation between tobacco and marijuana use confounds the predicted effect of 
marijuana on health when tobacco is not controlled for. 
 
Table 17 
NLS Estimates of ER Visits for Females 
 Demographic Human Capital Other Substances 
Variable of Interest 
MUD 0.399**  0.394** 0.250* 
 (0.121) (0.129) (0.132) 
ATE 0.701** 0.690** 0.407 
 (0.256) (0.270) (0.242) 
Demographics 
Black  0.127* 0.081 0.104 
 (0.069) (0.072) (0.070) 
Asian  -1.028*** -0.816*** -0.763*** 
 (0.164) (0.158) (0.156) 
Other  0.025 -0.011 0.005 
 (0.112) (0.113) (0.112) 
Hispanic  -0.373*** -0.407*** -0.373*** 
 (0.064) (0.071) (0.073) 
Age 18–24 0.036 0.475*** 0.467*** 
 (0.091) (0.095) (0.094) 
Age 25–29 0.085 0.416*** 0.375*** 
 (0.092) (0.101) (0.100) 
74 
 
 
Table 17 
(Cont.) 
 Demographic Human Capital Other Substances 
Demographics (cont.) 
Age 30–34 0.051 0.297** 0.265** 
 (0.100) (0.112) (0.115) 
Age 35–49 0.149 0.260** 0.232** 
 (0.094) (0.094) (0.095) 
Not Married 0.016 -0.113 -0.114 
 (0.083) (0.086) (0.086) 
Never Married -0.145* -0.252** -0.262** 
 (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) 
Kids  -0.164*** -0.118*** -0.109*** 
 (0.027) (0.029) (0.028) 
Pregnant -0.152** -0.110* -0.102 
 (0.071) (0.064) (0.064) 
1 HH Member > 65 -0.173 -0.155 -0.160 
 (0.107) (0.106) (0.105) 
2+ HH Members > 65 0.328 0.298 0.277 
 (0.446) (0.368) (0.357) 
Small CBSA 0.163** 0.130** 0.130** 
 (0.059) (0.063) (0.064) 
No CBSA 0.107 0.001 0.003 
 (0.102) (0.114) (0.111) 
Constant 0.525*** -0.074 -0.102 
 (0.123) (0.281) (0.282) 
Human Capital 
Less than  HS  0.049 0.028 
  (0.257) (0.266) 
High School  -0.159 -0.173 
  (0.257) (0.265) 
Some College  -0.091 -0.110 
  (0.260) (0.268) 
Full Time  -0.039 -0.034 
  (0.072) (0.071) 
Part Time  -0.223*** -0.211** 
  (0.066) (0.065) 
Disable No SSI  0.690*** 0.671*** 
  (0.096) (0.094) 
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Table 17 
(Cont.) 
 Demographic Human Capital Other Substances 
Human Capital (cont.) 
Disable Collects SSI  -0.066 -0.048 
  (0.101) (0.104) 
Income < $20,000  0.231** 0.228** 
  (0.111) (0.112) 
Income $20-50,000  0.223** 0.226** 
  (0.108) (0.109) 
Insurance  -0.123 -0.103 
  (0.085) (0.084) 
Food Stamp  0.187** 0.172** 
  (0.075) (0.074) 
Public Assistance  0.065 0.059 
  (0.079) (0.080) 
Family SSI  0.146** 0.154** 
  (0.063) (0.063) 
1 Phone  -0.032 -0.022 
  (0.059) (0.059) 
2+ Phones  0.186 0.181 
  (0.174) (0.172) 
Other Substances   
Alcohol    0.114 
   (0.111) 
Nicotine    0.086 
   (0.065) 
Hard Drugs   0.267** 
   (0.117) 
N 19,101 
[9,506,713] 
19,101 
[9,506,713] 
19,101 
[9,506,713] 
Notes.  The dependent variable is annual ER visit.  All models control for year and quarter of interview.  
Omitted categories include white, age 50-64, married, no household members over 65, respondent lives in 
CBSA with population over 1 million, college education, did not work last week, family income $50,000-
$75,000, and no phone lines in household.  Huber/White robust standard errors reported in parentheses.  
Standard errors for ATE computed using Delta Method.  Brackets contain “true” number of observations 
represented by weighted estimates. *p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01. 
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Table 18 
NLS Estimates of ER Visits for Males 
 Demographic Human Capital Other Substances 
Variable of Interest 
MUD 0.201 0.026 -0.253 
 (0.139) (0.144) (0.278) 
ATE 0.265 0.030 -0.229 
 (0.199) (0.173) (0.224) 
Demographics 
Black  0.073 0.101 0.081 
 (0.124) (0.136) (0.152) 
Asian  -0.858*** -0.661** -0.375 
 (0.245) (0.255) (0.274) 
Other  0.254* 0.170 0.173 
 (0.148) (0.150) (0.166) 
Hispanic  -0.149 -0.143 0.339** 
 (0.202) (0.210) (0.153) 
Age 18–24 -0.259* 0.187 -0.071 
 (0.139) (0.150) (0.190) 
Age 25–29 -0.114 0.164 0.015 
 (0.142) (0.169) (0.176) 
Age 30–34 -0.128 0.058 -0.121 
 (0.160) (0.176) (0.259) 
Age 35–49 -0.018 0.017 0.219* 
 (0.135) (0.137) (0.128) 
Not Married 0.387** 0.291* 0.068 
 (0.135) (0.158) (0.162) 
Never Married 0.103 -0.071 -0.002 
 (0.125) (0.136) (0.160) 
Kids  -0.083* 0.009 -0.047 
 (0.043) (0.049) (0.059) 
1 HH Member > 65 0.094 0.013 0.444*** 
 (0.193) (0.197) (0.133) 
2+ HH Members > 65 -0.127 -0.082 -0.153 
 (0.217) (0.226) (0.225) 
Small CBSA 0.376*** 0.357** 0.537*** 
 (0.112) (0.119) (0.115) 
No CBSA 0.109 -0.017 0.101 
 (0.127) (0.133) (0.164) 
Constant 0.233 -0.780** -1.689** 
 (0.209) (0.368) (0.598) 
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Table 18 
(Cont.) 
 Demographic Human Capital Other Substances 
Human Capital 
Less than  HS  0.165 0.483 
  (0.265) (0.442) 
High School  0.027 0.673 
  (0.270) (0.446) 
Some College  0.144 0.664 
  (0.281) (0.464) 
Full Time  -0.157 -0.279** 
  (0.118) (0.123) 
Part Time  -0.141 -0.112 
  (0.127) (0.142) 
Disable No SSI  0.676*** 0.783*** 
  (0.142) (0.154) 
Disable Collects SSI  0.719*** 0.822*** 
  (0.127) (0.136) 
Income < $20,000  0.353** 0.730** 
  (0.161) (0.274) 
Income $20–50,000  0.306* 0.879** 
  (0.159) (0.270) 
Insurance  -0.368* -0.304* 
  (0.220) (0.172) 
Food Stamp  0.071 0.047 
  (0.119) (0.110) 
Public Assistance  0.250 0.053 
  (0.177) (0.181) 
Family SSI  0.435*** 0.540*** 
  (0.101) (0.123) 
1 Phone  0.061 -0.265** 
  (0.124) (0.116) 
2+ Phones  -0.060 -0.386* 
  (0.247) (0.222) 
Other Substances 
Alcohol    0.727*** 
   (0.108) 
Nicotine    -0.202 
   (0.127) 
Hard Drugs   0.268 
   (0.195) 
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Table 18 
(Cont.) 
 Demographic Human Capital Other Substances 
N 8,075 [4,966,773] 
8,075 
[4,966,773] 
8,075 
[4,966,773] 
Notes.  The dependent variable is annual ER visit.  All models control for year and quarter of interview.  
Omitted categories include white, age 50-64, married, no household members over 65, respondent lives in 
CBSA with population over 1 million, college education, did not work last week, family income $50,000-
$75,000, and no phone lines in household.  Huber/White robust standard errors reported in parentheses.  
Standard errors for ATE computed using Delta Method.  Brackets contain “true” number of observations 
represented by weighted estimates. *p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01. 
 
Among males, MUD is positively but insignificantly correlated with ER visits in 
the basic demographic model, resulting in roughly 0.25 additional ER visits per year.  
Inclusion of controls for human capital reduces the effect to essentially zero.  However, 
inclusion of controls for other substance use disorders renders the ATE negative such that 
respondents with MUD visit the ER roughly 0.25 fewer times per year, on average.  
Although this is not a significant result, it is consistent with the finding among females 
that the correlation between MUD and other substance use disorders may be upward 
biasing the relationship between MUD and ER visits. 
In general, the control variables are estimated to have the relationship with ER 
visits that would be expected a priori.  Among both males and females, respondents 
reporting a disability are significantly more likely to use the ER, while those with private 
insurance are significantly less likely.  Lower income is associated with more ER visits 
among both males and females, while employment is associated with fewer ER visits.  
Age is negatively correlated with ER visits among both males and females, although this 
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result is consistent with previous studies regarding drug use and ER visits (French et al., 
2000; McGeary & French, 2000). 
Among females hard drug use disorder is positively and significantly correlated 
with ER visits, and the coefficient is similar in magnitude to the coefficient for MUD  
(βM).  Among males, only alcohol use disorder is significantly correlated with ER visits, 
although hard drug use disorder is also positively correlated with ER visits, in contrast to 
the negative estimated correlation between MUD and ER visits.   
Progressing from the demographic model to the model controlling for other 
substance use disorders appears to reduce omitted variables bias, although it remains 
uncertain whether or not the estimates are biased by potential endogeneity of the control 
variables.  However, the relative stability of the estimates, particularly among females, 
suggests that the NLS model is robust to the tradeoffs between potential omitted variables 
bias and bias from potentially endogenous regressors.  At this stage it appears that MUD 
may have a small, positive correlation with ER visits, although the most comprehensive 
model suggests there may be a null, or even negative relationship among males.  As 
mentioned previously there is reason to believe that these estimates may be biased if there 
is correlation between MUD and the error term for ER visits that is not accounted for by 
the control variables.  In the next section I repeat the preceding set of specifications using 
a 2SNLS model, allowing me to control for the potential endogeneity of MUD.  
7.2. Endogenous Model Development 
 The direction and magnitude of the estimates from the 2-Stage Nonlinear Least 
Squares (2SNLS) model differ markedly from those produced by the exogenous model.  
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These results are reported in Tables 19 (females) and 20 (males).  Among females MUD 
is predicted to have a large and negative, but statistically insignificant relationship to ER 
visits.  The ATE ranges from -0.85 in the baseline demographic specification to -0.79 in 
the specification controlling for other forms of substance use disorder.  The estimate of 
βM is only significant in the specification controlling for other substance use disorders, 
and the ATE is not significant in any of the three models.  However, the coefficient for 
the unobserved heterogeneity, βu, is significant and positive in all three specifications.  
This indicates that the relationship between MUD and ER visits is significantly 
confounded by unobserved factors correlated with both MUD and the demand for ER 
visits.  As with the exogenous model, the demographic and human capital specifications 
produce similar estimates to each other, with controls for other substance use disorders 
slightly attenuating the estimates of βM and βu.     
 Among males, marijuana use disorder is also estimated to have a negative 
relationship with ER visits, although the relationship is only significant in the substance 
use disorder specification.  The estimated ATE ranges from -0.61 in the demographic 
model to -0.92 in the substance use disorder specification but is not significant in any of 
the three specifications.  βu is only significant in the substance use disorder specification, 
making it less clear than among females whether MUD is endogenous to ER visits.  
However, the sign and magnitude of the estimates for the ATE and βu are roughly similar 
to those for females, suggesting that the lack of significance may be partly due to the 
reduced sample size among males.  The pattern of 2SNLS coefficient estimates across 
specifications is similar to that from the exogenous model, with controls for human 
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capital and financial resources somewhat reducing the value of βM, and controls for 
substance use disorder substantially reducing the value of βM.   
 
Table 19 
 
2SNLS Estimates of ER Visits for Females 
 
 Demographic Human Capital Other Substances 
Variable of Interest 
MUD -0.841 -0.847 -0.745* 
 (0.590) (0.515) (0.447) 
ATE -0.858 -0.862 -0.787 
 (0.711) (0.609) (0.522) 
Demographics 
Black  0.132* 0.088 0.126* 
 (0.068) (0.071) (0.069) 
Asian  -1.027*** -0.814*** -0.738*** 
 (0.164) (0.158) (0.156) 
Other  0.028 -0.009 0.016 
 (0.114) (0.114) (0.113) 
Hispanic  -0.387*** -0.425*** -0.368*** 
 (0.066) (0.072) (0.073) 
Age 18–24 0.131 0.597*** 0.554*** 
 (0.111) (0.116) (0.103) 
Age 25–29 0.155 0.515*** 0.441*** 
 (0.104) (0.111) (0.101) 
Age 30–34 0.101 0.373** 0.309** 
 (0.106) (0.115) (0.114) 
Age 35–49 0.168* 0.291** 0.237** 
 (0.093) (0.094) (0.094) 
Not Married 0.043 -0.090 -0.100 
 (0.087) (0.088) (0.088) 
Never Married -0.112 -0.225** -0.248** 
 (0.086) (0.084) (0.083) 
Kids  -0.178*** -0.136*** -0.118*** 
 (0.029) (0.031) (0.029) 
Pregnant -0.158** -0.116* -0.107* 
 (0.071) (0.064) (0.064) 
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Table 19 
(Cont.) 
 Demographic Human Capital Other Substances 
Demographics (cont.) 
1 HH Member > 65 -0.180* -0.160 -0.149 
 (0.107) (0.106) (0.105) 
2+ HH Members > 65 0.321 0.290 0.264 
 (0.442) (0.362) (0.350) 
Small CBSA 0.170** 0.135** 0.134** 
 (0.059) (0.063) (0.064) 
No CBSA 0.102 -0.006 0.003 
 (0.102) (0.113) (0.110) 
Constant 0.536*** -0.098 -0.141 
 (0.124) (0.284) (0.283) 
Human Capital 
Less than  HS  0.062 0.022 
  (0.261) (0.273) 
High School  -0.162 -0.190 
  (0.264) (0.275) 
Some College  -0.095 -0.123 
  (0.266) (0.278) 
Full Time  -0.042 -0.029 
  (0.071) (0.070) 
Part Time  -0.215** -0.202** 
  (0.067) (0.065) 
Disable No SSI  0.709*** 0.684*** 
  (0.099) (0.097) 
Disable Collects SSI  -0.069 -0.050 
  (0.104) (0.106) 
Income < $20,000  0.219** 0.215* 
  (0.111) (0.113) 
Income $20–50,000  0.210* 0.213* 
  (0.108) (0.109) 
Insurance  -0.107 -0.085 
  (0.087) (0.087) 
Food Stamps  0.205** 0.177** 
  (0.076) (0.074) 
Public Assistance  0.079 0.074 
  (0.082) (0.083) 
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Table 19 
(Cont.) 
 Demographic Human Capital Other Substances 
Human Capital (cont.) 
Family SSI  0.149** 0.160** 
  (0.064) (0.063) 
1 Phone  -0.011 0.003 
  (0.061) (0.061) 
2+ Phones  0.191 0.192 
  (0.170) (0.169) 
Other Substances 
Alcohol    0.237* 
   (0.132) 
Nicotine    0.120 
   (0.074) 
Hard Drugs   0.450*** 
   (0.131) 
βu 
0.617* 0.619** 0.523** 
(0.328) (0.279) (0.233) 
N 19,101 [9,506,713] 
19,101 
[9,506,713] 
19,101 
[9,506,713] 
Notes.  The dependent variable is annual ER visit.  All models control for year and quarter of interview.  
Omitted categories include white, age 50-64, married, no household members over 65, respondent lives in 
CBSA with population over 1 Million, college education, did not work last week, family income $50,000-
$75,000, and no phone lines in household.  Huber/White robust standard errors reported in parentheses and 
corrected for 2-stage estimation.  Standard errors for ATE computed using Delta Method.  Brackets contain 
“true” number of observations represented by weighted estimates. *p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01. 
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Table 20 
2SNLS Estimates of ER Visits for Males 
 Demographic Human Capital Other Substances 
Variable of Interest 
MUD -0.659 -0.889 -1.490** 
 (1.158) (0.994) (0.595) 
ATE -0.610 -0.742 -0.920 
 (1.239) (1.017) (0.586) 
Demographics 
Black  0.079 0.108 0.049 
 (0.126) (0.139) (0.153) 
Asian  -0.900*** -0.716** -0.428 
 (0.257) (0.263) (0.268) 
Other  0.263* 0.177 0.153 
 (0.151) (0.155) (0.174) 
Hispanic  -0.157 -0.165 0.315** 
 (0.203) (0.207) (0.147) 
Age 18–24 -0.168 0.270 0.087 
 (0.209) (0.199) (0.192) 
Age 25–29 -0.036 0.242 0.156 
 (0.198) (0.211) (0.190) 
Age 30–34 -0.088 0.100 -0.169 
 (0.180) (0.192) (0.255) 
Age 35–49 0.015 0.049 0.255** 
 (0.144) (0.142) (0.129) 
Not Married 0.425** 0.339* 0.133 
 (0.158) (0.174) (0.170) 
Never Married 0.134 -0.045 0.026 
 (0.136) (0.138) (0.162) 
Kids  -0.086** 0.003 -0.057 
 (0.043) (0.050) (0.059) 
1 HH Member > 65 0.077 -0.011 0.382** 
 (0.199) (0.197) (0.135) 
2+ HH Members > 65 -0.147 -0.086 -0.155 
 (0.221) (0.229) (0.224) 
Small CBSA 0.371** 0.340** 0.536*** 
 (0.114) (0.121) (0.118) 
No CBSA 0.084 -0.053 0.025 
 (0.141) (0.150) (0.170) 
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Table 20 
(Cont.) 
 Demographic Human Capital Other Substances 
Demographics (cont.) 
Constant 0.250 -0.783** -1.780** 
 (0.208) (0.364) (0.602) 
Human Capital 
Less than  HS  0.228 0.666 
  (0.279) (0.485) 
High School  0.073 0.845* 
  (0.277) (0.487) 
Some College  0.193 0.799 
  (0.288) (0.501) 
Full Time  -0.194 -0.370** 
  (0.131) (0.140) 
Part Time  -0.169 -0.166 
  (0.133) (0.148) 
Disable No SSI  0.618*** 0.702*** 
  (0.158) (0.158) 
Disable Collects SSI  0.684*** 0.783*** 
  (0.131) (0.138) 
Income < $20,000  0.356** 0.711** 
  (0.158) (0.269) 
Income $20-50,000  0.302* 0.870** 
  (0.156) (0.269) 
Insurance  -0.385* -0.416** 
  (0.221) (0.186) 
Food Stamp  0.098 0.090 
  (0.121) (0.106) 
Public Assistance  0.224 -0.018 
  (0.182) (0.197) 
Family SSI  0.439*** 0.564*** 
  (0.100) (0.120) 
1 Phone  0.064 -0.275** 
  (0.120) (0.114) 
2+ Phones  -0.062 -0.399* 
  (0.245) (0.227) 
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Table 20 
(Cont.) 
 Demographic Human Capital Other Substances 
Other Substances 
Alcohol    0.943*** 
   (0.174) 
Nicotine    -0.198 
   (0.127) 
Hard Drugs   0.684** 
   (0.267) 
βu 0.473 0.508 0.849** 
 (0.685) (0.585) (0.395) 
N 8,075 [4,966,773] 
8,075 
[4,966,773] 
8,075 
[4,966,773] 
Notes.  The dependent variable is annual ER visit.  All models control for year and quarter of interview.  
Omitted categories include white, age 50-64, married, no household members over 65, respondent lives in 
CBSA with population over 1 million, college education, did not work last week, family income $50,000-
$75,000, and no phone lines in household.  Huber/White robust standard errors reported in parentheses and 
corrected for 2-stage estimation.  Standard errors for ATE computed using Delta Method.  Brackets contain 
“true” number of observations represented by weighted estimates. *p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01. 
 
 In general, the coefficients on the control variables remain similar to the 
exogenous model.  However, the coefficients for the other substance use disorder 
variables shift substantially.  Among females the coefficient for alcohol nearly doubles 
and becomes significant, while the coefficient for hard drugs increases from 0.27 to 0.45 
and remains significant.  Among males the magnitude of the alcohol coefficient also 
increases (and remains significant), while the coefficient for hard drugs increases from 
0.27 to 0.68 and becomes significant.  The 2SNLS results also indicate that the average 
effect of MUD on total ER visits differs from the average effect of hard drug use 
disorders since the hard drug coefficient is large and positive, while the marijuana 
coefficient is large and negative.   
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Given the evidence that MUD is endogenously correlated with ER visits due to 
unobserved factors, at least among females, the 2SNLS model is preferred to NLS.  I 
select the final specification, which controls for demographics, human capital, and other 
substance use disorders, as the preferred specification for additional analysis.  In addition 
to being the most comprehensive model, the results from this specification among males 
warrant further attention.  Although the ATE is within the range of estimates from the 
female specifications, the estimate of βM seems implausibly large, which may indicate 
that the ATE is overestimated.  Therefore, this specification invites additional checks to 
determine whether this is a spurious result, or whether it reflects the true relationship 
between MUD and ER visits.  
7.3. First-Stage Estimation 
Although the endogeneity-corrected estimates differ from the exogenous ones, 
they are no more likely to be correct if the probability of MUD is not appropriately 
estimated in the first stage.  To address this concern I survey the general predictions of 
the first stage before turning to examine the validity of the instrumental variables.  Tables 
21 and 22 show the first-stage estimation results for females and males, respectively.  
Asian males are less likely than whites to suffer from MUD, while black females 
are more likely.  Among both males and females age is negatively correlated with the 
probability of having MUD, while individuals who are not currently married or never 
have been married are significantly more likely to have MUD.  Living outside of a core-
based statistical area (i.e., rural residence) is also negatively correlated with MUD among 
both genders.  For males, college graduates and full time workers are significantly less 
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likely to have MUD.  For females, having children is negatively associated with MUD.  
However, among females education is uncorrelated with MUD, and income is 
uncorrelated with MUD among both genders.32  The only control for financial resources 
that is significant among females is whether the respondent’s current household has a 
single phone line, an outcome that is positively correlated with MUD.  Whether or not the 
respondent reports a disability is uncorrelated with MUD, which helps to alleviate 
concerns of reverse-causality (i.e., that chronic poor health causes marijuana use that 
leads to MUD). 
 
Table 21 
 
First-Stage Probit Estimates of Marijuana Use Disorder for Females 
 
 Demographic Human Capital Other Substances 
Instrumental Variables 
Slightly Disapprove -0.426*** -0.434*** -0.408*** 
 (0.079) (0.079) (0.086) 
Strongly Disapprove -0.710*** -0.716*** -0.623*** 
 (0.117) (0.118) (0.121) 
IV Significance 57.93*** 58.24*** 41.22*** 
1st Stage {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} 
IV Significance 2.67 1.940 1.890 
2nd Stage {0.263} {0.379} {0.389} 
Demographics 
Black  0.134* 0.120 0.282*** 
 (0.076) (0.077) (0.085) 
Asian  0.034 0.068 0.272 
 (0.232) (0.231) (0.251) 
                                                          
32 Although it may seem odd that human capital is uncorrelated with MUD among females, these results are 
consistent with McGeary and French (2000) who find that education is uncorrelated with chronic drug use 
among both males and females, and that neither income nor employment status is correlated with chronic 
drug use among females.  The negative correlation between employment and MUD among males is also 
consistent with McGeary and French (2000).   
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Table 21 
(Cont.) 
 Demographic Human Capital Other Substances 
Demographics (cont.) 
Other  0.063 0.074 0.187 
 (0.120) (0.116) (0.128) 
Hispanic  -0.041 -0.046 0.105 
 (0.091) (0.089) (0.095) 
Age 18–24 0.847*** 0.985*** 1.035*** 
 (0.197) (0.188) (0.188) 
Age 25–29 0.721*** 0.860*** 0.850*** 
 (0.204) (0.195) (0.190) 
Age 30–34 0.661** 0.783*** 0.806*** 
 (0.212) (0.201) (0.202) 
Age 35–49 0.282 0.345* 0.319* 
 (0.186) (0.180) (0.184) 
Not Married 0.302** 0.274** 0.247* 
 (0.128) (0.125) (0.129) 
Never Married 0.294** 0.272** 0.213* 
 (0.111) (0.108) (0.111) 
Kids  -0.141*** -0.153*** -0.102** 
 (0.033) (0.037) (0.038) 
Pregnant -0.037 -0.020 0.035 
 (0.082) (0.083) (0.087) 
1 HH Member > 65 -0.093 -0.097 -0.047 
 (0.130) (0.132) (0.143) 
2+ HH Members > 65 -0.023 -0.039 -0.035 
 (0.189) (0.191) (0.216) 
Small CBSA 0.033 0.025 0.016 
 (0.066) (0.065) (0.071) 
No CBSA -0.089 -0.107 -0.116 
 (0.109) (0.112) (0.121) 
Constant -2.461*** -2.878*** -3.199*** 
 (0.204) (0.275) (0.308) 
Human Capital 
Less than  HS  0.249 0.119 
  (0.152) (0.171) 
High School  0.124 0.030 
  (0.148) (0.170) 
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Table 21 
(Cont.) 
 Demographic Human Capital Other Substances 
Human Capital (cont.) 
Some College  0.111 0.017 
  (0.158) (0.177) 
Full Time  -0.055 -0.034 
  (0.083) (0.089) 
Part Time  0.084 0.141* 
  (0.074) (0.081) 
Disable No SSI  0.172 0.103 
  (0.150) (0.164) 
Disable Collects SSI  -0.008 0.059 
  (0.176) (0.186) 
Income < $20,000  -0.012 -0.048 
  (0.103) (0.113) 
Income $20–50,000  -0.048 -0.068 
  (0.107) (0.116) 
Insurance  0.113 0.201* 
  (0.109) (0.118) 
Food Stamp  0.088 0.039 
  (0.074) (0.081) 
Public Assistance  0.074 0.057 
  (0.071) (0.074) 
Family SSI  0.022 0.059 
  (0.080) (0.087) 
1 Phone  0.143** 0.167** 
  (0.069) (0.073) 
2+ Phones  -0.070 -0.101 
  (0.173) (0.203) 
Other Substances 
Alcohol    0.605*** 
   (0.082) 
Nicotine    0.314*** 
   (0.076) 
Hard Drugs   0.956*** 
   (0.106) 
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Table 21 
(Cont.) 
 Demographic Human Capital Other Substances 
N 19,101 [9,506,713] 
19,101 
[9,506,713] 
19,101 
[9,506,713] 
Notes.  The dependent variable is a binary indicator for marijuana use disorder.  All models control for year 
and quarter of interview.  Omitted categories include white, age 50-64, married, no household members 
over 65, respondent lives in CBSA with population over 1 million, college education, did not work last 
week, family income $50,000-$75,000, and no phone lines in household.  Omitted IV category refers to 
“Neither agree nor disagree.” { } Indicates p-value for joint test of variable significance.  2nd-Stage 
Significance refers to the results of a heuristic test for excludability of the IVs from the 2nd stage, in which 
the IVs are included in an NLS regression of ER visits and tested for joint significance.  Brackets contain 
“true” number of observations represented by weighted estimates.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01. 
 
Table 22 
First-Stage Probit Estimates of Marijuana Use Disorder for Males 
 Demographic Human Capital Other Substances 
Instrumental Variables 
Somewhat Disapprove -0.090 -0.092 -0.055 
 (0.108) (0.109) (0.109) 
Strongly Disapprove -0.896*** -0.887*** -0.826*** 
 (0.106) (0.105) (0.105) 
IV Significance 72.36*** 71.26*** 63.57*** 
1st Stage [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
IV Significance 2.49* 7.98*** 6.90*** 
2nd Stage [0.083] [0.000] [0.001] 
Demographics 
Black  0.163 0.116 0.157 
 (0.100) (0.097) (0.102) 
Asian  -0.651** -0.621** -0.561** 
 (0.240) (0.250) (0.257) 
Other  0.149 0.126 0.165 
 (0.161) (0.150) (0.171) 
Hispanic  0.065 0.054 0.138 
 (0.128) (0.125) (0.124) 
Age 18–24 0.900*** 0.876*** 1.008*** 
 (0.194) (0.187) (0.189) 
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Table 22 
(Cont.) 
 Demographic Human Capital Other Substances 
Demographics (cont.) 
Age 25–29 0.818*** 0.825*** 0.820*** 
 (0.197) (0.188) (0.198) 
Age 30–34 0.641** 0.653** 0.629** 
 (0.208) (0.199) (0.205) 
Age 35–49 0.331* 0.349** 0.283 
 (0.189) (0.178) (0.181) 
Not Married 0.485** 0.451** 0.365** 
 (0.158) (0.158) (0.161) 
Never Married 0.256** 0.233* 0.131 
 (0.118) (0.120) (0.127) 
Kids  -0.043 -0.050 -0.031 
 (0.035) (0.037) (0.038) 
1 HH Member > 65 -0.196 -0.198 -0.234 
 (0.133) (0.140) (0.156) 
2+ HH Members > 65 -0.015 0.019 0.076 
 (0.274) (0.283) (0.329) 
Small CBSA -0.003 -0.027 -0.047 
 (0.092) (0.088) (0.092) 
No CBSA -0.251** -0.275** -0.318** 
 (0.119) (0.121) (0.135) 
Constant -2.526*** -3.068*** -3.581*** 
 (0.187) (0.406) (0.478) 
Human Capital 
Less than  HS  0.928** 0.876** 
  (0.303) (0.361) 
High School  0.812** 0.790** 
  (0.304) (0.364) 
Some College  0.834** 0.857** 
  (0.311) (0.374) 
Full Time  -0.234** -0.241** 
  (0.098) (0.102) 
Part Time  -0.085 -0.008 
  (0.099) (0.111) 
Disable No SSI  -0.240 -0.229 
  (0.150) (0.181) 
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Table 22 
(Cont.) 
 Demographic Human Capital Other Substances 
Human Capital (cont.) 
Disable Collects SSI  -0.039 -0.041 
  (0.139) (0.138) 
Income < $20,000  -0.035 -0.008 
  (0.129) (0.138) 
Income $20–50,000  -0.093 -0.090 
  (0.119) (0.127) 
Insurance  -0.082 -0.024 
  (0.109) (0.125) 
Food Stamp  0.036 -0.022 
  (0.089) (0.092) 
Public Assistance  -0.057 -0.095 
  (0.105) (0.111) 
Family SSI  -0.052 -0.094 
  (0.098) (0.107) 
1 Phone  -0.111 -0.107 
  (0.078) (0.082) 
2+ Phones  -0.024 0.054 
  (0.196) (0.246) 
Other Substances 
Alcohol    0.737*** 
   (0.091) 
Nicotine    0.336*** 
   (0.081) 
Hard Drugs   0.960*** 
   (0.147) 
N 8,075 [4,966,773] 
8,075 
[4,966,773] 
8,075 
[4,966,773] 
Notes.  The dependent variable is a binary indicator for marijuana use disorder.  All models control for year 
and quarter of interview.  Omitted categories include white, age 50–64, married, no household members 
over 65, respondent lives in CBSA with population over 1 Million, college education, did not work last 
week, family income $50,000-$75,000, and no phone lines in household.  Omitted IV category refers to 
“Neither agree nor disagree.” { } Indicates p-value for joint test of variable significance. 2nd-Stage 
Significance refers to the results of a heuristic test for excludability of the IVs from the 2nd stage, in which 
the IVs are included in an NLS regression of ER visits and tested for joint significance.  Brackets contain 
“true” number of observations represented by weighted estimates.  Standard errors are in parentheses.   
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01. 
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All three other forms of substance use disorder are strongly and positively 
correlated with MUD, which is consistent with the positive omitted variables bias on βM 
observed in the second stage.  Given the large magnitude of these three coefficients 
relative to the other controls, it is likely that inclusion of the substance use disorder 
controls improves the accuracy of estimates of the linear index for MUD at the individual 
level, which should in turn improve the second stage estimates.  This bolsters the case for 
the comprehensive substance use disorder specification being preferred to the human 
capital and demographic specifications.   
Overall, the coefficients for the controls in the first stage do not seem 
problematic.  However, consistency of the 2SNLS estimates requires that the 
instrumental variables (IVs) are valid.  Validity of the IVs requires both that they strongly 
correlated with the probability of MUD, conditional on all other control variables, and 
that conditional on all other control variables, they are uncorrelated with the error term 
for ER visits.  Recall from section 4 that the single instrument (measured by two 
variables) is the respondent’s opinion of another adult trying marijuana once or twice.  
Responses include “neither approve nor disapprove,” “somewhat disapprove,” and 
“strongly disapprove.”  Indicators for “somewhat” and “strong” disapproval are included 
in the first stage, with “neither approve nor disapprove” as the omitted category.   
The first stage results suggest that the IVs are jointly significant among males and 
females.  The chi-squared value for females is roughly 58 for both the demographic and 
human capital models, and diminishes to 41 in the substance use disorder specification.  
For males the IVs have even more predictive power, with a chi-squared value of 71–72 in 
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the demographic and human capital specifications and 64 in the substance use disorder 
specification.  These results suggest that the IVs are sufficiently strong. 
The theoretical justification for exclusion of the IVs from the equation for ER 
visits rests on the assertion that conditional on all of the available controls it is reasonable 
to assume that one’s opinion of adults trying marijuana is independent of health or of 
other behavior that may lead to ER visits.  Unfortunately, when the model is just-
identified, there is no formal empirical test that the instrumental variables are excludable 
from the equation for ER visits.  One heuristic test used previously in the substance use 
literature is to include the instruments directly in an exogenous version of the second 
stage NLS model and test whether the IVs are jointly significant (see e.g., Kenkel & 
Terza, 2001).  Among females the IVs are jointly insignificant, with a p-value ranging 
from 0.26 to 0.39.  However, among males the IVs are jointly significant in all three 
models.  Interestingly, the IVs become more strongly correlated with ER visits after 
controls for human capital are added, and the controls for other forms of substance use 
disorder barely diminish this joint significance, such that the statistical case for 
excludability is greatest in the least comprehensive model.   
These results provide only circumstantial rather than direct evidence in favor of 
the instrument (for females) or against them (for males).  However, the response of the 
IVs to the inclusion of additional controls among males suggests that the instrument is 
capturing statistical noise rather than any true underlying information about individual 
demand for ER visits.  Moreover, the evidence suggests that the IVs are excludable 
among females, and the female estimates are broadly similar to those for males (with the 
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exception of βM in the final specification.)  Therefore, I continue under the assumption 
that the IVs are valid.  To provide more support for the 2SNLS estimates, I run several 
additional specifications.  Results of these robustness checks are presented in the next 
section. 
7.4. Robustness Checks 
 The purpose of the analyses in this section is to not only demonstrate the 
robustness of the results from the preferred specification, but also to try to determine if 
there are any previously omitted factors that may explain why marijuana is negatively 
correlated with ER visits (and for males, why the estimated coefficient is improbably 
large).  The first of the extended specifications includes disease indicators that proxy for 
individual health.  The second extended specification includes measures of 
attitudes/beliefs, consisting of measures of preference for risky and dangerous behavior, 
as well as religiosity.  The third extended specification includes controls for illegal 
behavior.  Unlike the first set of specifications, each additional set of controls enters in 
isolation, rather than building on the previous set of controls (i.e., the “illegal activities” 
controls are introduced separately from the “attitudes” controls).  As a final robustness 
check, I re-run the substance use disorder specification without weighting the first or 
second stage.  Results are presented in Table 23 for females and Table 24 for males.  
 Among females, inclusion of controls for health slightly increases the magnitude 
of βM and βu although βM becomes insignificant.  Four diseases, including asthma, 
bronchitis, ulcers, and “other diseases” are positively correlated with ER visits, while 
none are significantly negatively correlated with ER visits.  The increasing coefficient 
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magnitude for βM and βu is consistent with the assumed positive correlation between 
negative health events (i.e., disease) and MUD, although the effect does not seem to be 
particularly large.   
 
Table 23 
2SNLS Robustness Checks for Females 
 Other 
Substances 
 
Health 
 
Attitudes 
Illegal 
Activities 
 
Unweighted 
Variable of Interest 
MUD -0.745* -0.789 -0.528 -1.467** -0.625** 
 (0.447) (0.497) (0.410) (0.619) (0.204) 
ATE -0.780 -0.867 -0.615 -1.245* -0.629** 
 (0.561) (0.607) (0.530) (0.721) (0.273) 
Demographics 
Black  0.126* 0.123 0.101 0.133* 0.098** 
 (0.069) (0.098) (0.075) (0.073) (0.031) 
Asian  -0.738*** -0.655*** -0.759*** -0.691*** -0.672** 
 (0.156) (0.173) (0.165) (0.157) (0.220) 
Other  0.016 -0.019 -0.020 0.015 0.001 
 (0.113) (0.125) (0.120) (0.113) (0.047) 
Hispanic  -0.368*** -0.347*** -0.384*** -0.358*** -0.248*** 
 (0.073) (0.100) (0.076) (0.074) (0.042) 
Age 18-24 0.554*** 0.576*** 0.504*** 0.540*** 0.480*** 
 (0.103) (0.119) (0.101) (0.110) (0.060) 
Age 25-29 0.441*** 0.500*** 0.396*** 0.405*** 0.387*** 
 (0.101) (0.117) (0.105) (0.100) (0.060) 
Age 30-34 0.309** 0.300** 0.253** 0.252** 0.315*** 
 (0.114) (0.121) (0.121) (0.115) (0.067) 
Age 35-49 0.237** 0.261** 0.217** 0.150 0.113** 
 (0.094) (0.104) (0.099) (0.101) (0.053) 
Not Married -0.100 -0.070 -0.090 -0.125 -0.012 
 (0.088) (0.095) (0.090) (0.094) (0.039) 
Never Married -0.248** -0.113 -0.245** -0.275** -0.197*** 
 (0.083) (0.109) (0.083) (0.088) (0.034) 
Kids  -0.118*** -0.075* -0.112*** -0.134*** -0.060*** 
 (0.029) (0.039) (0.029) (0.033) (0.013) 
1 HH Member > 65 -0.107* -0.129* -0.103 -0.096 -0.129** 
 (0.064) (0.072) (0.066) (0.065) (0.043) 
2+ HH Members > 65 0.264 0.197 0.272 0.154 -0.028 
 (0.350) (0.309) (0.337) (0.343) (0.129) 
Small CBSA 0.134** 0.089 0.147** 0.164** 0.141*** 
 (0.064) (0.072) (0.066) (0.072) (0.027) 
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Table 23 
(Cont.) 
 Other 
Substances 
 
Health 
 
Attitudes 
Illegal 
Activities 
 
Unweighted 
Demographics (cont.) 
No CBSA 0.003 0.019 0.021 0.043 0.013 
 (0.110) (0.111) (0.110) (0.108) (0.045) 
Constant -0.141 -0.249 -0.142 -0.079 -0.306** 
 (0.283) (0.322) (0.286) (0.273) (0.123) 
Less than  HS 0.022 0.087 -0.032 -0.095 0.219** 
 (0.273) (0.279) (0.289) (0.295) (0.080) 
High School -0.190 -0.160 -0.234 -0.294 0.081 
 (0.275) (0.277) (0.291) (0.301) (0.080) 
Some College -0.123 -0.159 -0.167 -0.231 0.082 
 (0.278) (0.283) (0.295) (0.311) (0.081) 
Full Time -0.029 -0.035 -0.024 0.016 -0.075** 
 (0.070) (0.061) (0.071) (0.084) (0.038) 
Part Time -0.202** -0.214*** -0.209** -0.192** -0.179*** 
 (0.065) (0.064) (0.067) (0.066) (0.043) 
Disable No SSI  0.684*** 0.483*** 0.701*** 0.700*** 0.653*** 
 (0.097) (0.105) (0.099) (0.109) (0.043) 
Disable Collects SSI -0.050 0.078 -0.072 -0.103 -0.007 
 (0.106) (0.122) (0.111) (0.120) (0.043) 
Income < $20,000 0.215* 0.098 0.252** 0.207* 0.096 
 (0.113) (0.155) (0.109) (0.119) (0.066) 
Income $20–50,000 0.213* 0.074 0.254** 0.228* 0.096 
 (0.109) (0.147) (0.107) (0.118) (0.066) 
Insurance -0.085 -0.151 -0.107 -0.098 -0.011 
 (0.087) (0.114) (0.088) (0.094) (0.053) 
Food Stamp 0.177** 0.093 0.182** 0.197** 0.178*** 
 (0.074) (0.107) (0.075) (0.075) (0.030) 
Public Assistance 0.074 0.113 0.079 0.108 0.067** 
 (0.083) (0.101) (0.091) (0.095) (0.028) 
Family SSI 0.160** 0.179** 0.149** 0.159** 0.191*** 
 (0.063) (0.069) (0.062) (0.066) (0.036) 
1 Phone 0.003 0.056 0.004 0.051 -0.022 
 (0.061) (0.066) (0.062) (0.074) (0.026) 
2+ Phones 0.192 0.167 0.201 0.294 0.090 
 (0.169) (0.144) (0.176) (0.209) (0.074) 
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Table 23 
(Cont.) 
 Other 
Substances 
 
Health 
 
Attitudes 
Illegal 
Activities 
 
Unweighted 
Other Substances 
Alcohol  0.237* 0.263** 0.163 0.255* 0.174*** 
 (0.132) (0.116) (0.118) (0.131) (0.051) 
Nicotine  0.120 0.049 0.138* 0.112 0.154*** 
 (0.074) (0.091) (0.079) (0.090) (0.028) 
Hard Drugs 0.450*** 0.435** 0.381** 0.421** 0.451*** 
 (0.131) (0.142) (0.130) (0.141) (0.058) 
Health Controls 
Asthma  0.292***    
  (0.078)    
Bronchitis  0.457***    
  (0.125)    
Pneumonia  -0.078    
  (0.135)    
Sinusitis  0.007    
  (0.122)    
Stroke  0.248    
  (0.220)    
High BP  0.033    
  (0.089)    
Heart Disease  0.170    
  (0.123)    
Diabetes  -0.104    
  (0.112)    
Hepatitis  -0.097    
  (0.232)    
STD  0.075    
  (0.148)    
HIV  -0.072    
  (0.237)    
Ulcer  0.624***    
  (0.152)    
Other Disease  0.560**    
  (0.236)    
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Table 23 
(Cont.) 
 Other 
Substances 
 
Health 
 
Attitudes 
Illegal 
Activities 
 
Unweighted 
Health Controls (cont.) 
Depression  0.061    
  (0.101)    
Attitude Controls 
Risk   0.008   
   (0.089)   
Danger   0.102   
   (0.076)   
Seatbelt   0.112   
   (0.082)   
Religion Important   0.030   
   (0.073)   
Service Attender   0.094   
   (0.068)   
Religious Friends   0.181**   
   (0.068)   
Religious Decisions   -0.165**   
   (0.070)   
Illegal Activity Controls 
Ever Arrested    0.193**  
    (0.068)  
Offered Drugs    0.439**  
    (0.180)  
βu 
0.523** 0.553** 0.409** 0.898** 0.396*** 
(0.233) (0.259) (0.203) (0.335) (0.106) 
N 19,101 [9,506,713] 
19,101 
[9,506,713] 
19,101 
[9,506,713] 
19,101 
[9,506,713] 
19,101 
[9,506,713] 
Notes.  Dependent variable is annual ER visits.  All models control for year and quarter of interview.  
Omitted categories include white, age 50-64, married, no household members over 65, respondent lives in 
CBSA with population over 1 Million, college education, did not work last week, family income $50,000-
$75,000, and no phone lines in household.  Huber/White robust standard errors reported in parentheses and 
corrected for 2-stage estimation.  Standard errors for ATE computed using Delta Method.  *p < 0.1 **p < 
0.05 ***p < 0.01. 
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Table 24 
2SNLS Robustness Checks for Males 
 Other 
Substances 
 
Health 
 
Attitudes 
Illegal 
Activities 
 
Unweighted 
Variable of Interest 
MUD -1.490** -1.678*** -1.304** -1.533** 0.041 
 (0.595) (0.451) (0.591) (0.612) (0.284) 
ATE -0.920 -1.032 -0.853 -0.956 0.047 
 (0.586) (0.444) (0.564) (0.582) (0.327) 
Demographics 
Black  0.049 0.050 -0.023 -0.010 0.113** 
 (0.153) (0.126) (0.156) (0.139) (0.054) 
Asian  -0.428 -0.359 -0.528** -0.225 -0.358 
 (0.268) (0.239) (0.265) (0.240) (0.280) 
Other  0.153 0.188 0.021 0.123 0.064 
 (0.174) (0.151) (0.193) (0.174) (0.073) 
Hispanic  0.315** 0.281** 0.168 0.202 -0.093 
 (0.147) (0.142) (0.149) (0.135) (0.072) 
Age 18-24 0.087 0.367** 0.130 0.095 0.262** 
 (0.192) (0.182) (0.193) (0.190) (0.095) 
Age 25-29 0.156 0.400** 0.154 0.189 0.276** 
 (0.190) (0.190) (0.185) (0.194) (0.090) 
Age 30-34 -0.169 0.258 -0.148 -0.160 0.003 
 (0.255) (0.276) (0.230) (0.237) (0.113) 
Age 35-49 0.255** 0.344** 0.202 0.190 0.074 
 (0.129) (0.119) (0.133) (0.125) (0.078) 
Not Married 0.133 0.114 0.164 0.089 0.024 
 (0.170) (0.135) (0.175) (0.162) (0.072) 
Never Married 0.026 0.051 0.023 -0.043 -0.196** 
 (0.162) (0.126) (0.158) (0.149) (0.062) 
Kids  -0.057 -0.025 -0.065 -0.048 0.009 
 (0.059) (0.049) (0.056) (0.060) (0.023) 
1 HH Member > 65 0.382** 0.339** 0.306** 0.367** 0.053 
 (0.135) (0.126) (0.130) (0.129) (0.079) 
2+ HH Members > 65 -0.155 -0.201 -0.393* -0.129 -0.138 
 (0.224) (0.277) (0.233) (0.234) (0.212) 
Small CBSA 0.536*** 0.472*** 0.516*** 0.526*** 0.198*** 
 (0.118) (0.113) (0.123) (0.116) (0.050) 
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Table 24 
(Cont.) 
 Other 
Substances 
 
Health 
 
Attitudes 
Illegal 
Activities 
 
Unweighted 
Demographics (cont.) 
No CBSA 0.025 -0.116 -0.061 0.030 0.048 
 (0.170) (0.183) (0.178) (0.170) (0.078) 
Constant -1.780** -1.675*** -1.648** -1.668*** -0.491** 
 (0.602) (0.434) (0.510) (0.497) (0.221) 
Human Capital 
Less than  HS 0.666 0.583* 0.438 0.425 0.137 
 (0.485) (0.303) (0.399) (0.360) (0.160) 
High School 0.845* 0.672** 0.609 0.628* 0.228 
 (0.487) (0.300) (0.398) (0.355) (0.158) 
Some College 0.799 0.730** 0.479 0.649* 0.219 
 (0.501) (0.325) (0.417) (0.376) (0.164) 
Full Time -0.370** -0.340** -0.289** -0.356** -0.085 
 (0.140) (0.127) (0.131) (0.133) (0.074) 
Part Time -0.166 -0.160 -0.208 -0.170 -0.015 
 (0.148) (0.130) (0.151) (0.158) (0.079) 
Disable No SSI 0.702*** 0.586*** 0.722*** 0.718*** 0.845*** 
 (0.158) (0.143) (0.152) (0.150) (0.074) 
Disable Collects SSI 0.783*** 0.596*** 0.775*** 0.761*** 0.731*** 
 (0.138) (0.132) (0.131) (0.140) (0.070) 
Income < $20,000 0.711** 0.575** 0.559** 0.703** 0.106 
 (0.269) (0.206) (0.227) (0.271) (0.105) 
Income $20–50,000 0.870** 0.529** 0.724*** 0.811** 0.013 
 (0.269) (0.185) (0.218) (0.264) (0.107) 
Insurance -0.416** -0.457** -0.524** -0.337* 0.000 
 (0.186) (0.188) (0.187) (0.197) (0.087) 
Food Stamp 0.090 0.057 0.103 0.095 0.145** 
 (0.106) (0.103) (0.101) (0.102) (0.048) 
Public Assistance -0.018 0.130 0.058 0.064 0.003 
 (0.197) (0.163) (0.196) (0.182) (0.057) 
Family SSI 0.564*** 0.446*** 0.596*** 0.508*** 0.445*** 
 (0.120) (0.105) (0.113) (0.119) (0.062) 
1 Phone -0.275** -0.194* -0.201* -0.156 -0.106** 
 (0.114) (0.111) (0.104) (0.105) (0.045) 
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Table 24 
(Cont.) 
 Other 
Substances 
 
Health 
 
Attitudes 
Illegal 
Activities 
 
Unweighted 
Human Capital (cont.) 
2+ Phones -0.399* -0.259 -0.293 -0.326 -0.131 
 (0.227) (0.245) (0.202) (0.236) (0.136) 
Other Substances 
Alcohol  0.943*** 0.908*** 0.836*** 0.738*** 0.318*** 
 (0.174) (0.124) (0.156) (0.151) (0.063) 
Nicotine  -0.198 -0.115 -0.213* -0.320** 0.097** 
 (0.127) (0.118) (0.127) (0.125) (0.048) 
Hard Drugs 0.684** 0.767*** 0.519** 0.451** 0.394*** 
 (0.267) (0.165) (0.239) (0.221) (0.090) 
Health Controls 
Asthma  0.243    
  (0.168)    
Bronchitis  -0.451*    
  (0.231)    
Pneumonia  0.461**    
  (0.221)    
Sinusitis  0.541    
  (0.330)    
Stroke  0.078    
  (0.289)    
High BP  0.210*    
  (0.114)    
Heart Disease  0.403**    
  (0.136)    
Diabetes  0.525***    
  (0.119)    
Hepatitis  -0.237    
  (0.172)    
STD  -0.636**    
  (0.286)    
HIV  -0.191    
  (0.202)    
Ulcer  0.147    
  (0.230)    
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Table 24 
(Cont.) 
 Other 
Substances 
 
Health 
 
Attitudes 
Illegal 
Activities 
 
Unweighted 
Health Controls (cont.) 
Other Disease  0.216    
  (0.244)    
Depression  -0.124    
  (0.155)    
Attitude Controls 
Risk   -0.044   
   (0.127)   
Danger   0.424***   
   (0.117)   
Seatbelt   -0.142   
   (0.161)   
Religion Important   -0.178   
   (0.127)   
Service Attender   -0.027   
   (0.136)   
Religious Friends   0.300**   
   (0.112)   
Religious Decisions   0.253*   
   (0.133)   
Illegal Activity Controls 
Ever Arrested    0.379***  
    (0.114)  
Offered Drugs    0.648***  
    (0.150)  
βu 0.849** 0.970*** 0.729* 0.822** -0.038 
 (0.395) (0.248) (0.383) (0.377) (0.154) 
N 8,075 [4,966,773] 
8,075 
[4,966,773] 
8,075 
[4,966,773] 
8,075 
[4,966,773] 
8,075 
[4,966,773] 
Notes.  Dependent variable is annual ER visits.  All models control for year and quarter of interview.  
Omitted categories include white, age 50-64, married, no household members over 65, respondent lives in 
CBSA with population over 1 million, college education, did not work last week, family income $50,000-
$75,000, and no phone lines in household.  Huber/White robust standard errors reported in parentheses and 
corrected for 2-stage estimation.  Standard errors for ATE computed using Delta Method.   
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01. 
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Inclusion of the attitudes/beliefs controls among females attenuates βM and βu by 
roughly 20–25% relative to the substance use disorder specification, indicating an 
(insignificant) ATE of -0.62, compared to the -0.78 predicted by the preferred 
specification.  Controls for risk and danger preference, as well as seatbelt use are 
insignificantly correlated with ER visits.  Preferring one’s friends to share one’s religion 
is positively correlated with ER visits, while allowing one’s religion to affect one’s 
decisions is negatively correlated with ER visits.  This suggests that among females, 
religious beliefs, but not attitudes towards risk-taking, are a significant confounder of the 
relationship between MUD and ER visits.  However, it is also possible that the potential 
endogeneity of beliefs to MUD or health is downward biasing the estimates. 
Including controls for illegal activities nearly doubles the magnitude of both βM 
and βu, rendering both coefficients roughly equivalent to the estimates from the preferred 
specification among males.  βM and the ATE are both significant, although the coefficient 
estimate is an implausibly large -1.47 (the next largest coefficient in magnitude is 0.700 
for individuals who report disability but do not collect SSI).  Being arrested and being 
offered drugs are both positively and significantly correlated with ER visits.  Although 
both variables are likely confounders of the relationship between MUD and ER visits, the 
magnitude of the new coefficient estimate for MUD suggests that these variables may be 
endogenous to the model and therefore biasing the coefficient estimates.  Regardless of 
the source of the error, it seems implausible that the inflated estimates reflect the true 
relationship between MUD and ER visits.   
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Lastly, in the unweighted model, βM and βu are both attenuated.  However, 
dropping the weights also decreases the standard errors so that βM and the ATE are both 
significant.  The unweighted model predicts that individuals with MUD utilize the ER -
0.69 times per year on average, compared to the estimated ATE of -0.79 from the 
weighted model.  In general, the other coefficients from the unweighted model are fairly 
consistent with those from the weighted model, suggesting that the weights do not have a 
dramatic effect on the results among females. 
Among males inclusion of the health variables increases the magnitude of both βM 
and βu, consistent with the female results.  Pneumonia, high blood pressure, heart disease, 
and diabetes are all positively and significantly correlated with ER visits, although 
bronchitis and sexually transmitted diseases are both significantly negatively correlated 
with ER visits.  The downward shift in the value of βM and βu supports the assumed 
positive relationship between MUD and negative health events, but as with females the 
magnitude of the shift remains comparatively small.  Considering that health should be 
one of the key, if not primary, determinants of ER visits, this suggests that the 
relationship between MUD and health events (as I am able to measure them) is not 
particular large. 
 Inclusion of controls for attitudes/beliefs attenuates βM and βu, which is also 
consistent with the female results.  However, βM remains an implausibly large -1.30, 
indicating that this set of variables cannot explain the inflation of the coefficient caused 
by inclusion of the substance use disorder controls.  A preference for dangerous behavior 
is significantly positively correlated with ER visits, as is the preference that one’s friends 
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share one’s religious beliefs, and whether one allows religion to influence decision 
making.  This, coupled with the attenuation of βM and βu, indicates that attitudes toward 
risky behavior, as well as religious beliefs, are significant confounders of the relationship 
between MUD and ER visits (although preferring one’s friends to share one’s religious 
beliefs has the opposite sign as in the results for females).  However, these confounders 
cannot account for the inflated estimate of βM and βu. 
 In contrast to the female specification, including controls for illegal activities has 
virtually no effect on βM or βu.  Although being arrested or offered drugs are both 
positively and significantly correlated with ER visits, it appears that these variables are 
not significant confounders of the model among males, and provide no new information 
regarding the accuracy of the coefficient estimates among males. 
 In another contrast to females, the unweighted model differs drastically from the 
weighted model among males.  βM and βu both become essentially 0, while many of the 
other coefficients shift substantially (although no coefficients that are significant in the 
weighted model become significant with an opposing sign).  It is still the case that the 
weighted results for males are considered closer to the “true” result since the weighting 
accounts for potentially endogenous sampling, and also makes the sample more closely 
correspond to the true population.  However, the unweighted results may reflect the 
possibility that the male subsample is more heterogeneous than the female subsample, 
such that the weights have a greater influence on the results. 
 In general, the extended specifications support the finding that MUD and ER 
visits are negatively correlated, although the results are not consistently significant for 
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females, and questionably large among males.  However, with the exception of the 
controls for illegal activities among females, no set of variables drastically affects the 
results.  Even this inflated estimate, though potentially inconsistent, is larger in 
magnitude than the preferred model, and thus cannot account for the negative estimate of 
βM.  Although βM is not consistently significant for females, βu remains significant in all 
models, supporting the hypothesis that MUD and ER visits are endogenously correlated 
through unobservable factors.  
8. Discussion 
 In this study I find evidence that marijuana use disorder is not positively 
correlated with ER visits, and may actually be negatively correlated with ER visits.  The 
precise effect is uncertain as estimates of the ATE are generally insignificant, but 
weighted 2SNLS estimates range from roughly -0.62 to -1.23 visits among females, and 
from -0.61 to -1.03 visits among males (although the upper bound estimates are 
considered to be implausibly large, a result I will return to shortly).  Although MUD and 
ER visits are predicted to have a positive relationship among females in the exogenous 
specifications, all 2SNLS models for females reject the null hypothesis that MUD is 
exogenous to ER visits, suggesting that the exogenous estimates are biased.  Among 
males exogeneity of MUD is rejected in the substance use disorder specification (and all 
subsequent weighted robustness checks) although this may be attributable to an inflated 
coefficient estimate for the unobserved heterogeneity rather than a true effect.  However, 
the coefficient estimates for unobserved heterogeneity among males are roughly similar 
to that among females, and the lack of significance may be partly due to the fact that the 
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male subsample is less than half the size of the female subsample.  This result, along with 
the theoretical considerations discussed in Section 4, suggests that unobservable factors 
jointly correlated with MUD and ER visits are significantly confounding the estimated 
relationship between these two outcomes.  This result is consistent with McGeary and 
French (2000) who find that chronic drug use (marijuana and/or hard drugs) is 
endogenous to the probability of any ER visit, and French et al. (2011) who find that 
time-invariant endogeneity may be biasing estimates of the effect of heavy drug use on 
total ER visits and hospital admissions.  In all weighted models, for both genders, 
unobserved heterogeneity is positively correlated with ER visits, suggesting an upward 
omitted variables bias for the relationship between MUD and ER visits.  Thus, while the 
true relationship between MUD and ER visits may be null, the evidence suggests that 
even the most comprehensive NLS specification considered is positively biased by 
omitted variables.   
The validity of the 2SNLS results, and subsequent rejection of exogeneity, rests 
on the validity of the instrumental variables (IVs) utilized in the first stage.  In all 
specifications the instrumental variables are significantly correlated with the probability 
of MUD with a chi-squared statistic over 40 for females and over 60 for males.  This 
indicates that the IVs are sufficiently strong.  Although I cannot directly test for the 
excludability of the IVs, I perform a heuristic test by including the IVs in an  NLS model 
for ER visits.  Among females the IVs are insignificantly correlated with ER visits.  
Among males the IVs are jointly significant with ER visits, although the largest F-
statistic is less than 8.0 in magnitude.  The IVs become more significant when controls 
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for human capital and financial resources are added, and controls for other substance use 
disorders barely attenuates these significant results.  This suggests that among males the 
IVs may be capturing statistical noise rather than a true relationship between the 
instrument and ER visits, particularly given the theoretical argument in support of the 
IVs.33  Moreover, the similarity of the estimates for males and females suggests that the 
estimates for males are not being substantially biased by potentially invalid instruments. 
(Put another way, it would seem odd for the instruments to bias the estimates so similarly 
for both males and females when the IVs seem to have a different relationship to ER 
visits among males compared to females.  On the other hand, the true relationship 
between MUD and ER visits being similar for males and females is not particularly odd).    
Another result of interest is the difference in effect between hard drugs and 
marijuana.  In all 2SNLS models hard drug use disorder is positively and significantly 
correlated with ER visits, a result consistent with the previous literature.  However, the 
predicted relationship between MUD and ER visits is negative in all of the 2SNLS 
models (except for the unweighted male specification).  In the NLS model for males, the 
coefficient for hard drug use is positive and significant, while the coefficient for MUD is 
negative and insignificant.  This suggests that even if the exogenous model is correct, the 
effect of MUD still differs from that of other drugs among males. 
The most troubling result is the large discrepancy between the weighted and 
unweighted model for males.  The most likely explanation is simply that the male 
                                                          
33 In an unreported specification I repeat the test with all control variables simultaneously, including the 
controls for health, attitudes/beliefs, and illegal activities.  The instruments remain jointly significant at the 
0.001 level.  This provides further evidence that these results may be spurious. 
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subsample is more heterogeneous than the female subsample.  Although the unweighted 
model differs from the weighted model among males, the weighted models for males 
produce broadly similar results to the weighted models among females.  This suggests 
that, rather than the heterogeneity of the male subsample rendering the weights invalid, 
the heterogeneity of the male subsample makes the weighs even more important, since 
the heterogeneity is exacerbated by the failure to appropriately weight the estimates.  
Even in the “worst case” scenario that the unweighted model is the correct one, this 
would still indicate a null result for MUD, which would remain in contrast both to the 
positive and significant coefficient for hard drugs indicated by the unweighted model, 
and to the previous literature.  
 An additional pair of other results stands out as requiring additional discussion.  
The first is the inflated estimates of βM and βu in the substance use disorder specification 
of the 2SNLS model among males.  In this specification, inclusion of controls for 
alcohol, nicotine, and hard drug use disorders increases βM by more than 50%.  
Moreover, the magnitude of the inflated coefficient is nearly twice the size of the next 
largest control variable coefficient, indicating that it is likely inaccurate.  Additional 
controls for health, attitudes/beliefs, and illegal activities fail to reduce the estimates of 
βM or βu to the more reasonable (though still large) values observed for males in the 
demographic and human capital specifications.  This suggests that the substance use 
disorder model among males may be suffering bias from endogenous regressors.  This 
possibility is supported by the fact that numerous coefficients were inflated compared to 
the demographic and human capital specifications (see e.g., Age 35-49, 1 household 
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member over 65, all education controls, full time work, both income variables, and the 
constant).  This across-the-board inflation did not occur among females, so whatever 
caused these other coefficients to be inflated is likely the same factor that inflated βM and 
βu.  One additional possibility is that the model is not over-inflated relative to the other 
models.  The estimate of ATE, -0.92, is nearly identical to the estimate among females in 
the model which only controlled for demographic and human capital control.  It is 
possible that the inflation of the other coefficients (some negative some positive) offset 
the inflation of βM, such that the predicted ATE remained roughly consistent.   
A similar inflation of βM and βu occurs among females with the inclusion of 
controls for ever being arrested, and being offered drugs in the past 30 days.  Unlike with 
males, the ATE estimate of -1.23 for this “inflated” model is nearly 1/3 larger than 
estimates from any of the other specifications among either gender, and is therefore 
unlikely to be correct.  Also in contrast to males, this model did not experience across-
the-board inflation.  However, several of the coefficients that inflated among males (e.g., 
education controls) shift upward noticeably compared to other weighted specifications 
among the robustness checks.  The control for age 35-49 deflates noticeably, which is in 
contrast to the results among males but consistent with overall bias, which may lend more 
credence to the possibility that the “illegal activities” variables are endogenous to ER 
visits and therefore biasing the estimates. 
It is uncertain exactly why βM and βu are inflated to implausibly large values in 
certain specifications, although bias from endogenous regressors is a likely culprit.  In 
both cases estimates become substantially more negative, rather than flipping signs and 
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becoming positive.  Moreover, among males, the “inflated” estimate is not substantially 
attenuated by controls for health, attitudes/beliefs, or illegal activities.  Therefore, it 
seems reasonable to assert that these models provide evidence against a positive 
relationship between MUD and ER visits, even if they cannot conclusively demonstrate a 
negative relationship. 
To summarize, in the preceding analyses I find that marijuana use disorder is not 
positively correlated with ER visits and may be negatively correlated.  Among females, 
hard drug use disorder is significantly positively correlated with ER visits in the NLS 
specification, while among both males and females hard drug use disorders are 
significantly and positively correlated with ER visits in 2SNLS models that correct for 
the endogeneity of MUD.  This result is consistent with previous literature regarding drug 
use and acute healthcare utilization (McGeary & French, 2000; French et al., 2000; 
French et al., 2011).  This suggests that the effect of marijuana use disorder on ER visits 
does, in fact, differ meaningfully from the effect of hard drug use disorders. 
I also find evidence that the relationship between MUD and ER visits is 
confounded by unobserved heterogeneity, particularly for females.  The results suggest a 
positive relationship between unobserved heterogeneity and ER visits that is significant 
in all specifications for females.  Although insignificant for males, the magnitude of the 
coefficients remains large and roughly consistent with the estimates for females, and it’s 
possible that the insignificance is due to the small size of the male subsample relative to 
the female subsample.  The positive coefficient for unobserved heterogeneity suggests 
that βM is being upward biased in the exogenous model, which supports the argument that 
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a null effect is the lower bound for the relationship between MUD and ER visits.  The 
endogeneity of MUD, like the negative relationship between MUD and ER visits, 
depends on the validity of the instrumental variables used in the first stage.  Although the 
validity of the instruments remains unprovable, an inconsistent 2SNLS would not 
undermine the evidence suggesting that MUD is uncorrelated with ER visits among 
males, a finding at odds with the previous literature.  
 These findings do, however, come with several caveats and shortcomings.  As 
discussed in Section 5, the lack of state-level controls introduces omitted variables bias 
that may not be completely accounted for by the instrumental variables.  The study also 
lacks controls for the sampling units, which prevents me from estimating clustered 
standard errors.  Thus it is possible that the estimated standard errors are too small.  
However, even using potentially deflated standard errors, all exogenous models among 
males fail to reject the null hypothesis that MUD and ER visits are uncorrelated, while 
the most comprehensive exogenous model among females is only significant at the 10% 
level.  Therefore, it is unlikely that the use of clustered standard errors would alter the 
evidence that the lower bound of the relationship between MUD and ER visits is zero.   
Lastly, despite the evidence that MUD is uncorrelated with ER visits, this result 
only refers to the partial relationship between MUD and ER visits.  It cannot, for 
instance, account for the effect of MUD on education, income, or probability of 
dependence upon other substances, which all may in turn affect demand for ER visits.  I 
also cannot control for the duration of the marijuana use disorder.  While it appears that 
MUD is positively correlated with negative health events, reduction in the health stock 
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may be gradual, and therefore those with longer spells of MUD may have a stronger 
demand for medical care.  A corollary to this is that I cannot control for heterogeneous 
effects of marijuana dependence within the population.  Although the estimation goal is 
an average for the entire population of Medicaid recipients, the magnitude of the 
relationship between marijuana dependence and acute medical care may differ between 
young and old, white and nonwhite, etc.  Such differences may be relevant to policy 
considerations.  
Ideally, future research will not only incorporate state-level controls, but also 
leverage state-level policy regarding marijuana, alcohol, or tobacco, into viable 
instruments that would allow the model to be overidentified, and shore up the 2SNLS 
results.  Future research should also focus on examining whether the results differ 
between individuals by age or race.  These effects will help policymakers to have a 
clearer understanding of the expected long-term ramifications of marijuana policy. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
ESSAY 3: INVESTIGATING THE NEGATIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
WAGES AND OBESITY: NEW EVIDENCE FROM THE WORK, FAMILY, AND 
HEALTH NETWORK  
 
 
1. Abstract 
A substantial literature has established that obesity is negatively associated with 
wages, particularly among females.  However, prior research has found limited evidence 
in support of the factors hypothesized to underlie this relationship.  Utilizing data from a 
single U.S. telecommunications firm I add to the literature by exploring the influence of 
productivity and discrimination on wages for workers who are and who are not obese, 
using control variables that are typically unavailable in national-level datasets.  
Consistent with previous research, I find that obesity is negatively associated with wages 
among females.  Results suggest that differences in productivity attributable to human 
capital accumulation and health account for approximately half of this wage penalty.  I 
find no evidence of coworker or manager discrimination against obese employees among 
males or females.  However, I find evidence that the wage-obesity penalty among 
females occurs only among obese mothers, a result that may suggest differences in 
unobserved productivity between obese and non-obese mothers.  
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2. Introduction 
Obesity is a substantial health issue in the United States, affecting 35 percent of 
adults in 2010—a proportion projected to increase to 51% by 2030 (Ogden, Carroll, Kit, 
& Flegal, 2012; Finkelstein et al., 2012).34  Finkelstein, Trogdon, Cohen, and Dietz 
(2009) estimate that in 2008 obesity accounted for 10 percent of medical spending in the 
US at a cost of $147 billion.  In addition to direct medical costs, obesity may incur 
significant economic costs through lost productivity.  Numerous studies link obesity to 
greater rates of both absenteeism and presenteeism (i.e., reduced work effort while 
present on the job), and it is estimated that in 2008 obesity-related absenteeism and 
presenteeism cost employers $42.8 billion in lost productivity (Finkelstein, 
DiBonaventura, Burgess, & Hale, 2010).35  Perhaps unsurprisingly, obesity has been 
linked to lower wages across the demographic spectrum in the United States, Europe, and 
even China.36  Subsequent studies using instrumental variables suggest that the 
relationship between obesity and wages is not attributable to reverse causality.37  This has 
                                                          
34 Body Mass Index (BMI) is the standard scale for establishing a healthy weight to height ratio.  BMI is 
defined as the ratio of kilograms of weight to squared-meters of height.  Healthy BMI is classified within 
the range [18.5, 25), while [25, 30) is classified as overweight, and people with BMI ≥ 30 are classified as 
obese. 
 
35 For examples of studies regarding obesity and absenteeism/presenteeism, see Howard and Potter (2012); 
Goetzel et al. (2010); Ricci and Chee (2005); Tsai, Ahmed, Wendt, Bhojani, and Donnelly (2008); Burton 
et al. (1998); Tucker and Friedman (1998); Schmier, Jones, and Halpern (2006); Finkelstein et al. (2010); 
Gates, Succop, Brehm, Gillespie, and Sommers (2008); and Pronk et al. (2004). 
 
36  See for example Register and Williams (1990); Loh (1993); Pagan and Davila (1997); Averett and 
Korenmann (1999); Cawley (2004); Garcia and Quintana-Domeque (2007); Lundborg, Bolin, Hojgard, and 
Lindgren (2007); Greve (2008); and Shimokawa (2008). 
 
37 For a thorough review of the wage-BMI instrumental variables literature, see Kortt and Leigh (2010). 
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led researchers to attempt to uncover the factors that could be underlying or confounding 
the wage-obesity relationship.  There are two primary hypotheses. 
The first hypothesis is that obese workers are less productive than non-obese 
workers in some way that is not captured in standard wage equations.  These differences 
are typically attributed to differences in human capital accumulation or differences in 
underlying health.  The second primary hypothesis is that the residual wage penalty for 
obesity that remains unexplained after controlling for typical human capital and 
demographic variables may be attributable to discrimination against obese employees.  
While the potential presence of systematic discrimination may seem more of a legal or 
ethical dilemma than an economic one, the socio-economic implications are significant.  
Nonwhites, less-educated individuals, and low-income females are more likely to be 
obese than others (Flegal, Carroll, Kit, & Ogden, 2012; Ogden, Carroll, Kit, & Flegal, 
2010).  To the extent that vulnerable populations are more likely to be obese, the wage 
effects of discrimination may have repercussions on income equality or equity of 
opportunity.  Additionally, discrimination may exacerbate productivity losses, for 
instance if it limits beneficial cooperation in the workplace.  Discrimination against obese 
individuals has also been shown to increase the negative health effects of obesity 
(Schafer & Ferraro, 2011) which may increase absenteeism or presenteeism costs to 
employers. 
The current study considers both the productivity and discrimination hypotheses.  
The study utilizes employee-level data from a US IT firm that provide measures of health 
and human capital accumulation unavailable in previous studies.  Information about the 
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organization of the firm also allows us to directly test for the possibility of discrimination 
against obese employees.  In addition to these two hypotheses, I investigate the 
previously unconsidered possibility that children are confounding the wage-obesity 
relationship.  While children are a standard inclusion in previous wage equations, our 
study is the first to interact children with obesity to test whether the wage penalty varies 
between parents and non-parents, a possibility that could explain why the estimated 
penalty for obesity is consistently larger among females than among males. 
 The data provide other advantages over previous datasets.  All employees in the 
dataset are high-income earners relative to the US population at large (the median annual 
salary is $85,000), which greatly alleviates concerns about possible reverse causality 
between low income and obesity.  Measures of annual salary used to construct hourly 
wages are retrieved from administrative records, and BMI measures are directly gathered 
by trained data collectors.  By eliminating self-reports of BMI and salary, the dependent 
variable and independent variable of interest should be less subject to measurement error 
than in previous studies.38 
Consistent with previous research I find that obese females earn significantly less 
than normal-weight females: a penalty of nearly 7%.  Obese males earn a roughly 4 
percent wage premium compared to normal-weight males, although this result is not 
statistically significant.  Results indicate that human capital accumulation explains a 
                                                          
38 As acknowledged by previous studies (e.g., Burkhauser & Cawley, 2008), BMI is an imperfect measure 
of health, as ratios of weight to height do not perfectly account for body frame or muscle mass.  To 
circumvent this issue, several recent studies have substituted percent body fat or waist size for BMI in the 
regression equation (Bozoyan & Wolbring, 2011; Johansson, Bockerman, Kiiskinen, & Heliovaara, 2009; 
Wada & Tekin, 2010).  Unfortunately the available data do not contain measures of body fat or waist 
circumference.  Since the majority of the literature uses the BMI measures previously described rather than 
waist size, using BMI is consistent with providing the best comparison possible. 
120 
 
 
significant amount of the difference in wages between obese and normal-weight 
employees among both males and females.  Contrary to previous research, I find 
evidence that health is an important confounding factor among males, which suggests 
that efforts to improve employee health may yield significant gains in productivity.  I do 
not find evidence of peer or supervisor discrimination against obese employees, but I do 
find that the wage penalty for obese females only occurs among obese mothers, and that 
obese females with no children actually earn wage premiums similar to obese males. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows.  Section 3 discusses previous attempts to 
explain the well-documented negative relationship between wages and obesity.  Section 4 
introduces the econometric model, while Section 5 describes the data in detail.  Section 6 
reports the results of tests for differences in productivity and for the possibility of 
discrimination.  Lastly, Section 7 explores the possibility that the wage-obesity 
relationship is confounded by unobserved factors related to parenthood. 
3. Background and Previous Literature 
 
As evidence has mounted in support of the negative wage-obesity relationship, a 
subset of the literature has shifted focus from estimating the relationship between obesity 
and wages to identifying the possible factors(s) that may be underlying this relationship 
(hereafter referred to as the “wage penalty”).  There are two broad hypotheses for the 
underlying source of the wage penalty.  The first hypothesis is that obese employees are 
less productive than normal-weight ones for reasons that are not captured by standard 
wage equations.  These differences are typically attributed to either differences in human 
capital accumulation or differences in health.  This is an important distinction.  
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Differences in human capital are typically attributed to differences in unobserved 
individual attributes that could be correlated with both human capital investment and the 
probability of becoming obese (such as time-preference or intrinsic motivation).  In this 
case obesity is a confounding rather than a causal mechanism: it is not causing lower 
wages but is merely the physical manifestation of other attributes that lead to lower 
wages.  Moreover, these attributes are considered immutable.  One’s time preference or 
ambition is not likely to respond to intervention at the public or private level.  On the 
other hand, differences in underlying health may reflect a causal relationship.  Even if 
obesity and reduced health occur simultaneously, reduced wages attributed to reduced 
health would signal the possibility of restoring lost productivity through appropriate 
health intervention at the public or private (i.e., firm) level. 
Support for the human capital hypothesis is offered by Baum and Ford (2004), 
who find that obese U.S. workers earn significantly lower returns to tenure on the job, a 
result which they attribute to differences in investment in the on-the-job training.  Atella, 
Pace, and Vuri (2008) attempt to recreate this result among European employees but find 
no difference in returns to participation in training programs between obese and normal-
weight workers.  
The literature provides less support for the health hypothesis.  Brunello and 
D’Hombres (2007) and Baum and Ford (2004) control for health using a binary indicator 
for “poor health” or “health limitations,” respectively, while Atella et al. (2008) use a 
measure of absenteeism (days of work missed in the last four work weeks due to illness).  
All three studies fail to find evidence that obese workers are less productive due to lower 
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average health.  Johansson et al. (2009) do find that a binary indicator for “good health” 
is significantly correlated with wages among Finnish workers, but inclusion of the 
measure only slightly attenuates the observed wage penalty for obesity.  Similarly, 
Lundborg et al. (2007) find that controlling for chronic conditions, mobility, and self-
reported health status partially attenuates the wage penalty among European workers over 
50 years of age, but leaves a significant wage penalty unaccounted for.  Gregory and 
Ruhm (2009) point out that medical expenditures do not begin to increase with increasing 
BMI until well after the point at which BMI begins to adversely affect wages, casting 
further doubt on the health hypothesis.  Ultimately, no supplemental control for 
productivity has been able to fully account for the observed wage penalty, leading 
researchers to consider alterative explanations. 
The second primary hypothesis for the wage penalty is that obese workers are 
subject to workplace discrimination.39  Two recent wage studies have found evidence in 
support of this hypothesis.  Han, Norton, and Stearns (2009) find that the wage penalty 
for obese employees is higher in jobs that require higher levels of interpersonal skill.  A 
similar study by Johar and Katayama (2012) finds that obese employees in socially-
oriented jobs (those requiring “authority” or “nurturance”) also face a higher wage 
penalty than those in non-social jobs.  However, these studies cannot differentiate 
between possible customer and employer discrimination (although Baum and Ford, 2004 
                                                          
39 A third hypothesis posits that total compensation for obese employees is consistent with normal-weight 
employees, but that wages decrease as employers shift compensation to cover higher insurance premiums 
incurred by obese workers but borne by the firm.  Bhattacharya and Bundorf (2009) find strong evidence 
for this effect in the US, but Baum and Ford (2004) find that obese American workers with employer-
provided insurance actually earn more than obese workers without it.  Atella et al. (2008) also fail to find 
evidence for the insurance hypothesis among European workers. 
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find that obese workers in customer-oriented occupations do not face a higher wage 
penalty than those outside of such occupations suggesting that the results may be driven 
by employer discrimination).  Moreover, in both of these studies, obese employees in the 
less-social jobs still face a wage penalty.  This suggests that even if discrimination is 
occurring, it cannot fully account for the observed wage penalty.  
In the current study I consider two types of employer discrimination: direct and 
indirect.  Direct discrimination refers to obese employees being paid less simply because 
they are disliked by their employers.  Standard economic theory posits that competitive 
markets should eliminate this type of behavior, although evidence for labor market 
discrimination according to gender, race, or sexual orientation remains, suggesting that 
this type of discrimination cannot be ruled out (see e.g., Biddle & Hamermesh, 2013; 
Laurent & Mihoubi, 2012). 
Indirect discrimination is more subtle.  In this case, non-obese employees may 
mistreat their obese coworkers, or refuse to cooperate with them to the same degree they 
would their non-obese peers.  Due to this negative behavior, obese employees will be less 
effective at their jobs, therefore “earning” their reduced wages, even though the effect is 
still attributable to discrimination.  Several studies have found qualitative evidence for 
this type of discrimination.  Carr and Friedman (2005) report that BMI is positively 
correlated with perceived workplace discrimination (e.g., rudeness, being treated as less 
intelligent, etc.), and that such workplace discrimination is more prevalent among white 
collar workers.  Obese workers are also more likely to be perceived by their coworkers as 
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lazy, lacking in self-control, of lower ability, and less likely to get along with and be 
accepted by coworkers and subordinates (Rudolph, Wells, Weller, & Baltes, 2009). 
In addition to the previously considered hypotheses, I also consider one 
possibility that has not been previously addressed in the literature: that having children is 
a factor that may both increase BMI and decrease wages.  This would help to explain the 
discrepancy in results between obese males and females sometimes encountered in the 
literature (see e.g., Cawley, 2004; Greve, 2008; Johansson et al., 2009; Hildebrande & 
Van Kern, 2010).  Women have larger biological roles in pregnancy and childbirth that 
may affect body mass or disrupt human capital accumulation, and in the US women still 
handle the majority of child care responsibilities (Craig, 2006).  Children are a standard 
control variable in the literature and therefore not the source of any omitted variables 
bias.  What has not been accounted for is the possibility that the relationship between 
children and wages differs between obese and normal-weight women, or that the 
relationship between wages and obesity differs between mothers and non-mothers. 
Research has suggested that women who are obese in early adulthood are less 
likely to ever have children and that those who do will have fewer children than mothers 
who were not obese in early adulthood (Frisco & Weden, 2013; Frisco, Weden, Lippert, 
& Burnett, 2012).  Therefore the presence of children may provide information on the 
timing of obesity.  The timing of obesity may influence the wage-obesity relationship in 
ways that can be captured by this variation, something that I consider in Section 7. 
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4. Econometric Model 
Following the classic Mincer (1975) approach, wages may be modeled as 
 
 W = exp(X′β + δ1OV + δ2OB + ε) (Eq. 1) 
 
where OV and OB refer to indicators for overweight and obese, with BMI < 25 (normal 
weight) serving as the reference category,  and X is a set of control variables available in 
national-level datasets, including demographic and occupational controls, as well as basic 
measures of human capital accumulation (e.g., experience, education).40   
In general, the aim of regressing wages on obesity is to estimate the average 
percentage difference in wages between obese and normal-weight (or non-obese) 
individuals conditional on X (hereafter referred to as the average “treatment” effect of 
obesity [ATEOB]).  This ATE may be defined as 
 
 ATEOB = exp(δ2) – 1.41 (Eq. 2) 
 
Practitioners generally make several additional assumptions about the model.  The first is 
that  
 
 ε =   Z′γ + ν (Eq. 3) 
 
                                                          
40 I omit the “underweight” category in the analysis as only 5 respondents meet this definition.  Therefore 
the normal-weight category refers to anyone with a BMI of less than 25, rather than the strict definition of 
individuals with a BMI between 18.5 and 25. 
 
41 In the literature ATEOB is often approximated by δ2 itself.  This distinction is unimportant for the present 
analysis. 
126 
 
 
where Z is a vector of explanatory variables that are not contained in X.  The second is 
that corr(OB,Z|X) ≠ 0, so that estimates of δ2 are biased due to the omission of Z.  
Finally, it is assumed that ν is exogenous and mean zero conditional on both X and Z, so 
that estimates of δ2 would be consistent if Z was included in the model. 
Previous studies (e.g., Atella et al., 2008; Baum & Ford, 2004; Cawley, 2004) 
have utilized a mixture of instrumental variables and individual fixed effects in order to 
condition out Z and retrieve consistent estimates of δ2.  As discussed in Section 3, a 
segment of the literature has recently shifted from consistently estimating the wage-
obesity relationship (δ2) towards uncovering the elements of Z.  However, previous 
studies have not utilized a rigorous approach to achieving this goal.  Typically, if 
inclusion of a new variable set (Zk) appears to substantially attenuate the estimate of δ2 or 
renders the estimate insignificant, then the new set is deemed to be an element of Z.  In 
this study I take this approach a step further by using a generalized Hausman test to test 
the null hypothesis that the estimate of δ2 from the regression equation excluding Zk is 
identical to that produced by the equation that includes Zk (δ2′ ).  Although motivated by 
Baron and Kenny’s (1986) test for mediating effects, our approach is virtually identical to 
previous efforts in the literature to classify Z, except I rely on a statistical rather than 
“eyeball” test.42   
 Let Wij be the hourly wage rate of individual i in work group j.  In our sample a 
work group refers to a collection of employees who all report to the same manager.  
                                                          
42 This approach is similar to the test for collapsibility proposed by Clogg, Petkova, and Shihadeh (1992).  
Their approach requires the assumption of normally distributed and homoscedastic errors.  I assume that 
errors are clustered, and therefore the assumptions necessary for that test are not met. 
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Virtually all collaboration at the firm occurs within a work group and I assume that both 
observed and unobserved work group attributes may influence the wages of employee i.  
I express the true wage equation for our sample as: 
 
 Wij = exp(Xij′ β + Zij′ γ + λ1OVi + λ2OBi + uj + ξi) (Eq. 4) 
 
where Xij are individual and group-level control variables consistent with those drawn 
from national-level datasets; Zij are individual and group-level variables that remain 
jointly correlated with Wij and OBi conditional Xij; λ2 is the true value of the regression 
parameter for obesity; uj is a work-group level random effect and ξi is an individual-level 
stochastic shock, both of which are exogenous and mean zero conditional on Xij and Zij.   
I define a “potentially consistent” estimator of λ2 as one that would consistently 
estimate λ2 if the regression contained the entire vector Z (i.e., every possible variable 
jointly correlated with wages and obesity not contained in X) and that would consistently 
estimate the appropriate standard error 𝜎𝜆2 .  Furthermore, estimates of λ2 produced by 
this estimator would consistently estimate the true population ATEOB if λ�2 was inserted 
into equation (2).  I define the estimator as “potentially” consistent since I do not assume 
that the set of k variables ZK available in our data represents the full set of potentially 
omitted variables jointly correlated with wages and obesity (that is, I do not assume that I 
ever successfully estimate the “true” relationship between wages and obesity).  
The previous literature almost universally utilizes OLS on a log-transformed 
model of wages.  However, I deviate from this approach since it may not fulfill the 
assumptions of the potentially consistent estimator.  As discussed by Blackburn (2007) 
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and Manning and Mullahy (1998), estimates of λ2 from a log-wage model may not 
recover the true ATEOB if there is heteroskedasticity in the error term.  Moreover, due to 
the presence of uj, a log-wage model will not produce the correct residuals to construct 
cluster-robust standard errors since 
 
E[yj – exp(Xij′ β + Zij′ γ + λ1OVi + λ2OBi)] ≠ E[ln(yj) - Xij′ β + Zij′ γ + λ1OVi + λ2OBi]. 
 
Therefore, I utilize a generalized linear model with a log link function as a potentially 
consistent estimator in place of OLS.43   
 If Z is jointly correlated with wages and obesity, and Zk is some subset of Z, then 
including Zk in the regression should reduce (or potentially eliminate) omitted variables 
bias that is present, such that δ2′  is different in magnitude to δ2, and λ2 - δ2′  < λ2 - δ2 
(i.e. δ2′  is closer to the “true” parameter value than is δ2).  Our estimation goal then is 
neither λ2 nor ATEOB but Δ, where Δ = δ2′ - δ2.  I assert that the greater the magnitude of 
Δ, the greater the confounding effect of Zk.  By imposing a “potentially” consistent 
estimator of ATEOB, I ensure that Δ is a consistent estimate of the confounding effect of 
Zk, and that the cluster robust standard errors are not underestimated.   
I use a generalized Hausman test to determine whether Δ is statistically 
significant.44  If so, then I can reject the null hypothesis that δ2′  = δ2.  Although rejecting 
                                                          
43 When dealing with clustered as opposed to panel data with nonlinear outcomes, random effects will only 
improve efficiency and will not affect the consistency of the estimates (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005).  On the 
other hand, integration of the random effect requires the assumptions that the errors are normally 
distributed and homoscedastic within a cluster.  Failure of these assumptions will render the model 
inconsistent.  This, coupled with the practical shortcomings of the nonlinear random effects model makes 
us opt to construct clustered standard errors rather than cluster random effects. 
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the null of a statistical test cannot prove that the omission of Zk was causing omitted 
variables bias, such a rejection when coupled with valid theoretically consideration 
allows us to make a compelling case that Zk is an explanatory factor underlying the wage-
obesity relationship.  Elements of Zk include controls for employee productivity (human 
capital accumulation and health) as well as controls for peer or supervisor discrimination.  
These elements will be detailed in Sections 5.3 and 6.3. 
5. Data 
 
5.1. Work, Family, and Health Network 
 
The data were obtained from the Work, Family, and Health Network (WFHN).  
The WFHN was created by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to study the relationship between work, family 
life, and health outcomes.  The WFHN is comprised of four research centers, a 
translational coordinating center (TCC), and a data and methods coordinating center 
(DCC).  The four research centers are the University of Minnesota, Penn State 
University, Harvard University, and Portland State in conjunction with Purdue 
University.  The Kaiser Permanente Center for Health Research serves as the TCC, and 
RTI International serves as the DCC.  Members of the WFHN were tasked with 
determining the health effects of an intervention intended to:  (a) increase employees’ 
control over their work time, and (b) improve supervisor and coworker support for 
employees’ family and personal lives.  Two firms were selected for intervention, one of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
44 Tests are 1 tailed with p ≤ 0.1 as the cutoff for “significant” difference.  The residuals used to estimate 𝜎�2 
are clustered at the work group level.  
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which is an American telecommunications firm.  A single cross-section of data from this 
firm, collected prior to the intervention, is utilized in the present study. 
The sample is limited to full-time, permanent (non-contractor) employees, each of 
whom belongs to one of 106 “work groups.”45  The work groups are collections of 
employees who report to the same manager and may collaborate with each other 
frequently.  Employees operate at one of thirteen sites, and all sites are located in one of 
two urban locations in two separate states.46  The mean work group size in the sample is 
approximately 12, and the average work site hosts about 58 employees.   
Employees are classified by the firm’s human resources (HR) department as 
either support personnel (e.g., network administrators, administrative assistants) or core 
personnel (those directly involved in the firm’s core business).  Within the firm there are 
also four broad occupational classes based on primary job function.  Each work group 
emphasizes or is entirely devoted to one of the four functions.  Each employee in the 
sample is designated by HR as belonging to one of four job categories based on the 
function emphasized by her or his work group (that is, occupational controls are at the 
work group rather than individual level).  The support/core and occupational categories 
are utilized as additional controls in the wage equation as discussed in Section 5.2.47  
 
                                                          
45 The data do not contain any “blue collar” support personnel (e.g., custodians, security). 
 
46 In addition to work site indicators, all models include an indicator for those who did not report a work 
site. 
 
47 The distinction between core/support and occupation assignment are defined for the benefit of 
researchers and are not official administrative divisions.  However, these divisions represent real and 
significant differences between tasks performed and potentially the compensation that accompanies each 
task.  Disclosure of details regarding the four job functions is prohibited. 
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5.2. Standard Variables 
The dependent variable is a constructed measure of hourly wages.  Annual 
income is obtained from administrative records.  Annual hours are constructed by 
multiplying self-reported average weekly hours by 52 and subtracting out the number of 
vacation hours taken by the employee that year (which is also recorded in the 
administrative data).  Hourly wages (Wij) are the ratio of annual income to annual 
hours.48  Controls for the hourly wage, indicated by the vector Xij, include age, squared 
age, tenure with the firm, tenure squared, education, race, nativity, married/cohabitating 
status, number of children, occupation, an indicator to differentiate between support and 
core employees, and indicators for state and worksite.49,50  Following the literature, 
separate models are run for males and females.    
                                                          
48 Using an hourly wage measure as the dependent variable raises the concern that low wages are a 
consequence of long hours rather than reduced compensation, and that long hours could be correlated with 
obesity.  However, constructed hourly wage is an issue with all data.  For instance, in the 2010 wave of the 
NLSY79, 56 percent of employed respondents reported a time-unit of compensation other than hourly 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2013).  Thirty-seven percent of employed respondents reported compensation 
as an annual value.  Moreover, a relationship between longer hours and obesity is consistent with a 
productivity hypothesis.  Salaried compensation is offered with the expectation of a certain level of output 
per unit of time (e.g. every week).  Individuals who take more hours to produce that level of output are, by 
definition, less marginally productive.  Therefore long hours “causing” obesity over time still indicates that 
reduced productivity is confounding the wage-obesity relationship.  One other possibility is that individuals 
put in longer hours than necessary in order to signal commitment with the hope of higher future salary.  If 
this is the case I should see that obese employees have higher returns to tenure than normal-weight 
employees.  However, as reported in Appendix G, this is not the case. 
 
49 The binary division between support and core workers is a qualitative distinction in job type not captured 
by the four job categories.  The difference between staff and senior workers may reflect differences in 
ability or human capital accumulation and therefore this distinction is not considered until later models in 
Section 6.2. 
 
50 Race enters the equation as a binary white/nonwhite variable.  Roughly half of non-whites are Indian-
Asians, while about 20% are “Other Asian,” 10% are African American, and the remainder self-identify as 
Pacific Islander, Native American, or “Other.” 
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Observations with missing data for BMI or salary are dropped from the sample.51  
All missing observations are assumed to be missing at random (Rubin, 1976), and the 
observed subsample is thus representative of the full population of non-executive, white-
collar employees within the firm.  Due to the small sample size, extra attention is paid to 
outliers that may have an undue influence on the parameter estimates, and I drop any 
observation that fulfills both of two conditions: belonging to either the top or bottom 1-
percentile of BMI, and belonging to either the top or bottom 1-percentile of hourly 
wages.  This resulted in two additional males and one additional female being dropped, 
leaving a final sample of 452 men and 295 women.  Summary statistics are provided in 
Tables 25 and 26 for females and males, respectively. 
 
Table 25 
Summary Statistics (Female) 
  Full Sample 
(n = 295) 
Obese 
(n = 92 ) 
Normal Weight 
(n = 111) 
  M SD M SD M SD 
Standard 
Variables 
 
BMI 28.28 6.61 36.05*** 5.68 22.44 1.75 
Overweight 31.18% 0.46     
Obese 31.18% 0.46     
 Hourly Wage 38.76 7.85 37.00*** 7.96 40.35 7.61 
 Married or 
Cohabitating 70.85% 0.46 54.34%
*** 0.50 72.97% 0.45 
 Total 
Number of 
Children 
1.63 1.24 1.73* 1.34 1.48 1.19 
                                                          
51 See Appendix F for information regarding missing data. 
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Table 25 
(Cont.) 
  Full Sample 
(n = 295) 
Obese 
(n = 92 ) 
Normal Weight 
(n = 111) 
  M SD M SD M SD 
 Nonwhite 24.07% 0.43 17.39%* 0.38 27.03% 0.45 
 Born Abroad 19.32% 0.40 8.70%*** 0.28 27.03% 0.45 
 College 
Graduate  
(4-year) 
66.44% 0.47 55.43%*** 0.50 75.68% 0.43 
 Age 46.88 8.38 48.49** 7.68 45.11 9.14 
 Tenure with 
Firm (years) 16.04 9.94 17.66
** 10.19 15.01 9.96 
 Support 
Personnel 5.76% 0.23 8.70% 0.28 5.41% 0.23 
Productivity 
Controls 
(Z) 
Staff 36.27% 0.48 38.04% 0.49 32.43% 0.47 
Senior 57.97% 0.49 53.26%** 0.50 62.16% 0.49 
Physical 
Function 92.63% 13.38 87.14
*** 17.69 96.00 7.61 
Loud Snoring 25.76% 0.44 40.22%*** 0.49 10.82% 0.31 
C-Reactive 
Proteina 3.06 4.34 5.74
*** 6.24 1.53 2.25 
Cholesterol 
Ratiob 3.87 1.09 4.17
*** 1.18 3.61 0.94 
Hypertension 31.18% 0.46 43.48%*** 0.50 18.92% 0.39 
Heart Rate 72.35 11.10 73.66* 12.39 71.37 10.58 
Notes:  a: C-Reactive Protein concentration is measured in mg/L. For reference, CRP levels below 1.0 are 
considered low-risk for heart disease, 1.0-2.99 is considered average risk, and greater than 3.0 is high risk.  
b: A cholesterol ratio below 3.5 is considered optimal, 3.5-5 is normal, and >5 is considered high.   
* Indicates obese employees are significantly different from normal-weight employees at the 0.1 level. ** p 
< 0.05  ***  p < 0.01 
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Table 26 
Summary Statistics (Male) 
  Full Sample 
(n = 452) 
Obese 
(n = 135 ) 
Normal Weight  
(n = 123) 
  M SD M SD M SD 
Standard 
Variables 
 
BMI 28.10 4.90 33.74*** 4.38 23.04 1.55 
Overweight 42.92% 0.50     
Obese 29.87% 0.46     
 Hourly Wage 41.02 8.23 42.20* 9.23 40.24 8.51 
 Married or Cohabitating 84.74% 0.36 85.93% 0.35 81.30% 0.39 
 Total Number of Children 1.64 1.43 1.83
** 1.49 1.32 1.25 
 Nonwhite 29.20% 0.46 17.04%*** 0.38 45.53% 0.50 
 Born Abroad 31.89% 0.44 16.30%*** 0.37 47.97% 0.50 
 
College 
Graduate  
(4-year) 
83.63% 0.37 73.33%*** 0.44 91.87% 0.27 
 Age 45.12 8.70 46.96*** 9.04 43.24 9.38 
 Tenure with Firm (years) 12.07 8.16 12.60
** 8.11 10.82 7.35 
 Support Personnel 6.86% 0.25 4.44%
* 0.21 10.47% 0.31 
Productivity 
Controls 
(Z) 
Staff 33.41% 0.47 34.07% 0.48 33.33% 0.47 
Senior 59.73% 0.49 61.48% 0.49 56.10% 0.50 
Physical 
Function 95.28 10.21 92.96
*** 12.30 97.02 6.57 
Loud Snoring 32.74% 0.47 40.00%** 0.49 23.58% 0.43 
C-Reactive 
Proteina 1.87 2.32 2.53
*** 2.86 1.04 1.08 
 
Cholesterol 
Ratiob 4.47 1.35 4.60
** 1.11 4.31 1.68 
Hypertension 45.35% 0.50 55.56%*** 0.50 29.27% 0.45 
Heart Rate 69.75 11.33 73.40*** 11.96 68.26 10.73 
Notes: a: C-Reactive Protein concentration is measured in mg/L. For reference, CRP levels below 1.0 are 
considered low-risk for heart disease, 1.0-2.99 is considered average risk, and greater than 3.0 is high risk.  
b: A cholesterol ratio below 3.5 is considered optimal, 3.5-5 is normal, and >5 is considered high. 
* Indicates obese employees are significantly different from normal-weight employees at the 0.1 level.  
** p < 0.05  ***  p < 0.01 
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Respondents’ annual salaries average about $82,000 for females and $88,000 for 
males: equivalent to hourly wages of roughly $39 for females and $41 for males.  The 
majority of the sample has at least a four-year degree with virtually the entire remainder 
having some college education and only a few holding just a high school diploma.52  
Employees are generally mid-career with a mean age of about 46 (minimum 26, 
maximum 64) and 12–15 years of experience with the current company.  Roughly 25 
percent of the sample is nonwhite, while about 32 percent of males and 19 percent of 
females were born abroad.  Approximately 85 percent of males and 71 percent of the 
females are married or cohabitating, and both subsamples have slightly less than two 
children, on average. 
Both men and women have an average BMI of 28, about 1.5 units higher than the 
national average, with females having a slightly higher variance.  Approximately 32 
percent of females and 42 percent of males are clinically overweight (≤ 25 BMI < 30), 
while about 30 percent of males and 32 percent of females are clinically obese (BMI ≥ 
30).  The proportions overweight and obese are roughly consistent with unadjusted 
national averages (except for the slightly high proportion of overweight males).53   
                                                          
52 Testing found no significant difference in wages between those with just a high school diploma and those 
with some college but no bachelor’s degree.  Individuals without a bachelor’s degree do not appear to have 
diminished standing with the firm.  Employees without a degree are more likely to be classified as senior 
than staff, and are represented across all four job classes.  The primary difference is that employees without 
a degree have been with the company longer, suggesting a longer path to promotion, or the possibility that 
older employees were “grandfathered” in before more rigorous selection was enacted. 
 
53 Parametric studies typically model the relationship between BMI and wages by utilizing a linear measure 
of BMI, possibly paired with a quadratic term, or by creating a set of categorical BMI indicator variables 
defined as underweight (BMI < 18.5), overweight (25 ≤ BMI < 30), or obese (BMI ≥ 30), with the normal 
range (18.5 ≤ BMI < 25) as the reference group.  Testing suggests a nonlinear relationship between wages 
and BMI that is best captured by the categorical measures. 
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 Comparisons between obese and normal-weight employees indicate significant 
differences between the two subsamples.  Relative to their normal-weight coworkers, 
obese females are significantly less likely to be married, nonwhite, or born abroad.  The 
average obese female is also about three years older than her normal-weight peers, with 
an extra two years of tenure with the present firm.  Despite the additional experience, 
obese females earn nearly $3 less per hour than normal-weight women, a significant 
difference equivalent to nearly one-half of a standard deviation.  However, obese females 
are nearly 20 percent less likely to have completed a 4-year degree and 10 percentage 
points less likely to be “senior” core personnel.  Among males, obese workers actually 
earn significantly more than their normal-weight peers, a difference of $1.50, or about 
one-fifth of a standard deviation.  Obese males are significantly less likely to be nonwhite 
or born abroad, and also significantly less likely to have finished college.  Like females, 
obese males in the sample are roughly three years older with an additional two years of 
experience with the firm. 
5.3. Additional Controls for Productivity 
The control variables (Xij) in Section 5.2 are those that are included as standard in 
previous wage models in the wage-obesity literature.  However, these controls may be 
insufficient to fully account for differences in productivity between obese and normal-
weight workers (as evidenced by the significant wage-obesity relationship typically 
estimated in the literature).  The WFHN data include additional controls (Zij) for 
employee productivity that allow me to more precisely account for differences in 
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productivity that may remain after accounting for the standard controls, either due to 
differences in human capital accumulation or health.54   
The first set of variables controls for possible differences in accumulation of 
occupation-specific human capital, i.e., skills and abilities that directly translate to the job 
(and which should entail a mixture of workplace experience and natural ability).  Core 
personnel in the data are differentiated between “staff” and “senior” level workers.  
Senior level workers do not possess administrative authority over staff workers.  Rather, 
senior status indicates a meaningful accumulation of human capital that has resulted in 
one or more promotions. 55  Indicator variables accounting for this division should 
capture potential differences in human capital accumulation between obese and non-
obese employees.  Among both males and females roughly 60 percent of employees have 
reached senior status, and approximately 35 percent are staff level (with the remainder 
belonging to support positions).  Obese females are significantly less likely to be senior-
level employees, a difference of nearly 10 percentage points, although this discrepancy 
does not hold among males. 
The second set of variables contains proxies for facets of health that may affect 
productivity, including physical function, sleep, and cardiovascular health.  The first 
health proxy is a comprehensive measure of physical function, rated on a scale from 0-
100.  This variable is constructed from nine separate questions, which assess self-reported 
                                                          
54 Tests for discrimination rely on organizational data rather than specific variables.  The approach for these 
methods will be outlined in Section 6.3. 
 
55 Staff may be either “Staff I” or “Staff II” and seniors as “Senior I” or “Senior II.”  Therefore someone 
joining the firm as a Staff I would need two promotions to reach Senior I, while someone hired as a Senior 
I could be promoted and still appear in the data as a “Senior.”  The distinction between sub-levels I and II is 
unavailable in the data. 
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limitations on everyday activities such as walking up stairs, carrying groceries, and 
bending/stooping, among others.  Responses may be either “Yes, limited a lot”; “Yes, 
limited some” or “No, not limited at all.”  The responses are transformed by the DCC 
(RTI, International) into a 0-100 scale based on scoring devised by the RAND 
Corporation. 56 A score of 100 reflects full functionality (able to run and play sports) and 
0 is barely functional (health severely limits all everyday activities).  Although software 
development is not a physically strenuous job, it is still reasonable to assume that 
diminished physical function may affect on-the-job performance.  In general, the sample 
is highly functional, with average ratings over 90 percent.  However, obese employees 
are significantly limited compared to their normal-weight coworkers, a difference of 10 
percentage points (roughly one standard deviation) among females and 5 percentage 
points (roughly one-half a standard deviation) among males. 
Another way in which obesity may result in reduced productivity is if obesity 
substantially disrupts sleep.  Obesity is significantly correlated with obstructive sleep 
disorder (aka “sleep apnea”), which in turn has been associated with decreased cognitive 
function (Engleman & Douglas, 2004; Ulfberg, Carter, Talback, & Edling, 1996; 
Vgontzas et al., 1994).  Although the data lack an exact measure of sleep apnea, they do 
contain a self-reported indicator variable for “loud snoring.” The indicator denotes 
positive response to the question “During the past month, have you ever snored loudly, or 
                                                          
56 The questions comprising the physical limitations measure are derived from the Medical Outcomes Study 
36-Item Short-Form Survey (Ware & Sherbourne, 1992).  Scoring from 0-100 is based on the RAND 36-
Item Health Survey 1.0 (www.rand.org/health/surveys_tools/mos/mos_core_36item_scoring.html). 
 
139 
 
 
been told you were snoring loudly?”57  Severity of snoring has been identified as one of 
the primary predictors of sleep apnea among obese patients (Vgontzas et al., 1994).  
Therefore, controlling for loud snoring may serve as a proxy for the effect of obesity on 
sleep.  Approximately one-fourth of females and one-third of males report loud snoring.  
Obese females are more likely to snore heavily by 30 percentage points, while for males 
the differences is 15 percentage points. 
The final set of health variables contains four measures of cardiovascular health 
including blood serum levels of C-reactive protein (CRP), a biomarker for inflammation; 
blood serum levels of cholesterol; blood pressure; and heart rate.58  All four of these 
measures capture elements of risk for cardiovascular disease, as well as overall 
cardiovascular fitness.  Measures of cholesterol are transformed into a ratio of total to 
HDL (“good”) cholesterol, a measure that is more strongly correlated with heart disease 
than total cholesterol or LDL (“bad”) cholesterol and that may better capture the negative 
lifestyle behaviors associated with BMI (Kinosian et al., 1994).  Measures of both CRP 
and the cholesterol ratio appear to follow a lognormal distribution (and to be 
heteroskedastic in relation to log wages), and so these variables are transformed by the 
natural log before entering the model.  Measures of blood pressure and heart rate refer to 
                                                          
57 This question distinguishes people who have reported snoring (but not loudly) from people who have 
reported “loud” snoring.  Nested within the “loud snoring” indicator are respondents who have 
“snorted/gasped” or “stopped breathing/struggled for breath.”  These sub-measures are not considered 
separately due to the small number of respondents (particularly females) who suffer from these conditions.  
Moreover, analysis by Maislin et al. (1995) suggests that loud snoring is nearly as correlated with apnea as 
snorting/gasping, and more correlated with apnea than stopped breathing/struggled for breath. 
 
58 Data for C-Reactive protein and cholesterol are missing for 7% and 13% of the sample, respectively.  
Several observations were also missing data on heart rate.  Since these are not the variables of interest and 
are assumed to be missing at random, missing values were imputed using a modified regression-based EM 
algorithm.  See Appendix F for details. 
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the mean value of three measures obtained on three separate days.  The average blood 
pressure measure is used to construct an indicator for high blood pressure (hypertension), 
which refers to systolic pressure greater than 140 mmHg or diastolic pressure greater than 
90 mmHg.   
Among both males and females, obese employees have significantly worse 
measures of cardiovascular health compared to their normal-weight coworkers.  Obese 
females measure nearly one standard deviation higher in their cholesterol ratio and CRP 
levels, and are approximately 25 percentage points more likely to have clinically high 
blood pressure.  Females also have significantly higher heart rates, although the 
difference is not substantial (about 2.5 beats per minute [BPM]: less than one-fifth a 
standard deviation).  Obese males also have higher measures of inflammation and 
cholesterol ratio compared to normal-weight males, equal to approximately one-half of a 
standard deviation.  Obese males are also 25 percentage points more likely to have high 
blood pressure, and have a heart rate approximately 5 BPM (one-half standard deviation) 
higher than normal-weight employees.  Taken together, the set of health variables 
suggests that obese workers are less healthy than normal-weight employees in physical 
function, cardiovascular health, and potentially in quality of sleep.  Incorporating these 
measures should capture differences in productivity that are attributable to health.  Tests 
for differences in productivity between obese and normal-weight workers attributable to 
differences in health and human capital are provided in Section 6.2. 
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6. Results 
6.1. Baseline Results 
Results from the initial model containing only standard control variables 
(equation 1) are reported in Table 27.  Among females, overweight employees earn 
approximately 5.5 percent less than those in the normal-weight category, while obese 
employees earn roughly 6.8 percent less, on average.  Neither overweight nor obese 
males earn significantly different wages compared to their normal-weight coworkers.  
The lack of a significant wage-obesity relationship for males is consistent with the 
literature, which has found mixed results regarding the wage-obesity relationship among 
men.  The simplest explanation is that obesity is a more imperfect measure of physical 
health for males, since body mass index (BMI) does not distinguish muscle from other 
body mass.  It may also be the case that the wage-obesity pathway operates differently for 
males versus females, a possibility that will be explored further in the remainder of 
Section 6. 
 
Table 27 
The Relationship between Wages and Obesity with Standard Control Variables (Model 1) 
 Female (n = 295) Male (n = 452) 
Obese -0.068
** 
(0.033) 
0.039 
(0.025) 
Overweight -0.055
* 
(0.032) 
-0.003  
(0.022) 
Married or Cohabitating 0.026  (0.032) 
0.018  
(0.026) 
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Table 27 
(Cont.) 
 Female (n = 295) Male (n = 452) 
Total Number of Children -0.002  (0.012) 
0.008  
(0.008) 
Nonwhite -0.046  (.029) 
-0.026  
(0.025) 
Born Abroad 0.025  (0.034) 
0.039  
(0.027) 
College Graduate (4-year) 0.060
**  
(0.025) 
0.057*  
(0.033) 
Age (10 years) 0.285
**  
(0.125) 
0.342***  
(0.092) 
Age Squared (100 squared years) -0.027
**  
(0.013) 
-0.032***  
(0.010) 
Tenure with Firm (10 years) -0.157
***  
(0.062) 
-0.020  
(.045) 
Tenure Squared (100 squared years) 0.042
***  
(0.015) 
0.011  
(0.011) 
Core (Staff and Senior) 0.185
**  
(0.076) 
0.231***  
(0.038) 
Note: The dependent variable is hourly wages. The overweight and obese coefficients report wages relative 
to normal-weight employees (BMI < 25).  Estimates are obtained using a generalized linear model with a 
log link function.  The model includes indicators for worksite, state, and job category. Standard errors are 
clustered at the work group level and reported in parentheses. 
 
Table 28 reports the results of tests for the hypothesized productivity mechanisms 
(human capital accumulation and health).  Results examining possible peer or supervisor 
discrimination are reported in Table 29, while Table 30 shows results for models that test 
whether parenthood is a confounding factor of the wage-obesity relationship among 
females.  For the sake of brevity, only results for obese workers relative to normal-weight 
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workers will be reported in results tables moving forward.  All subsequent models 
include indicators for overweight, and all interaction models include an overweight 
interaction term in addition to the reported obese interaction term.  Results for overweight 
employees are qualitatively similar to those for obese ones. 
 
Table 28 
Productivity Differences as a Potential Factor Underlying the Wage-Obesity Relationship 
  
Baseline 
Human 
Capital 
 
Health 
 
Combined 
Female     
Obese -0.068
** 
(0.033) 
-0.054* 
(0.033) 
-0.049 
(0.035) 
-0.039 
(0.032) 
Δ 
 
 
0.014 # 
[0.065] 
0.019 
[0.157] 
0.029# 
[0.066] 
Male     
Obese 0.039 (0.025) 
0.016 
(0.024) 
0.79*** 
(0.027) 
0.045* 
(0.026) 
Δ 
 
 
-0.023 # 
[0.010] 
0.040 # 
[0.000] 
0.006 
[0.318] 
Note: The dependent variable is hourly wage.  Estimates are obtained using a generalized linear model with 
a log link function.  Models control for employee’s state, site, age, age2, race, nativity, marital status, 
number of children, tenure with the firm (in years), tenure2, and job category, unless reported otherwise.  
All models also contain an indicator for overweight.  The normal-weight category therefore serves as the 
point of reference for all obesity and obesity-interaction coefficients.  Standard errors are clustered at the 
work group level and reported in parentheses.  The p-value for the chi-squared statistic from a generalized 
Hausman test is reported in brackets. 
# Signifies that the obesity coefficient is significantly different from the Baseline coefficient estimate. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.5, *** p < 0.1 
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Table 29 
 
Discrimination as a Potential Factor Underlying the Wage-Obesity Relationship 
 
  Health and 
Human 
Capital 
 
Opposite 
Gender 
 
Obese 
Coworkers 
 
Workgroup 
Fixed Effects 
Females Obese -0.039 (0.032) 
-0.045 
(0.078) 
-0.005 
(0.048) 
-0.060* 
(0.033) 
 Proportion Opposite 
Gender  
-0.088 
(0.98)   
 
Obese X Proportion OG  0.005 (0.123)   
 
Proportion Obese   0.129 (0.102)  
 Obese x Proportion 
Obese   
-0.124 
(0.114)  
 
Δ  -0.006 [0.434] 
0.034 
[0.176] 
-0.021 
[0.390] 
Males Obese 0.045
* 
(0.026) 
0.032 
(0.039) 
0.121*** 
(0.034) 
0.039 
(0.025) 
 Proportion Opposite 
Gender  
-0.050 
(0.047)   
 
Obese X Proportion OG  0.030 (0.085)   
 Proportion Obese 
  
 
 
0.177** 
(0.079)  
 Obese x Proportion 
Obese  
 
 
-0.259*** 
(0.105)  
 
Δ 
 -0.013 
[0.318] 
0.076# 
[0.009] 
-0.006 
[0.202] 
Note: The dependent variable is hourly wage. Estimates are obtained using a generalized linear model with 
a log link function.  Models control for employees’ state, site, age, race, nativity, marital status, number of 
children, tenure with the firm (in years), job category, indicators for staff and senior, an indicator for loud 
snoring, as well as log cholesterol ratio, log CRP plasma concentration, hypertension, and heart rate.  All 
models also contain an indicator for overweight, and overweight is interacted with proportion opposite 
gender in model (9) and proportion obese in model (10).  The normal-weight category therefore serves as 
the point of reference for all obesity and obesity-interaction coefficients. Standard errors clustered at work 
group level and reported in parentheses.  The p-value for the chi-squared statistic from a generalized 
Hausman test is reported in brackets.  # Signifies that the obesity coefficient is significantly different from 
the obesity coefficient in model (5), the preferred productivity model. 
 * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.5, *** p < 0.1 
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Table 30 
 
Parenthood as a Potential Factor Underlying the Wage-Obesity Relationship 
 
  Health and 
Human 
Capital 
 
Child-
Interaction 
 
Single- 
Parent 
Females Obese -0.039 (0.032) 
0.051 
(0.041) 
0.041 
(0.053) 
 
Children -0.007 (0.012) 
0.009 
(0.014) 
0.012 
(0.013) 
 
Obese x Children  -0.053
*** 
(0.016) 
-0.070*** 
(0.024) 
 
Obese x Married x Children   0.027 (0.024) 
 
Δ  0.090
# 
[0.001] 
0.080# 
[0.007] 
Males Obese 0.045
* 
(0.026) 
0.046 
(0.031) 
0.044 
(0.032) 
 Children 0.008 (0.006) 
0.018 
(0.013) 
0.018 
(0.013) 
 Obese x Children  -0.002 (0.012) 
0.019 
(0.037) 
 Obese x Married x Children   -0.022 (0.035) 
 Δ  0.001 [0.492] 
-0.001 
[0.458] 
Note: The dependent variable is hourly wages. Estimates are obtained using a generalized linear model 
with a log link function.  Models control for employee’s state, site, age, race, nativity, marital status, 
number of children, tenure with the firm (in years), job category, indicators for staff and senior, physical 
function, an indicator for loud snoring, as well as log cholesterol ratio, log CRP plasma concentration, 
hypertension, and heart rate.  All models also contain an indicator for overweight, and overweight is 
interacted with children in models (12) and (13).  The normal-weight category therefore serves as the point 
of reference for all obesity and obesity-interaction coefficients.  Standard errors are clustered at the work 
group level and reported in parentheses. The p-value for the chi-squared statistic from a generalized 
Hausman test is reported in brackets. # signifies that the obesity coefficient differs significantly from model 
(11) – which is identical to the preferred productivity model (model 5).   Models 12 and 13 are re-runs of 
Model (5) – the preferred productivity model - with and without a control for children. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.5, *** p < 0.1 
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6.2. Productivity 
To control for differences in underlying human capital I replace the indicator for 
“core” jobs with two indicators differentiating between staff and senior positions.  Since 
transition from staff to senior requires one or more promotions, achieving senior level 
indicates a demonstrable level of human capital accumulation that has been recognized 
by the firm.  This may provide a more precise measure of overall human capital 
accumulation than simple years of tenure with the firm.  If obese employees accumulate 
human capital at a different rate than normal-weight employees (or if they are 
discriminated against in promotion), they may be disproportionately represented at the 
staff level.  If this is the case, controlling for the staff/senior distinction should attenuate 
the coefficients for the overweight and obese indicators. 
As shown in the second column of Table 27, accounting for the distinction 
between staff and senior employees significantly reduces the obesity coefficient among 
males, suggesting that obese males actually have greater accumulated human capital 
relative to normal-weight males.  Inclusion of these variables decreases the magnitude of 
the estimated wage penalty among females from -6.8 percent to -5.4 percent, a 
statistically significant reduction.  This result suggests that differences in human capital 
accumulation are a significant confounder of the wage-obesity relationship, a finding 
consistent with Baum and Ford (2004).59   
                                                          
59 However, as seen in Appendix G, neither obese males nor females have significantly lower returns to 
years of tenure, despite not controlling for the staff/senior distinction.  This may suggest that the 
staff/senior distinction is a better measure of human capital accumulation than are years of tenure. 
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 In the health model in Table 28, I test whether differences in productivity 
attributable to underlying health may be biasing the estimated relationship between 
wages and obesity.  This model omits the controls for staff and senior and introduces a 
measure of physical function, a proxy for sleep quality, and proxies for cardiovascular 
fitness.  Proxies for cardiovascular health include log C-Reactive Protein concentration, 
log cholesterol ratio, resting heart rate, and an indicator for hypertension.  Contrary to 
previous research, controlling for employee health reveals a large negative bias in the 
obesity coefficient among males, suggesting that health is a key omitted variable.  The 
wage penalty for females is attenuated from -6.8 percent to -4.9 percent while the male 
wage premium from obesity increases significantly from 3.9 percent to 7.9 percent.   
 The combined model in Table 28 contains both the health controls and the 
staff/senior indicators to determine if a joint model of productivity is able to explain the 
entire wage-obesity relationship.  Among males the health and human capital variables 
essentially cancel each other out.  Controlling for human capital accumulation reduces 
the wage premium significantly, whereas including controls for cardiovascular health 
significantly increases the wage premium.  The net effect is a small positive increase that 
leaves a large and significant wage premium of 4.5 percent.  For females the combined 
model reduces the obesity penalty from -6.8 percent to -3.9 percent, a large and 
significant reduction.  The magnitude of the coefficient shift in the combined model of 
health and human capital is roughly consistent with the sum of the coefficient shifts from 
the individual health and human capital models.  This suggests that the two sets of proxy 
variables are capturing different elements of the wage function rather than jointly 
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measuring the same element.  For instance, health stock could be correlated with the 
same unobservable attributes (e.g., time-preference or motivation) that are intended to be 
captured by the proxy for human capital.  If this were the case then lost wages 
attributable to lower health would not be recoverable through health intervention, since 
the underlying individual traits causing the health disparities would remain.  However, 
the health variables do not seem to be capturing the same unobservable attributes 
supposed to be captured by the human capital model, suggesting that employee 
productivity could be enhanced if employee health was improved. 
Although the remaining female wage penalty and male wage premium are 
statistically insignificant, the sign and magnitude of the estimates are not inconsistent 
with the previous literature, suggesting that meaningful unexplained wage differences 
may still exist between obese and normal-weight employees.  Consistent with prior 
research, I next consider the possibility that the remaining differences in wages may be 
attributable to discrimination.   
6.3 Discrimination 
This section utilizes three approaches to test for two possible sources of 
discrimination.  The first two approaches use work group-level measures to test for 
coworker discrimination.  Work group-level measures include the proportion of obese 
coworkers in an employee’s work group, and the proportion of the work group of 
opposite gender in each employee’s work group.60,61  Research has shown that 
                                                          
60 The sample mean of the work group characteristics is consistent with the sample mean of the 
characteristics themselves (i.e., the mean proportion of obese coworkers across work groups equals the 
proportion of the overall sample that is obese). 
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individuals are more likely to discriminate publicly when it is considered socially 
acceptable to do so (Crandall, Eshelman, & O’Brien, 2002).  Presumably as the 
proportion of obese workers in a work group increases, the acceptability of 
discrimination towards obese members of that work group will diminish.  The proportion 
of work group members of the opposite gender is also hypothesized to affect the 
probability of discrimination again obese employees, as social norms of body size may be 
enforced more rigidly by members of the same sex, or members of the opposite sex.  The 
peer discrimination models include an interaction between the indicators for 
overweight/obese and the measures of proportion opposite gender and proportion obese.  
This provides a test of whether the wage penalty varies based on either work group 
characteristic.  The third discrimination model utilizes work group fixed effects to test 
whether unobserved work group attributes are driving the wage penalty among obese 
workers.  Recall that each work group reports to a single manager.  Therefore key 
unobserved work group characteristics include the attributes of the manager and her or 
his potential attitude towards obese subordinates.  The first two discrimination models 
should account for the primary channels through which indirect, coworker discrimination 
would manifest.  Therefore the work group fixed effects model can be thought of as a 
manager fixed effects model that is able to account for direct supervisor discrimination.62  
                                                                                                                                                                             
61 An attempt was made to generate gender-specific obesity proportions, but there were several work 
groups that had only one male or female, making this approach infeasible. 
 
62 In order to compute work group-level fixed effects males and females are combined into a single 
regression.  This avoids dropping observations for individuals who do not have another member of the 
same gender in their work group (all observations belong to work groups of at least two individuals, but 
within gender-specific regressions several individuals do not have any other within-group observations to 
provide variation).  This strategy also boosts the number of observations per workgroup helping to alleviate 
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All models condition on the controls for human capital and health from the combined 
productivity model.   
 The results in Table 29 show that among females there is no evidence for 
coworker discrimination.  The proportion of male coworkers in a work group is 
insignificantly correlated with wages, and the coefficients on the interaction terms do not 
indicate that the relationship between work group gender composition and wages varies 
by BMI category.  Controlling for the proportion of obese coworkers in one’s work group 
reduces the observed wage penalty to zero, although this is not a significant change from 
the combined productivity specification.  The proportion of obese coworkers is 
insignificantly correlated with wages, and the coefficient for the obesity interaction is 
also insignificant.  Moreover, the sign of the interaction coefficient for both overweight 
and obese employees is the opposite of the hypothesized direction.  The wages for both 
obese and overweight females diminishes as the proportion of obese coworkers increase.   
Among males the proportion of females in the work group has no effect on the 
wage of overweight or obese males.  However, as the proportion of obese workers in a 
group increases, the wages of overweight and obese males actually fall significantly.  An 
obese male with no other obese group members earns a significant wage premium of 
approximately 12 percent, while obese males in a group comprised entirely of obese 
coworkers face a nearly 14 percent wage penalty.    
                                                                                                                                                                             
the potential incidental parameters problem that arises when using least squares dummy variables to 
estimate a nonlinear fixed effects model.  Heckman (1981) suggests that having 8 observations per unit is 
sufficient to mitigate the problem.  In the combined sample the average group size is 12, which should be 
sufficient to allow for consistent estimation of the parameter of interest (δ2).  Based on differences between 
coefficient estimates by gender in the previous regression analyses, gender-interactions are included for 
age, age2, tenure, tenure2, log C-reactive protein, log-cholesterol ratio, hypertension, and tiers 2 and 3, in 
addition to interactions for overweight and obese. 
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It is unclear what is causing this result.  If work groups comprised almost entirely 
of obese workers are less productive as a group, or reflect over-representation of obese 
employees in lower-paying positions, then higher proportions of obesity should be 
negatively correlated with wages among normal-weight workers as well, which is not 
what the model predicts.  An alternative explanation is that normal-weight workers are 
able to outperform more of their immediate peers if they are in a work group with a high 
proportion of obese coworkers.  If this were the case, then overweight workers should 
also perform better in comparison to obese employees.  However, the overweight 
interaction term is actually more negative than the obesity interaction for both males and 
females, suggesting that whatever factor is diminishing wages for heavier employees has 
a greater effect for overweight compared to obese employees.  While the underlying 
explanation for these results is uncertain, the direction of the effect does not suggest that 
indirect, peer-level discrimination is an issue within the sample.  I turn next to the 
possibility of supervisor discrimination. 
 Controlling for unobserved work group (manager) attributes decreases the wage 
premium among obese males from 4.5 percent to 3.9 percent.  The difference is 
statistically insignificant and the change in coefficient is the opposite direction to what 
would be expected if unobserved discrimination was occurring.  Controlling for work 
group fixed effects among female employees increases the magnitude of the wage penalty 
roughly 2.1 percentage points for obese employees.  This result is also insignificant and 
suggests that the coefficients from the pooled work group models are positively biased 
among females, which is the opposite of what would be expected if manager 
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discrimination was a dominant factor.  Ultimately, though the possibility of 
discrimination cannot be completely ruled out, the results from the previous analyses do 
not uncover any evidence in support of this hypothesis.   
7. Parenthood 
The final set of analyses investigates the possibility that the female wage penalty 
and male wage premium that remains unaccounted for may be attributable to parenthood.  
Although this is expected to affect females more than males, males are included in the 
analysis for comparison of the results.  To test this possibility I augment the health and 
human capital model with interactions between children and the overweight/obesity 
indicators.   
Including an interaction between children and obesity does not produce any 
significant results among males.  However, the results show a significant difference in the 
wage-obesity relationship between obese mothers and non-mothers.  Obese females 
appear to pay a significant penalty of over 5 percent for each additional child.  Obese 
females without children no longer face any wage penalty, and may in fact earn a wage 
premium.   The results appear to be nonlinear.  Obese mothers with one child face no 
penalty, while those with two children face a penalty of roughly 17%, and those with 
three or more children face a penalty of roughly 15% compared to normal weight 
mothers.  These results do not hold for overweight females, who face no additional wage 
penalty for fertility.  Moreover, overweight females without children continue to incur a 
wage penalty of approximately 4 percent, although the estimate remains insignificant. 
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 The difference in wages between obese mothers and non-mothers likely has a 
straightforward explanation.  Non-mothers may have a preference for market production 
over non-market production.  Or perhaps the absence of children allows obese non-
mothers to prioritize their careers, regardless of preference.  However, the discrepancy in 
wages between normal-weight and obese mothers is more unusual.   
The results indicate that there are important underlying differences between 
mothers who are obese and those who are not since there is no wage penalty associated 
with children among normal-weight mothers.  This may suggest underlying differences in 
productivity that are not captured by other control variables.  For example, females who 
are more efficient at work may also receive greater returns to investment in health and 
thus be less likely to become obese.  It is also possible that the underlying differences 
between obese and normal-weight mothers is a manifestation of differences in human 
capital accumulation, although accounting for the distinction between staff and senior 
employees cannot account for the wage penalty attributed to obese mothers.  It may also 
be the case that obese mothers are more likely to be single mothers, which may influence 
both body mass and productivity.  However, controlling for single-motherhood does not 
significantly change the coefficient on the child-obesity interaction, suggesting that 
having a spouse present is not the primary factor that differentiates obese mothers from 
normal-weight mothers.  The result is also not attributable to a wage penalty that is 
increasing in BMI.  Obese Mothers with two children have the same mean BMI as those 
with one child.  Although obese mothers with three or more children have a slightly 
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higher BMI (1.5 units) compared to those with only one child, all obese mothers have a 
lower mean BMI than non-mothers (Appendix H). 
The one outstanding characteristic of obese mothers who are penalized is their 
age.  On average, obese mothers with two children are five years older than normal-
weight mothers with two children (48 vs. 43).  The same pattern holds among mothers 
with three or more children (52 vs. 47), and in both cases the difference is statistically 
significant.  Obese mothers with one child (who face no wage penalty) are not 
significantly older.  Although data are not available for all children, the age of the 
youngest child among obese mothers is, on average, five years older than that for normal-
weight mothers.  This suggests that obese mothers have older children at home rather 
than the possibility that obese females delay having children.  Findings from the labor 
literature regarding the motherhood wage penalty indicate that the penalty may fade with 
time (Baum, 2003; Buligescu, de Crombrughe, Mentesoglu, & Montizaan, 2009), which 
suggests that normal weight mothers, with younger children, should have a higher penalty 
compared to older (obese) mothers rather than no penalty.  It is possible that the negative 
health associated with obesity does not begin to have adverse effects on productivity until 
a more advanced age.  Yet, obese non-mothers also have an average age of 47, roughly 
equivalent to obese mothers with two children.  It also does not appear that having 
children significantly reduces health among obese females (Appendix H), although it is 
possible that the dual burden of childrearing and low average health are what cause 
productivity to be reduced.  However, this cannot be conclusively demonstrated in the 
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current data, and the exact mechanism underlying this result remains an issue for future 
research. 
8. Conclusion 
 Consistent with previous literature I find a significant negative relationship 
between wages and obesity among females.  I also find that obese males earn a wage 
premium, although this result is not significant.  To explain these results, I test for 
differences in productivity between obese and normal-weight employees.  I find evidence 
that human capital accumulation and health are both confounding the wage-obesity 
relationship, although neither factor can account for the full difference in wages between 
obese and non-obese employees.  Results suggest that differences in measured health are 
not attributable to unobserved individual attributes that are correlated with wages (e.g., 
time-preference, ambition), which suggests that a substantial portion of productivity 
losses attributable to obese workers may be recoverable through appropriate health 
intervention.   
I find no evidence for peer or supervisor discrimination among males or females.  
Subsequent analyses indicate that obese females with children are the primary recipients 
of the wage-penalty for obesity in the sample.  Obese mothers incur a significant wage 
penalty of roughly 5 percent per additional child, on average.  Estimates also suggest that 
obese females without children may actually earn more than normal-weight females, 
although this result is not statistically significant.   
The wage difference between obese mothers and normal-weight mothers may be 
attributable to unobserved differences in productivity.  However, this discrepancy cannot 
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be ascribed to human capital accumulation, delayed child-bearing, or single-
parenthood.63  Uncovering the exact mechanism driving the productivity difference 
between obese and normal-weight females is a promising avenue for future research: a 
better understanding of this mechanism could yield valuable information for employers 
or policymakers wishing to improve maternal health and well-being. 
These results may also inform research on women’s wages in other branches of 
the literature.  For instance, the motherhood wage penalty established in the labor 
literature (see Budig & England, 2001) may fall more heavily on obese than normal-
weight women.  Lastly, these results may provide guidance for future wage-obesity 
analyses at the national level.  If the frequently observed wage penalty for obese women 
is primarily attributable to obese mothers across region and industry, this may provide 
justification for public policy aimed at promoting maternal health.  Such policy could 
help to recover some of the lost productivity and medical spending currently attributable 
to obesity. 
  
                                                          
63 Although without a full panel of adulthood it is impossible to account for past spells of single-
motherhood that may have affected investments in health or interruptions in work experience. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
EXPECTED VALUE OF UNOBSERVED CONFOUNDER IN CONWAY-
MAXWELL POISSON DISTRIBUTION 
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When a and b are negative and positive infinity (respectively), the second multiplicand is 
1, proving the result. 
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EXPECTED VALUE OF UNOBSERVED CONFOUNDER IN 
(APPROXIMATED) CONWAY-MAXWELL POISSON DISTRIBUTION 
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When a and b are negative and positive infinity (respectively), the second multiplicand is 
1, proving the result. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
COMPARISON OF THE APPROXIMATED AND “TRUE” TREATMENT 
EFFECTS FOR THE CMP 
 
 
As discussed in Section 1 there are two expressions for the conditional mean of Y in the 
CMP specification.  The approximated value is expressed as 
 
E[Y|X, ν] =  λ1/ν −
v − 1
2ν
 
 
 
whereas the “true” conditional mean can be expressed as 
 
E[Y|X, ν] =  λ�
∑ jλ
j−1
(j!)ν
∞
j=1
∑ λ
j
(j!)ν
∞
j=0
�. 
 
 
Using the approximation typically results in additional bias of both the estimated 
treatment effect derived from the conditional expectation, and of the expectation itself.  
Comparison of the two methods is presented in the following tables.  Absolute percentage 
bias is reported in parentheses.  Mean squared error is shown in brackets for the estimated 
treatment effects. 
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Comparison of Estimated Y with Positive Dependence 
  
Model 
 
Actual Value 
“True” 
estimate 
 
Approximation 
Endogenous 
Treatment 
CMP 3.13 3.05 (2.33) 
2.91 
(6.84) 
NB 3.00 2.53 (15.65) 
2.50 
(16.65) 
RGP 3.00 2.97 (1.30) 
2.91 
(3.07) 
Endogenous 
Sample 
Selection 
CMP 3.13 3.05 (2.70) 
2.93 
(6.42) 
NB 3.00 3.49 (14.06) 
3.40 
(10.75) 
RGP 3.00 3.50 (13.95) 
3.38 
(10.31) 
 
 
Comparison of Estimated Y with Negative Dependence 
  
Model 
 
Actual Value 
“True” 
estimate 
 
Approximation 
Endogenous 
Treatment CMP 3.03 
2.90 
(2.57) 
3.62 
(21.52) 
Endogenous 
Sample 
Selection 
CMP 3.03 3.03 (1.98) 
3.23 
(8.30) 
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Comparison of Estimated ATE with Positive Dependence 
  
Model 
 
Actual Value 
“True” 
estimate 
 
Approximation 
Endogenous 
Treatment 
CMP .917 
.921 
(10.95) 
[.024] 
.770 
(16.97) 
[.042] 
NB .826 
.661 
(19.95) 
[.092] 
0.655 
(20.69) 
[.037] 
RGP .826 
.758 
(11.31) 
[.249] 
0.743 
(12.23) 
[.230] 
Endogenous 
Sample 
Selection 
CMP .917 
.925 
(8.05) 
[.015] 
.774 
(15.90) 
[.033] 
NB .826 
.964 
(17.22) 
[.557] 
.936 
(14.34) 
[.026] 
RGP .826 
.793 
(7.60) 
[.184] 
.923 
(13.65) 
[.025] 
 
 
Comparison of Estimated ATE with Negative Dependence 
  
Model 
 
Actual Value 
“True” 
estimate 
 
Approximation 
Endogenous 
Treatment CMP 0.766 
.939 
(24.21) 
[.292] 
1.13 
(48.92) 
[.143] 
Endogenous 
Sample 
Selection 
CMP 0.766 
.793 
(7.60) 
[.184] 
0.829 
(10.70) 
[.013] 
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While the comparison tables suggest that the approximation performs worst when the 
data are CMP distributed, a closer look at the data generating processes paints a slightly 
different picture.  The CMP data with positive dependence were generated using ν = 
0.281.  The estimated dispersion parameter values for the NB and RGP models were 
roughly 0.9 and 0.8, respectively.  This suggests that the approximation breaks down 
when the positive dependence becomes too great, rather than being specific to a particular 
specification.  The results from the tables of negative dependence also suggest the 
approximation does not perform well when the counts are negatively dependent.  It is 
unclear at what level of positive dependence the approximations begin to increase 
substantially in bias, but it is recommended that the “true” conditional mean be used to 
produce estimates for any data that reject a standard Poisson distribution as the baseline 
specification (i.e., ν̂  is significant). 
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APPENDIX C 
 
MEANS FROM THE SUBSTANCE ABUSE LITERATURE 
 
 
Study Outcome Measure Means 
Atella and Deb (2008) Primary care visits last 4 weeks 0.235 
 
Public specialist visits last 4 
weeks 0.096 
 
Private specialist visits last 4 
weeks 0.136 
Ayyagari et al. (2011) Drinks per day 0.68 
Bauer, Gohlmann, and 
Sinning (2007) Cigarettes per Day 3.63–8.10 
Birch, Eyles, and Newbold 
(1993) Physician visits last year 2.79 
Brown, Scheffler, Seo, and 
Reed (2006) Cigarettes per month 99.38 
Davalos, Fang, and French 
(2012) 
Days of binge drinking last 
year 12.8 
Deb and Holmes (2000) Mental health visits last year 3.88 
Deb and Trivedi (2002) Physician visits last year 2.861 
 Outpatient visits last year 3.546 
Deb et al. (2006) Physician visits last year 2.83–3.56 
 Non-physician visits last year 0.18–1.87 
 ER visits last year 0.13–0.28 
Deb and Trivedi (2008) Physician visits last year 3.52 
 Non-physician visits last year 0.26 
 Surgery last year 0.18 
 ER visits last year 0.26 
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Study Outcome Measure Means 
 
Inpatient hospital visits last 
year 0.11 
Decker et al. (2011) Inpatient hospital visits last year 0.18–0.28 
Farbmacher (2012) Physician visits last three months 1.325 
Gerdtham (1997) Physician visits last year 2.06 
 Weeks in hospital 0.3 
Gerdtham and Trivedi 
(2001) Physician visits last year 2.06 
 Weeks in hospital last year 0.3 
Greene (2009) Physician visits last three months 3.18 
 Hospital visits last year 0.14 
Grootendorst (1995) Prescription drugs in last month 2.02–2.11 
Gupta and Greeve (2011) Physician visits last year 5.19 
Gustavsen, Nagya, and Wu 
(2010) Physician visits last year 4.03 
Hyppolite and Trivedi 
(2012) Physician visits last year 2.35–2.66 
Jimenez-Martin, Labeaga, 
and Martinez-Granado 
(2002) 
Physician visits last year 3.39–3.53 
 Specialist visits last year 1.07 
Jochman and Leon-
Gonzalez (2004) 
Physician visits last four 
months 4.12 
Lee and Kobayashi (2001) Physician visits last year 3.34–3.64 
 Hospital visits last year 0.60–0.65 
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Lourenco and Ferreira 
(2005) Physician visits last year 5.52 
Madden, Nolan, and Nolan 
(2005) Physician visits last year 2.30–6.50 
McLeod (2011) Physician visits last year 3.26 
Meyerhoeffer and Zuvekas 
(2009) Physician visits last year 2.76 
 Mental health visits last year 0.23 
Moreira and Barros (2010) Physician visits last three months 1.01 
Mullahy (1998) Physician visits last year 4.91 
Nolan (2007) Physician visits last year 3.4 
Ovrum (2004) Physician visits last year 4.94 
Saez et al. (2006) Physician visits last year 1.00–1.33 
 Specialist visits last year 1.13–1.31 
Sari (2009) Physician visits last year 3.03–3.68 
 Specialist visits last year 0.68–0.85 
 
Inpatient hospital visits last 
year 0.40–0.82 
Sarma and Simpson (2006) Physician visits last year 3.49 
 Specialist visits last year 0.72 
 
Inpatient hospital visits last 
year 0.62 
Schellhorn (2001) Physician visits last year 2.15–2.77 
 Specialist visits last year 1.12–2.19 
Shafrin (2010) Inpatient surgery last year 0.50 
 Outpatient surgery last year 1.37 
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Sheu et al. (2004) Cigarettes per day among daily smokers 16.10 
Windmeijer and Silva 
(1997) Physician visits last month 0.40 
Winkelmann (2004) Physician visits last year 2.39–2.69 
Winkelmann (2006) Physician visits last three months 2.46–2.96 
Van Ourti (2004) Physician visits last year 4.94 
Yen and Jones (1996) Cigarettes per day among daily smokers 9.38 
Yen, Tang, and Su (2001) Traditional medicine visits per month 0.22 
Zhong (2010) Physician visits last month 0.40 
 Inpatient days last year 0.06 
Zimmer and Trivedi (2006) Physician visits last year 2.33–3.92 
 Specialist visits last year 1.03–1.70 
 ER visits last year 0.10–0.11 
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APPENDIX D 
 
CRITERIA FOR MARIJUANA DEPENDENCE OR ABUSE 
 
 
Dependence: 
 
1. Spent a great deal of time over a period of a month getting, using, or getting over 
the effects of substance 
2. Unable to keep set limits on substance use or used more often than intended. 
3. Needed to use substance more than before to get desired effects or noticed that 
using the same amount had less effect than before. 
4. Unable to cut down or stop using the substance every time he or she tried or 
wanted to. 
5. Continued to use substance even though it was causing problems with emotions, 
nerves, mental health, or physical problems. 
6. Reduced or gave up participation in important activities due to substance. 
 
Abuse: 
 
1. Respondent reported having serious problems due to substance use at home, 
work, or school. 
2. Respondent reported using substance regularly and then did something where 
substance use might have put them in physical danger. 
3. Respondent reporting substance use causing actions that repeatedly got them in 
trouble with the law. 
4. Respondent reported having problems caused by substance use with family or 
friends and continued to use substance even though it was thought to be causing 
problems with family and friends.  
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APPENDIX E 
 
CORRECTION OF SECOND-STAGE STANDARD ERRORS TO ACCOUNT 
FOR FIRST-STAGE ESTIMATION OF RELEVANT PARAMETERS 
(TERZA, 2012) 
 
 
Let q represent the function that is to be optimized in the second-stage (the square of the 
residuals in the case of NLS).  Then define the following: 
 
∇δq = gradient of the second-stage optimization function with respect to the first-stage 
estimates 
∇βq = gradient of the second-stage optimization function with respect to the second-stage 
estimates 
∇δβq = cross-partial derivative of second-stage optimization function with respect to the 
first and second-stage estimates 
∇ββq = Hessian matrix of the second-stage optimization function 
Ω1 = variance-covariance matrix from estimation of first-stage 
Ω2 = variance-covariance matrix from estimation of second-stage 
 
When the second stage is estimated via NLS, as in the present case, the corrected 
variance-covariance matrix Ω* can be computed as: 
 
Ω* = E[∇ββq]-1E[∇δβq]’Ω1E[∇δβq] E[∇ββq]-1 + Ω2 
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APPENDIX F 
 
MISSING AND IMPUTED DATA 
 
 
Omitted Observations 
Reason Omitted Females Males 
Salary nonresponse 19 (5.9%) 36 (7.2%) 
BMI nonresponse 6   (2.0%) 5   (1.1%) 
TOTAL 25 (7.9%) 41 (8.4%) 
Note. Values in parentheses refer to percentage of original (full) sample dropped for each reason  
 
Observations were dropped from the analysis sample if respondents did not 
provide their salary or a BMI value.  Nineteen females and 36 males failed to provide 
salary data.  This represents approximately 6 percent of all females and 7 percent of all 
males.  Six females and five males failed to provide their BMI.  This represents 2 percent 
of females and 1 percent of males.  Among the remainder of the control variables in 
Model (1) no nonresponses are recorded.  The following table reports differences in 
means between non-respondents and respondents.  On average, non-responding females 
have less tenure, and are more likely to be nonwhite or foreign. Male non-respondents 
also have less tenure, and more likely to be nonwhite or foreign.  They are also 
significantly younger, on average.  These marginal differences do not suggest that weight 
or salary-level are correlated with item non-response.   
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Summary Statistics for Observations with Omitted Data 
 Females Males 
 Omitted Retained Omitted Retained 
Married or 
Cohabitating 
60.00% 
(0.50) 
70.85% 
(0.46) 
85.37% 
(0.34) 
84.74% 
(0.36) 
Total Number of 
Children 
1.52 
(1.45) 
1.63 
(1.24) 
1.61 
(1.28) 
1.64 
(1.43) 
Nonwhite 36.00%
* 
(0.49) 
24.07% 
(0.43) 
48.78%* 
(0.49) 
29.20% 
(0.46) 
Born Abroad 32.00%
* 
(0.48) 
19.32% 
(0.40) 
53.65%* 
(0.53) 
31.89% 
(0.44) 
College Graduate 
(4-year) 
76.00% 
(0.44) 
66.44% 
(0.47) 
88.80% 
(0.32) 
83.63% 
(0.37) 
Age 46.52 (12.56) 
46.88 
(8.38) 
41.95* 
(9.20) 
45.12 
(8.70) 
Tenure with Firm 
(years) 
11.12* 
(10.87) 
16.04 
(9.94) 
8.80* 
(8.60) 
12.07 
(8.16) 
Support Personnel 12.00% (0.33) 
5.76% 
(0.23) 
9.75% 
(0.30) 
6.86% 
(0.25) 
Staff 24.00% (0.44) 
36.27% 
(0.48) 
29.27% 
(0.46) 
33.41% 
(0.47) 
Senior 64.00% (0.50) 
57.97% 
(0.49) 
60.98% 
(0.49) 
59.73% 
(0.49) 
* Indicates significant difference in means between omitted and retained observations (p < 0.1).  
 Omitted observations were left out of the sample due to missing salary or missing BMI. 
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Comparison of Means Between Imputed and Reported Health Variables 
 Females Males 
 Imputed Non-imputed Imputed Non-imputed 
C-Reactive 
Protein 
1.65* 
(2.10) 
[15] 
3.14 
(4.42) 
[280] 
1.88 
(0.84) 
[34] 
1.87 
(2.41) 
[418] 
Cholesterol 
Ratio 
3.76 
(0.25) 
[30] 
3.88 
(1.15) 
[265] 
4.48 
(0.26) 
[58] 
4.47 
(1.44) 
[394] 
Heart Rate 
73.40 
(0.43) 
[2] 
72.35 
(11.14) 
[293] 
68.85 
(3.88) 
[4] 
69.76 
(11.38) 
[448] 
Standard errors in parenthesis. N in brackets. 
* Indicates significant difference between imputed and non-imputed means (p < 0.1). 
 
 
Among control variables the only item non-response occurred among biological 
measures that proxy for cardiovascular health.  Due to the relatively high number of non-
responses values were imputed for missing observations rather than dropping the entire 
observation from the sample.  Imputation followed the modified regression-based EM 
algorithm detailed in Cameron and Trivedi (2005) Section 27.5 (pp. 931–932).  X1 refers 
to control variables for observations with no missing responses.  X2 indicates control 
variables for observations with a missing response for one of the above biological 
variables.  There are N1 complete observations and N2 incomplete observations.  The 
algorithm is as follows: 
 
1. Estimate β� using the N1 complete observations. 
2. Estimate 𝑠2 using only N1 complete observations. 
3. Generate N2 estimates of the missing values:𝑦�MIS = X2β� 
4. Estimate 𝑉� [𝑦�MIS] = 𝑠2(𝐼𝑁2+ X2[X1ʹX1]-1X2ʹ) 
5. Generate adjusted values 𝑦𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑎� = (𝑉�
-1/2𝑦�MIS) ° um where um is a Monte Carlo draw 
from the N(0, s2) distribution and ° denotes element by element multiplication. 
6. Using the augment sample (y1 and 𝑦𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑎� )obtain a revised estimate of β� . 
7. Repeat steps 1-6 using the revised β� in step 1 for each iteration. 
 
Consistent with Aitkin and Aitkin (1996), this algorithm is cycled until the difference 
between successive log likelihood values is less than 10-5 
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The Relationship Between Wages and Obesity with Standard Control Variables 
Weighted for Nonresponse 
 Female (n = 295) Male (n = 452) 
Obese -0.065
** 
(0.033) 
0.039 
(0.025) 
Overweight -0.051 (0.034) 
-0.004 
(0.022) 
Married or Cohabitating 0.027 (0.032) 
0.017 
(0.026) 
Total Number of Children -0.002 (0.012) 
0.008 
(0.008) 
Nonwhite -0.055
* 
(0.030) 
-0.025 
(0.025) 
Born Abroad 0.030 (0.034) 
0.037 
(0.026) 
College Graduate (4-year) 0.054
** 
(0.025) 
0.060* 
(0.033) 
Age (10 years) 0.305
** 
(0.124) 
0.337*** 
(0.093) 
Age Squared (100 squared years) -0.029
** 
(0.014) 
-0.032*** 
(0.011) 
Tenure with Firm (10 years) -0.148
*** 
(0.062) 
-0.027 
(.043) 
Tenure Squared (100 squared years) 0.039
*** 
(0.015) 
0.012 
(0.011) 
Core (Staff and Senior) 0.208
** 
(0.078) 
0.229*** 
(0.038) 
Note. Dependent variable is hourly wages. The overweight and obese coefficients report wages relative to 
normal-weight employees (BMI < 25).  Estimates are obtained using a generalized linear model with a log 
link function. The model includes indicators for worksite, state, and job category. Standard errors are 
clustered at the work group level and reported in parentheses.  
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.5, *** p < 0.1  
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APPENDIX G 
 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
 
Returns to Job Tenure Among Obese Employees 
 Female (n = 295) Male (n = 452) 
 Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic 
Obese * Tenure  
(Years) 
0.005 
(0.030) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.009 
(0.027) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
Obese * Tenure2 
(10 years)  
0.008 
(0.094)  
0.081 
(0.092) 
Note. Dependent variable is hourly wage.  Estimates are obtained using a generalized linear model with a 
log link function.  Models control for employee’s state, site, age, age2, race, nativity, marital status, number 
of children, job category, and an indicator for core vs. support employee, unless reported otherwise.  All 
models also contain an indicator for overweight and all interactions are interacted with overweight.  The 
normal-weight category therefore serves as the point of reference for all obesity and obesity-interaction 
coefficients.  Standard errors are clustered at the work group level and reported in parentheses.  
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.5, *** p < 0.1 
 
Nonlinear Wage Penalty of Children 
 Female (n = 295) Male (n = 452) 
Obese 0.062 (0.051) 
0.036 
(0.049) 
Obese * 1 Child 0.007 (0.068) 
0.010 
(0.059) 
Obese * 2 Children -0.171
*** 
(0.060) 
0.026 
(0.0960) 
Obese * 3+ Children -0.150
** 
(0.064) 
-0.050 
(0.061) 
Note. Dependent variable is hourly wage.  Estimates are obtained using a generalized linear model with a 
log link function .  Models control for employee’s state, site, age, age2, race, nativity, marital status, 
number of children, and job category, and an indicator for core vs. support employee, unless reported 
otherwise.  All models also contain an indicator for overweight and all interactions are interacted with 
overweight.  The normal-weight category therefore serves as the point of reference for all obesity and 
obesity-interaction coefficients.  Standard errors are clustered at the work group level and reported in 
parentheses.  
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.5, *** p < 0.1 
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APPENDIX H 
 
ADDITIONAL FEMALE SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
 
BMI of Obese Females by Number of Children 
No Children (n = 24) 37.71 (5.93) 
1 Child (n = 12) 34.99 (4.12) 
2 Children (n = 33) 34.95 (4.02) 
3+ Children (n = 56) 35.56 (5.80) 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses 
 
Age of Obese Mothers Compared to Obese Non-Mothers and Normal-weight Mothers 
 Obese Normal Weight 
No Children 47.04 (6.36) 45.52 (10.51) 
1 Child 44.75 (6.45) 45.76 (9.31) 
2 Children 48.06** (8.75) 43.25 (7.91) 
3+ Children 51.38* (7.01) 47.09 (9.71) 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses 
* Indicates obese mothers significantly older than normal-weight mothers at 10% significance level 
** Indicates obese mothers significantly older than normal-weight mothers at 5% significance level 
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Health Status of Obese Females by Number of Children 
 No Children 1 Child 2 Children 3+ Children 
C-Reactive Protein 6.57 (5.43) 7.85 (4.59) 3.93 (3.03)* 6.32 (9.91) 
Cholesterol Ratio 4.17 (0.65) 3.97 (1.25) 4.17 (1.50) 4.18 (1.03) 
Hypertension 0.33 (0.48) 0.42 (0.52) 0.36 (0.49) 0.65 (0.49)* 
Heart Rate (BPM) 71.86 (12.85) 78.25 (10.40) 73.31 (13.43) 73.66 (11.43) 
Physical Function 88.43 (13.40) 93.51 (11.56) 84.51 (22.81) 86.23 (15.70) 
Heavy Snoring 0.33 (0.48) 0.42 (0.51) 0.39 (0.50) 0.48 (0.51) 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses 
* Indicates significant difference in health measure between mothers and non-mothers at 5% level 
 
